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ABSTRACT 
 
Misconceptions on affordability remain a barrier to postsecondary access for millions of 
potential students. When students recognize financial aid availability during secondary school 
years, they gain the capability to better establish a curricular path that aligns with postsecondary 
aspirations. This dissertation assesses the use of residency-based financial aid programs and 
parents’ college assets as methods to generate early information on postsecondary affordability.  
Following a three-paper format, the first paper develops a typology organizing the growing 
number of residency-based “Promise” programs around the country. The typology captures 
variations in the geographic scope for eligibility, supplementary qualifications, funding sources, 
value, and redeeming criteria to generate a description and list of comparable programs. 
Identifying program comparability is a necessary step for research examining program outcomes. 
The first paper uses a cluster analysis methodology to identify programs comparable based on 
the advertised operational characteristics. I find three distinctly different groups of residency-
based financial aid programs, which I term state-based aid programs, institutionally funded 
programs, and community-sustained programs. The typology is extended to identify the specific 
operational characteristics for which residency-based, community-sustained financial aid 
programs differ. The second paper uses a unique institutional-level dataset and quasi-
experimental Difference-in-Difference design to examine changes in college readiness, 
postsecondary outcomes, and curriculum decisions resulting from the residency-based, 
community-sustained Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship. The award guarantees all Meridian 
High School students last-dollar funding for unmet need at Richland Community College. I find 
that information about Carroll Scholarship eligibility increases the college-readiness levels 
among high-achieving high school graduates who elect to enroll at Richland. After enrollment, 
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all Carroll-eligible students register for, and earn, a statistically significant increased number of 
credit hours. I also find evidence that the Carroll Scholarship impacts student’s curriculum 
selection. The final paper uses a quantitative, quasi-experimental design of the nationally 
representative Education Longitudinal Study of 2002. Propensity Score Matching models are 
used to estimate different parents’ college asset savings strategies impacts the likelihood of a 
child enrolling in postsecondary education after completing high school. I find an enrollment 
association from parent’s postsecondary savings across different socioeconomic and 
sociodemographic groups. The models evaluate student responsiveness differences based on 
socioeconomics, race, and ethnicity, and control for secondary school academic achievement and 
the amount saved.  
 
Keywords: higher education; financial aid; Promise programs; place-based aid; universal 
eligibility; parent college assets; postsecondary savings; quasi-experimental design; propensity 
score matching; difference-in-difference 
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Paper One: A Typology of Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs 
Sparked by the announcement of the Kalamazoo Promise in 2005, an increasing number 
of communities have established financial aid programs aimed at providing postsecondary access 
to all students residing within a specified geographic boundary. The programs typically award 
aid without an individual selection process or considering student characteristics, such as 
financial need or academic merit. Instead, the promise of financial aid is based on residency 
requirements easily interpreted by students and their family, such as longevity within the school 
district. This format for financial aid has drawn a number of different monikers among 
researchers, most commonly, Promise programs, place-based aid, universally eligible, and early 
commitment programs (Andrews, 2013; Blanco, 2009; Daun-Barnett, 2011; Miller-Adams, 
2015; Schwartz, 2008). Prior literature on residency-based aid programs have not addressed 
questions regarding program comparability; for instance, whether state-based programs and 
institutional aid should be used as a comparative measure for outcomes. This typology makes a 
unique contribution to the literature by examining a list of financial aid programs and applying 
multiple cluster analysis methodologies to identify which programs are sufficiently similar for 
comparative purposes.  
Residency-based aid programs can help students navigate information barriers associated 
with estimating higher education’s cost of attendance (Ash & Ritter, 2014; Bartik, Hershbein, & 
Lachowska, 2015; Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Hershbein, 2013; Penn, 2012). Incomplete and 
inaccurate information on postsecondary affordability is a substantial barrier to postsecondary 
access for millions of potential college students (Heller; 2006; Perna, 2006; Kelchen & Goldrick-
Rab, 2013). The close proximity of a local residency-based aid program creates a clear and direct 
network for students to receive personalized information on eligibility. When a student is able to 
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continuously reassess their estimated aid award, using the program’s transparent eligibility 
criterion, students receive information on postsecondary affordability in advance of the normal 
financial aid process, the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Providing early 
awareness of postsecondary affordability is credited with prompting students to make college-
going decisions earlier in high school, improving students’ efforts toward academic performance, 
and broadening students’ postsecondary institutional choice, to name a few immediate effects 
(Ash & Ritter, 2014; Bartik, Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015; Carruthers & Fox, 2016; 
Hershbein, 2013; Penn, 2012).  
The benefits cited above are drawn from a body of literature that examines the impact of 
a handful of residency-based financial aid programs. However, as a whole, there has been a lack 
of research examining the impact of multiple programs from this budding format of financial aid. 
One reason for the limited amount of research is that a residency stipulation for financial aid is 
vague and does not address other potential differences among programs. For instance, a program 
described as residency-based does not speak to how researchers should qualify the geographic 
range of location, characterize programs with non-residency-based eligibility requirements (for 
instance, minimum grade point average), categorize programs with different maximum aid 
amounts, or represent programs that limit the number of redeemable institutions. The individual 
choices made by researchers to address these comparability questions results in new knowledge 
on program outcomes, but only within the narrow focus of how the author addressed program 
comparability. For example, Andrews (2013) compares Georgia’s HOPE scholarship and the 
Kalamazoo Promise based on the relatively equal-sized aid awards, yet the two programs have 
dissimilar eligibility characteristics. Georgia’s program uses a state-based residency requirement 
and provides 90% tuition coverage to all students who graduate high school with a 3.5 grade 
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point average or above (Long, 2004). Kalamazoo is a locally funded program that provides a 
varying range of tuition coverage based solely on the number of years a student attended the 
city’s public schools (Miller-Adams, 2015). Comparing the two programs may be appropriate for 
some research, but fundamentally the programs differ in substantial ways like providing students 
information on postsecondary affordability.  
The typology presented here fills a gap in the literature by examining the distinction 
among residency-based financial aid programs under a new focus − the connection between 
residency-based aid programs and providing students information on postsecondary access and 
affordability. This typology makes two major contributions. First, I use cluster analysis to create 
multiple groups of residency-based aid programs using the characteristics from each program’s 
individual operating procedures. I define operation procedures as the decisions made by 
programs, and advertised to students, regarding the process for distributing financial aid. 
Operating procedures include decisions on how to define residency, to what extent non-
residency-based eligibility criteria are used, the process for determining aid awards, and the 
value of the aid award. The programs included in this research have all begun distributing 
financial aid prior to the 2016-2017 academic year. The second contribution of this typology is 
the descriptions it offers of the specific ways programs developed within local communities 
differ. Cluster analysis is a useful tool for identifying groups of programs comparable overall; 
however, one limitation of cluster analysis is its inability to distinguish where programs within a 
group have variation. For this reason, I extend the typology to include a more in-depth 
examination of the range of program variation among community-sustained programs.  
This typology does not intend to organize the existing research on residency-based aid 
programs; rather, the purpose is to illustrate the similarities and differences among programs that 
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use a residency requirement for financial aid eligibility. The resultant list of comparable 
programs can be used as the foundation for future research centered on residency-based aid 
programs and student information on postsecondary access and affordability. Formally, the 
research question in this study is:  
1.) How can differences in residency-based financial aid programs be categorized to 
identify meaningful program variability in a typology?  
 
Next, I give background to the growth of residency-based aid programs, from early 
examples of residency-based aid programs through current national policy considerations. I 
include a description of how the expansion of programs fosters characteristics making different 
typologies necessary. Second, I review prior literature that defines the characteristics present in 
residency-based aid programs and other typologies that describe program classifications. Then, I 
describe the method used for acquiring a sample of residency-based aid programs, the dataset I 
create, and the cluster analysis methodology I use to group programs. Following the cluster 
analysis description, I detail the descriptive statistics of the groupings that are identified. Lastly, I 
describe the degree of program variability among community-sustained programs and 
demonstrate how spectrums provide a tool for researchers to assess comparability among 
individual programs.  
Background 
The expansion of residency-based aid programs has been sparked by the success of early 
examples such as the Kalamazoo Promise (Andrews, 2013). The Kalamazoo Promise is funded 
through contributions of anonymous donors and provides first-dollar aid award to Kalamazoo 
Public School (KPS) graduates. Kalamazoo does not use any selectivity metrics to determine 
eligibility; instead, aid award is determined using only a percentage scale derived from a 
student’s longevity in the city’s public schools. The award percentage equation is demonstrated 
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in Equation 1.1 The Kalamazoo Promise will pay 100% of tuition for students who matriculated 
from kindergarten through high school graduation. Students who enter between 1st and 3rd grades 
receive 95% tuition coverage, while students who enter later are eligible for 5% less for each 
year after 3rd grade they enter the school district. Students who enter during, or after, 10th grade 
are ineligible for any funding. Aid is redeemable at any public two- or four-year institution 
within the state of Michigan and private institutions at a prorated rate. 
 
Award percentage= {
100%, 𝑖𝑓 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑛
95%, 𝑖𝑓 1𝑠𝑡 ≤ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 ≤ 3𝑟𝑑 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
95% − 5% 𝑥 [𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 − 3], 𝑖𝑓 3𝑟𝑑 < 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 < 10𝑡ℎ 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒
 (1) 
 
 
Kalamazoo witnessed student input (i.e. effort) increases immediately after the program’s 
announcement. Students exhibited fewer behavior issues, increased enrollment in advanced 
placement courses, increased college aspirations, and demonstrated broader postsecondary 
institutional considerations (Andrews, DesJardins & Ranchhod, 2010; Bartik, Hershbein, & 
Lachowska, 2015; Miller-Adams, 2015). The benefits generated by the program extended 
beyond the KPS student population. Among the cited social benefits, the parents of KPS students 
increased their level of social involvement in the school district after the program was 
implemented, voters approved a bond mileage to fund two new school buildings in the district, 
commercial property value increased, and local businesses donated resources to establish an 
after-school tutoring center (Miller-Adams, 2015). The generosity of the program and the 
number of non-education-related social benefits are among the reasons why scholars, like 
Andrews (2013), call Kalamazoo the gold standard for place-based programs.  
                                                        
1 I use percentages in Equation 1 to demonstrate the magnitude of awards. A more accurate method of calculation is 
to convert the percentages to decimal form (dividing by 100). 
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The immediate returns observed in Kalamazoo prompted the development of similar 
programs across Michigan. The state of Michigan enacted tax legislation in 2008 to encourage 
10 new Promise Zone programs in low-socioeconomic areas (Miller-Adams, 2015). The 
Michigan Promise Zone Authority requires that the 10 communities collect the resources 
necessary to fund all eligible students for the first two years of the program (Miller-Adams, 
2015). After the two-year mark, the communities are qualified to receive state education tax 
appropriations to be used to fund future years (Miller-Adams, 2015).   
The national attention received by the Kalamazoo Promise coincides with a swell of new 
residency-based aid programs across the country. Communities began to develop their own 
Kalamazoo-type “Promise” programs, frequently using the word “Promise” in the program title. 
Cities of Promise (2016), an organization that consult on residency-based aid programs, list 
communities in 36 different states as operating or developing financial aid programs using 
residency-based eligibility stipulations. The range of locales that are developing programs 
extends from rural communities, such as Shelby, NC (population: 20,000), to large metropolitan 
locations, such as Pittsburgh, PA (population: 300,000) (Census Bureau, 2017).  
Basing financial aid awards on geographic residency has evolved into the idea of “free 
college” in a number of states. Oregon and Tennessee have passed state legislation designed to 
reduce the out-of-pocket cost associated with postsecondary enrollment, modeling their 
programs after community level programs. Bill Haslam was mayor of Knoxville when the 
Knoxville Achieves program (later to become tnAchieves) was developed (Fain, 2014). After 
winning the Governorship, Haslam used the model from Knox Achieves and the Ayers 
Foundation Scholarship (another local program) as the basis for the statewide Tennessee Promise 
(Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Fain, 2014). The Tennessee Promise legislation was passed in 2014 
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and commits to cover the cost of attendance at any of the state’s 39 two-year institutions 
(community colleges or applied technology colleges) for all graduates of Tennessee high 
schools. Like Tennessee, the Oregon Promise is a statewide program for students enrolling at in-
state two-year community colleges. The Oregon Promise has important distinctions. Students 
must graduate high school with a minimum 2.5 GPA (Oregon Promise, 2017). After one full year 
in operation, the Oregon Promise opted to make changes to the eligibility requirements. 
Beginning in Fall 2017, the Oregon Promise will contain a financial need provision where 
students must meet minimum Expected Family Contribution (EFC) requirements to earn 
eligibility (Theen, 2017). Arizona, California, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wisconsin have proposed 
legislation for similarly structured statewide financial aid programs (NCSL, 2016).  
The idea of a nationwide “free community college” initiative is also linked to residency-
based aid and is a point of debate in federal policy (Jesse, 2015; NCSL, 2016; White House, 
2015). In 2015, the administration of President Barack Obama began the push for tuition-free 
community colleges nationwide (White House, 2015). In a speech at Macomb Community 
College in Detroit, MI, President Obama attributed the growing number of residency-based aid 
programs as evidence that fiscal access to postsecondary education can create widespread social 
benefits (Jesse, 2015; White House, 2015). The idea of “free community college” extended into 
the 2016 presidential campaign trail for a number of candidates. Democratic candidate and 
Vermont State Senator Bernie Sanders proposed debt-free college education by eliminating 
tuition costs for all postsecondary institutions (Friends, 2016). Democratic candidate and Former 
First Lady Hillary Clinton proposed a program to offer states a monetary incentive to create 
tuition policies that eliminated the need for student loans (Douglas-Gabriel & Gearan, 2015).  
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As the number of programs that use a residency-based eligibility stipulation expand, 
research on program outcomes will become increasingly important for questions regarding 
academic, social, and fiscal benefits; however, not all programs are uniform. The rapid 
expansion of programs has led to a growing problem of program comparability, particularly as 
communities adopt unique eligibility stipulations beyond residency. Differences in the 
operational procedures of programs blur the line of what constitutes residency-based financial 
aid and programs that elect to award aid to students from within a specified geographic location. 
Four primary issues have arisen that make characterizing residency-based programs and 
identifying program comparability difficult for researchers.  
First, each residency-base program employs its own unique, limited set of resources to 
meet the community objective. Scarce resources (for example, available funding or fundraising 
capabilities) may mean that communities are forced to include additional eligibility 
qualifications beyond residency to reduce the number of eligible students (Mumper, 2003). 
Secondary qualifications can include minimum grade point average, maximum income 
thresholds, and institutional choice stipulations, among other things. The additional program 
characteristics allow the community to target a specific student demographic and control how 
many students will be eligible. From a student’s vantage point, increasing the number of 
secondary qualifications reduces the transparency for assessing eligibility. When students 
perceive uncertainty in earning eligibility, responsiveness can be negatively influenced (Daun-
Barnett, 2011; Doyle, 2008).  
Second, a large number of programs use residency-based stipulations and the label 
“Promise” interchangeably; however, the title “Promise” may not equate to a commitment for 
financial aid. One example is the Rockford (Illinois) Promise. Rockford’s program operates as a 
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lottery with a residency-based entrance criterion. Graduating students from any of the five 
Rockford public high schools become eligible after providing proof of submitting a FAFSA 
application and completing a Rockford Promise information application (Rockford 
Cosmopolitan Club, 2015). The award process is determined by a random drawing in the months 
prior to high school graduation. The lottery system used by Rockford is more akin to a selection 
process for aid award because eligibility does not guarantee aid. The aid award of one student 
(whose name is drawn during the lottery) comes at the expense of another student not being 
awarded aid. Despite being based on residency, the Rockford Promise does not provide students 
with early information on postsecondary affordability. 
Third, financial support and the specified geographic location for the award are only two 
ways the programs are designed to be community-centric. Program benefits ripple to non-
education-based aspects of the local economy. An increasing number of programs cite economic 
development as the primary objective and financial aid as the incentive. Residency-based 
financial aid programs are a fiscally efficient method to train the local labor force, because the 
value of social returns can outweigh local monetary contributions (Andrews, 2013). In addition, 
the creation of a residency-based aid program is connected to local economic development 
through increased consumer spending, population migration, and job creation (Bartik, Eberts, & 
Huang; 2010; Hershbein, 2013; LeGower & Walsh, 2014; Miller-Adams, 2015). Programs with 
an economic development objective may incorporate a different list of program characteristics 
relative to programs with the primary objective of financing postsecondary access with ancillary 
economic benefits. For example, the programs may not actually provide any financial aid dollars 
but instead provide services for applying for external financial aid. One such example is the 
10,000 Degrees Program in San Rafael, CA (10000 Degrees, 2016). A program modeled this 
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way does not provide the same type of information on postsecondary affordability to students, 
because an unknown third party controls the decision of aid award. 
Lastly, a number of programs extended eligibility beyond a single school district or city. 
The extended boundaries lead to questions for how to geographically define a “community”.  
Changing the geographic focal point of the program adds degrees of separation between students 
and the program’s stakeholders. This eliminates the clear and direct line of communication for 
students to receive personalized eligibility information. The ability to receive a clear 
commitment is an important benefit of community-developed programs. Pluhta and Penny 
(2013) state that a local commitment to fund postsecondary education is received by students 
differently than large-scale programs, for example, Pell grants. Access to a direct source of 
information reinforces a student’s confidence in earning eligibility and is the catalyst to all other 
benefits. 
A student who deems that higher education is not affordable alters his or her secondary 
school objectives and curricular choices. Heller describes this experience as cost discouragement 
(Goldrick-Rab, 2007; Glenn, 2004; Heller, 2006). Problems associated with postsecondary 
affordability extend beyond the amount of financial aid available to students, however. To 
acquire information on financial aid eligibility students must navigate barriers related to the 
limited time for gathering information on enrollment costs, the myriad of conditions used for 
financial aid eligibility, and the actually application process used to file for financial aid 
(Deming & Dynarski, 2009; Goldrick-Rab, 2012; Perna & Steele, 2011; Tierney & Venegas, 
2009). Residency-based aid programs have been identified as one method of financial aid that 
can be used to overcome the barriers to misinformation on affordability (Andrews, 2013; Blanco, 
2009; Harnisch, 2009; Schwartz, 2008; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). The following literature 
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review outlines these issues and how residency-based financial aid programs have been used to 
lessen the burdens associated with acquiring information on postsecondary affordability for 
students. 
Literature Review 
I start by reviewing literature describing student’s college choice decision-making 
process. Second, I describe issues related to acquiring information on postsecondary 
affordability, followed by a description of the application process for the federal financial aid, 
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Third, I identify circumstances that 
impact a student’s sensitivity to financial aid. Lastly, I describe prior research on defining 
residency-based financial aid programs and detail the existing research on program outcomes.  
College Choice. The examination of students’ college choice has relied on the theories of 
two different academic disciplines: Economics and Sociology. Early examination of the decision 
to pursue higher education was treated as a consumer choice model. Economics’ Human Capital 
Theory describes education as a student investing in his or her own intellectual capability leading 
to improved workforce productivity and higher workplace earnings (Becker, 1964; McMahon, 
2009). Human Capital-based enrollment models make the assumption that students compare the 
potential return on investment from additional education against all implicit and explicit costs of 
attendance. When the perception of returns outweighs the accumulated costs, Human Capital 
Theory predicts a student will act to maximize their individual wealth by pursuing additional 
academic credentials. 
Early sociological-based college choice models are different from Human Capital 
Theory. Sociological models consider what factors students use to make the college going 
decision and where a student accumulates information they use in making the decision. 
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Sociological-based models explain that student environment, background, and networks 
contribute to the decision to enroll. Bourdieu describes the amalgamation of environmental, 
social, and cultural forces as Habitus (Coleman, 1988; McDonough, 1997; Perna, 2006). In 
context to the college-going decision-making process, Habitus represents how students receive 
context on educational expectations based on experiences within their environment and through 
feedback obtained within their networks. The sociological perspective offers insight to why 
students from different racial and ethnic groups, unique upbringings, and dissimilar experiences 
may view the returns from education differently. Furthermore, it explains why students with 
varying level of resources may make different college going decisions.  
The work of Hossler & Gallagher (1987) is considered one of the first, and most 
frequently cited, comprehensive models that outline the process students navigate to make the 
decision to enroll in postsecondary education (Bergerson, 2009). It builds from existing 
frameworks by Chapman (1981), Jackson (1982), and Manski and Wise (1983). Hossler and 
Gallagher (1987) explain college choice as the way “students move toward an increased 
understanding of their educational options,” and how “individual and organizational factors 
interact” to contribute to the process (p. 208). Their model details student movement through 
three sequential stages: predisposition, search, and choice. The stages provide a linear framework 
for how students move from inquiring about postsecondary attendance, to a decision on 
enrollment, and if applicable, a decision on which institution to attend.   
One criticism of Hossler and Gallagher’s model is the failure to specifically include the 
influences of financial aid, financial aid accessibility, and price (tuition) sensitivities. Finances 
are embedded in multiple aspects of accessibility to higher education. St. John (2003) contends 
that a student must obtain financial access to higher education, as well as academic access. The 
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availability of resources has a profound influence on college going decisions, such as the 
selection on where to enroll and the quantity of education to pursue. To model this interaction, 
St. John (2003) introduces financial aid into a college choice model labeled Balanced Access. 
Affordability shapes postsecondary aspirations and a student’s level of academic preparation, in 
addition to the decision to enroll.  
DesJardin, Ahlburg & McCall (2006) argue that financial aid is incorrectly treated as an 
exogenous variable. Financial aid awards are strongly correlated with other socioeconomic 
factors that models are conditioned on (DesJardin, Ahlburg & McCall, 2006; St. John, 2003). 
Various student characteristics predict financial aid availability, intertwining the financial and 
sociological aspects of college choice. To capture this, the authors develop a model formulation 
that includes the probability of financial aid in the application and enrollment process.   
 A critique of early stepwise college choice models is a lack of explanatory power on the 
actual decision that students make, how transition occurs between stages, and a timeframe in 
which transitions occur. Cabrera and LaNasa (2000) take Hossler and Gallagher’s (1987) 
fundamental three-stage model and develop more clearly defined descriptions for when students 
advance through the model’s stages. The Cabrera and LaNasa (2000) model identifies 
characteristics that connect the stages, explain how students advance through the process, and 
define the time parameters for when each stage is likely to occur. The predisposition stage starts 
with parent’s motivational activities for students that usually occur in the pre-secondary 
schooling years of 7th and 8th grade. The search stage occurs later, between 10th and early in 12th 
grade. Lastly, the decision-making point is bound by the completion of secondary schooling at 
the end of the 12th grade year. 
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Perna (2005) provides a conceptual framework of multiple layers that organize where 
students receive information and context. Perna’s framework breaks from the trend of describing 
students moving sequentially to a college choice decision, instead depicting a non-linear process 
of accumulated information and context. The process describes students gathering information 
and acquiring context through four contextual layers: Social, Economic, & Policy Context, 
Higher Education Context, School & Community Context, and Habitus. The accumulated 
feedback is then funneled into the core of the framework where the perceived rewards from 
additional education are weighed against both explicit and implicit costs from enrollment. The 
contextual layers capture Sociology’s environment emphasis, and feed the result into a model 
similar to Economics’ Human Capital Theory.  
The college choice literature summarizes the process and factors that students use in the 
decision to pursue postsecondary education. Students psychologically adjust their perspective on 
school to become forward thinking somewhere between 9th and 11th grade (Bell, Rowan-Kenyon, 
& Perna, 2009). In this timeframe students establish aspirations for higher education, either 
developing a strategy for postsecondary admission or initiating actions toward other non-
academic alternatives, such as entering the labor force or redirecting effort toward athletics. The 
exact point this evolution occurs is unknown and differs based on student characteristics 
(Cabrera & LaNasa, 2000; Perna, 2005). The models are limited in their ability to detail how 
information on postsecondary affordability may generate other college-choice decisions or 
impact the academic barriers to enrollment. 
Acquiring Information on Financial Aid and Affordability. Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton (2013) describe financial aid as a basic application of Economic principles - if the price 
of college is lowered, more people will elect to purchase a college degree (through purchasing 
 15 
additional college courses). The straightforward application of this principle assumes that the 
price of education is known upfront and students are capable of determining if they are able to 
afford the cost of attendance. This assumption may not hold for the demographic most in need of 
financial aid (King, 2004; Perna & Steele, 2011). Inaccurate information and limited 
understanding of how the financial aid system operates disproportionately hurts students from 
lower income households, underrepresented minority populations, and first generation students 
(Perna & Steele, 2011). This has confounding implications for financial aid programs targeting 
different student populations. 
Elaborating on the multi-dimensional nuances of student financial aid issues, King (2004) 
describes how low-income students perceive they should be able to pay higher education 
expenses out of pocket. That is to say, those most in need of financial assistance believe that 
financial aid isn’t intended for them. Perna and Steele (2011) identify that the information a 
student accumulates may be creating a counterproductive, vague awareness. Particularly among 
underrepresented populations, students do not know how much they do not know. Students with 
some level of information (accuracy notwithstanding) may not recognize that acquiring 
additional information is necessary.  
Navigating the price of higher education is also a challenge for parents. Few parents have 
accurate perceptions on the cost of higher education, regardless of prior higher education 
experience (Perna & Steele, 2011). In general, parents expect tuition rates to be higher than their 
actual rates. The tendency to overestimate the expected cost of attendance and underestimation 
financial aid eligibility exacerbates the perception of postsecondary education being 
unaffordable.    
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When families seek additional information, the methods they employ may inadvertently 
perpetuate the spread of inaccurate information. Students with low levels of social and cultural 
capital are susceptible to limited alternatives, or awareness of alternatives, for acquiring 
information; for instance, limited Internet access for low-income populations (Deming & 
Dynarski, 2009; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). This issue is compounded when school districts are 
faced with constraints, such as understaffing. The information constraint from limited resources 
can cause students to navigate through inefficient channels to gain personalized information, 
such as seeking information from friends, and seeking information from teachers and coaches 
over college representatives. (Flint, 1993; Heller, 2006; Hossler & Vesper, 1993; McDonough & 
Calderone, 2006; Perna, 2006; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). The difficulty in acquiring accurate 
information produces a network where erroneous information is continually cycled among 
students.  
When parents begin with limited financial aid knowledge they are less likely to feel 
confident in the accuracy of any new information they receive. One reason for this may be 
limited trust in the source of information, but another reason may be the source providing 
financial aid. Trust issues can be embedded in underrepresented populations and have 
ramifications beyond promoting accurate information. Mistrust is a function of past experiences 
with social programs and is projected onto other social benefits, such as financial aid. This is true 
even when eligibility is straightforward, such as with residency-based aid programs. Penn (2012) 
finds that parents and students are skeptical of the financial aid offered through the Kalamazoo 
Promise. Penn describes that African-American parents believe the scholarship was a trick, the 
award comes with unstated expectations (a “catch”), the award was actually “not for us”, or that 
aid would be “snatched” away at the last minute (2012, pg. 12).  
 17 
Barriers exist in navigating and deciphering financial aid information after obtaining 
details on eligibility. Deming and Dynarski (2009) describe a “tradeoff between targeting and 
program effectiveness” that results from the large number of financial aid programs that exist 
and the inconsistent eligibility criteria (pg. 16). Doyle (2008) describes that the effort to target 
aid specifically to students with financial need leads to an increased number of eligibility criteria 
and causes excess confusion. Similar arguments have been made regarding all social welfare 
programs (Mumper, 2003; Porter, 2015).  
The Financial Aid Application Process. Eligibility for financial aid does not 
automatically equate to being awarded financial aid. The process of applying for financial aid is 
particularly sensitive to timing and demonstrating eligibility, specifically the federal application 
process used to allocate federal aid. The Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) 
application requires students to submit personal information (such as student assets and family 
resources) to determine how much tuition and fees will remain after a student has exhausted their 
personal and family resources. The annual application uses household responses to calculate the 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC) for each student.2 EFC is an estimate of how much 
monetary support can be provided by the household to cover postsecondary expenses.3 The 
results of a student’s FAFSA application are used to determine eligibility for a large number of 
state, local, and institutional financial aid programs, in addition to all federal-based aid awards 
(Dynarski & Wiederspan, 2012). In total, the information collected through FAFSA is 
                                                        
2 See Dynarski and Wiederspan (2012) for a complete review. 
3 This does not necessarily mean that a family will devote these resources. A student must include information on 
guardian’s wealth until the age of 24, unless the emancipation process has occurred or they have a child. This is 
regardless of whether the student is claimed as a dependent on income taxes, or whether the student lives in the 
household. 
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responsible for determining as much as three-quarters of all financial aid dollars (Dynarski & 
Wiederspan, 2012). 
The FAFSA form may be submitted as early as a student’s junior year of high school 
containing income tax information from the year prior (Supiano, 2015). The timing corresponds 
with the late stages of the college choice process and potentially beyond the point at which a 
student can reevaluate their academic decisions (Cabrara & LaNasa, 2000; Dynarski & Scott-
Clayton, 2013; Kelchen & Goldrick-Rab, 2012; Plank & Jordan, 2001). Students are likely to 
have already made an enrollment decision by the time they receive confirmation on 
postsecondary affordability (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013). The late notification of eligibility 
reduces the college-going decision to a narrow decision set: accept the aid package offered by 
the accepting institutions, enroll in an open-enrollment institution, or delay enrollment. For 
example, accepting the aid package may include student loans introducing the potential for 
student debt. To this point, Heller (2006) argues that students may not fully understand the trade-
offs for accepting different financial aid programs until after they have been awarded. 
Student Price Sensitivity. Generally, research finds that financial aid has a positive 
effect on postsecondary enrollment (Heller, 1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). The degree of this 
relationship is difficult to discern because of inconsistencies in research findings and 
complicated realities. Heller’s (1997) research raises the question whether students view all 
financial aid equally, specifically identifying the existence of a greater responsiveness to grant 
aid, relative to loans or work-study programs. In addition, sensitivity to financial aid is 
differentiated based on student characteristics such as race, ethnicity, and income status. 
Sensitivity to the amount of financial aid offered may be a function of the availability of 
resources (Heller, 1997; Paulsen & St. John, 2002). Van der Klaauw (2001) finds that 
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underrepresented student populations likely have higher enrollment elasticity toward financial 
aid. Small financial aid incentives represent a large proportion of a low-income student’s overall 
resources. As a result, small changes in aid offerings are perceived as large monetary incentives 
and impact the probability of enrollment drastically. The degree of sensitivity is diminished for 
students from higher income households likely because comparable aid awards represent a 
smaller share of total resources. 
Differences exist in sensitivity to the financial aid form in which an award is presented, 
dependent on race and ethnicity. A direct, positive relationship is found between federal aid 
amount and minority enrollment, particularly among African-American and Hispanic students 
(St. John, 2003; St. John & Noell, 1989). African-American students do not exhibit different 
levels of responsiveness to financial aid based on household income (Paulsen & St. John, 2002). 
Heller (1997) attributes this to the role cultural values play in viewing potential trade-offs, such 
as foregoing higher education and entering the labor force.  
 Hispanic students demonstrate distinctive trends in aid sensitivity. In particular, Hispanic 
students appear acutely sensitivity to student loan offerings. Burdman (2005) observes that they 
are less inclined to attend a postsecondary institution if it means accumulating any amount of 
student debt. Bers (2005) finds that only about one-third of students who attend traditionally, low 
cost community colleges applied to other institution types. Rodriquez, Guido-DiBirto, Torres and 
Talbot (2000) describe that Hispanic students will opt to enter the workforce instead of accepting 
financial aid packages that include student loans. McDonough and Calderone (2004) and Perez 
(2010) assert that this choice is explicitly to avoid any amount of debt. 
Typically, financial aid research examines the impact from a specific financial aid format 
or financial aid amount. Responsiveness to financial aid is not just a function of the format or 
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amount of aid, but also includes the timeframe in which students receive affordability 
information. Time is a necessary resource in developing college readiness characteristics for 
students. The opportunity costs of postsecondary enrollment offset financial aid awards when 
students do not perceive they are capable of being academically successful (Perna, 2004). 
Students are less capable in adjusting academic outputs, such as increasing grades or 
standardized test scores, in shortened timeframes (Fryer, 2011; Kelchen & Goldrick-Rab, 2012; 
Plank & Jordan, 2001).  
Fryer (2011) tests a series of financial stimulants designed to assess academic outcomes 
in urban, predominately low-income schools through the use of input and output-based reward 
systems. Fryer’s (2011) research was based on a secondary school “pay for grades” incentive. 
Fryer (2011) concludes that students are more receptive to input-based rewards because of 
existing shortages in educational capital and resource availability. Output-based incentives are 
largely ineffective if students have limited prior experience in identifying and alleviating 
academic deficiencies in a short-term timeframe. Students who have limited prior experience 
turning motivation into outcomes recognize that they are not able to identify how to achieve this 
in a short timeframe, and as a result, are less likely to be incentivized by an output dependent 
incentive. 
Fryer’s research uses a financial incentive different from financial aid but still has 
implications on issues related to information on postsecondary affordability. Fryer’s research 
raises the question on whether incentives in the latter years of high school are sufficient to 
promote positive academic outcomes. Students who are guided away from an academic mindset 
in early high school may require a larger motivation to reconsider higher education and this may 
not provide enough time to become academically prepared.  
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The literature outlined above describes how student information on postsecondary 
affordability and the time they receive this information may have a broad array of consequences 
beyond college enrollment, including secondary school outcomes and behaviors. Residency-
based aid programs have characteristics that may provide students with transparent, advanced 
information on postsecondary affordability (Andrews, 2013; Blanco, 2009; Harnisch, 2009; 
Schwartz, 2008; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). 
Defining Characteristics of Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs. Next, I review 
how previous research has described and labeled programs with residency-based stipulations. I 
begin by outlining the defining characteristics described by past authors. Three major areas are 
given emphasis in the literature: the timing for when the commitment is provided, how to address 
the use of secondary non-residency-based qualifications to target specific student demographics, 
and the role of geographic region in developing programs. Afterward, I review another typology 
created to categorize residency-based aid programs and describe how my research contributes to 
the literature. 
Timeframe. Time is relative in regard to financial aid. For financial aid, “early” is 
typically expressed in terms of receiving feedback on the FAFSA application. FAFSA 
submission requirements do not allow students to learn about the aid award, and affordability, 
until their late high school years. The timing of financial aid information is beyond the point 
when students may begin to alter their postsecondary expectations. Researchers assert that time 
is essential for students to comprehend the information provided by financial aid programs 
(Schwartz, 2008). Understanding the characteristics and benefits of a program are necessary to 
incentivize positive academic and social adjustments (Blanco, 2009; Harnisch, 2009; Kelchen & 
Goldrick-Rab, 2012; Tierney & Venegas, 2009; Vaade, 2009). When early information on aid 
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eligibility is clear and provides certainty in affordability, students have greater confidence in 
making curricular decisions and improving college readiness. 
Residency-based aid programs are typically associated with early information on 
affordability because of the transparent eligibility criteria and their commitment to fund all 
eligible students. Transparent, upfront information on the requirements for eligibility allows a 
student to accurately estimate and continuously reassess their eligibility before formally applying 
for aid. Harnisch (2009) describes a benefit of early commitment programs as the ability to 
“alleviate real or perceived cost barriers to postsecondary education through offering a contract 
that clearly spells out the terms needed to qualify for college admission and state financial 
assistance” (pg. 3). Harris and Orr (2013) state “by increasing real and perceived affordability of 
college, and clearly communicating the path to college, the theory is that these early commitment 
programs improve academic preparation and social capital” (pg. 1).  
Researchers have differed on when information from a residency-based aid program must 
be provided to students in order to receive the benefits from advanced information on 
affordability. Andrews’ (2013) describes that students must obtain information in a point in time 
before they have made a decision on postsecondary enrollment. Schwartz (2008) requires only 
that information be available prior to a student’s 11th grade year. Blanco (2009) describes early 
information in relation to the decisions associated with academically preparing for college, 
stipulating that information on eligibility must be provided in the first years of high school.  
Secondary Qualifications. Some programs attempt to restrict the eligible student 
population, or reward a specific student group, by targeting which students receive the aid award. 
Targeting a specified demographic is achieved through adding secondary eligibility 
qualifications beyond residency. The variation among secondary qualifications blurs the division 
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between merit- and income-based financial aid programs, which has implications for program 
comparisons (Andrews, 2013; Ash, 2015; Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Miller-Adams, 
2015). Residency-based aid programs may be useful to incentivize a specific student 
demographic, for instance, students who perceive higher education as unaffordable. For 
economically disadvantaged students, an early commitment for financial aid removes fiscal 
roadblocks present in the college-going decision and encourages postsecondary academic 
preparation (Blanco, 2005; Harris & Orr, 2013; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). Removing financial 
obstacles fosters the idea of educational attainment and creates a college-going culture among 
the community (Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Harnisch, 2009; Harris & Orr, 2013). 
Tierney and Venegas (2009) are among a group of scholars who generalize early commitment 
programs as need-based, specifically targeting economically disadvantaged students.  
Blanco (2009) uses early commitment to signify an “umbrella descriptor for a wide 
variety of programs that target low-income students while they are in middle or high school” (pg. 
1). The author describes these programs as a relationship to uphold certain qualifications in 
return for the promise of aid, helping to eliminate financial anxiety while still promoting 
academic preparation. Vaade and McCready (Vaade, 2009; Vaade, 2010; Vaade & McCready, 
2011) distinguish between Universal and Targeted aid. The authors discuss a variation of early 
financial aid programs using the term Postsecondary Opportunity Programs (POPs). They define 
such programs as containing any mixture of need-based aid, merit aid, or universal aid, so long 
as non-monetary benefits such as mentoring are also included.  
Geographic Region. The capacity to generate economic benefits is a component of 
residency-based aid programs. Economic development was a point of emphasis in creating early 
programs, such as the Kalamazoo Promise (Miller-Adams, 2015). According to Economics’ 
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Human Capital Theory, improved educational access has preventative and curative influences on 
social welfare needs (Becker, 1964; McMahon, 2009; Schwartz, 2008). Harnisch (2009) notes 
that policymakers may use residency-based programs as a tool to capture students who are not 
influenced by other social benefit programs. 
The geographic alignment of social and educational benefits is important. Programs with 
residency-based eligibility act similarly to social policy mechanisms (Andrews, 2013; Schwartz, 
2008). The relationship between economic development and geographic boundaries is described 
as influential for developing a reliable revenue source (Andrews, 2013). Researchers have stated 
that programs with different geographic sizes (size being a measure relative to the eligibility 
boundary) stimulate different levels of incentives. Programs smaller than state eligibility 
stimulate localized economic returns (Andrews, 2013; Blanco, 2009). Programs with broader 
statewide residency eligibility typically act as a policy tool for larger social purposes (Andrews, 
2013; Blanco, 2009).  
Typologies. Perna and Leigh (2017) develop a typology for organizing and categorizing 
existing programs with residency-based qualifications. The authors use five primary criteria for 
program inclusion in their typology: programs must designate higher education access as the 
primary objective, programs must offer a “promise” of financial aid to eligible students, 
programs must clearly define “place” as residency within a state or a geographic subset within a 
state, programs cannot be catered to students within a specific demographic or for students 
seeking specific postsecondary credentials, and programs must provide clear information for 
eligibility. Perna and Leigh’s (2017) typology examines 289 programs.  
Perna and Leigh (2017) use cluster analysis to identify six distinct groups of programs. 
The group distinctions are based on state and local geographic region, the type of institution aid 
 25 
that can be redeemed, and how broadly residency is defined. They label the six resulting groups 
as State-Sponsored, Unrestricted, Merit-based (Type I); State-Sponsored, Unrestricted, Need-
based (Type II); State-Sponsored, 4-Year, Last Dollar (Type III); State-Sponsored, 4-Year, 
Merit-based (Type IV); Universal Eligibility (Type V), and 2-Year, Last Dollar (Type V). The 
authors describe the six groupings as a meaningful starting point for new research on Promise 
programs. Each group contains program with operational characteristics fundamentally 
dissimilar from programs in other categories.  
There are important differences in the research presented in Perna and Leigh’s (2017) 
typology and the typology I present here. The differences between the two typologies lead to 
differing results and allow each to contribute meaningful knowledge on residency-based aid 
programs. First, there are differences in the qualifications used for including programs in each 
sample after accounting for residency and transparent eligibility criteria. Perna and Leigh include 
programs that have not begun distributing funding. This adds to the sample size of their research, 
but it captures programs that have not yet made final operational decisions. These programs may 
still experience changes that fundamentally alter their structure and mission or that cause them to 
never commence distributing aid. Removing these programs, or altering their characteristics, can 
have impact on the cluster analysis methodology (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). In 
contrast, I focus on programs that have finalized operational procedures and are currently 
providing financial aid to students. As a result of the sampling decisions, the cluster analysis 
results I present are groups of programs that are distributing financial aid, not clusters of 
programs with similar designs.  
Perna and Leigh (2017) opt to exclude programs that formally state economic 
development as their primary motive and programs funded directly by postsecondary institutions 
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(typically called No Loan programs). Omitting these programs makes it unclear how they may 
have distinction from residency-based aid programs and does not offer insights into how they 
should be compared in research. I include each of the previously described program types. This 
decision allows my clustering results to contribute to the fields understanding for how to treat 
programs with a residency-stipulation but that may not typically be considered residency-based 
aid programs. 
The authors discuss that future researchers should explore “whether a program creates 
early commitment to or awareness of program benefits and requirements”. The typology I 
present here addresses this need by identifying the operational procedures, the specific groupings 
that each program is clustered into, and addressing the hole in the literature regarding program 
comparisons. The typological groups directly address which programs are comparable and the 
specific areas of comparability with regard to early information on postsecondary affordability.  
Student Outcomes from Residency-based Scholarship Programs. An affiliation 
between the W.E. Upjohn Institute and the Kalamazoo Promise has produced a disproportionate 
amount of research on this particular program. Research corresponding to the Kalamazoo 
Promise has centered on secondary school outcomes, evolution of the local culture, college 
choice, and postsecondary outcomes. I outline the Kalamazoo Promise research first, followed 
by research of other individual programs with redeemability at 4-year institutions. A 
comprehensive review of programs with eligibility at 2-year institutions can be found in the 
literature review for Paper Two.  
The Kalamazoo Promise announcement transfers Kalamazoo student’s post-high school 
decision-making process to a timeframe earlier than 11th grade (Penn, 2012). The scholarship can 
inspire a fundamental shift in postsecondary aspirations and is most profound for student 
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populations with relatively little understanding of educational returns. The program is associated 
with positive impacts related to student’s secondary school effort and academic outcomes (Bartik 
& Lachowski, 2012). In the three years after the announcement, Bartik and Lachowski (2012) 
find that the average number of student suspension days decreased by over one day. One 
explanation proposed by the authors is that students were present in class more frequently, which 
limited the amount of time available for undesirable behaviors. During the first three years of the 
scholarship, student GPA’s did not significantly change; though when disaggregated by race, 
there was evidence of a slight GPA increase for African-American students (Bartik & 
Lachowski, 2012). Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) find statistically significant gains in reading 
for the entire school district and mixed results in Mathematics scores. Despite the limited 
improvements in student grades, increased demand necessitated the addition of more Advance 
Placement courses and a new college readiness-based curriculum (Miller-Adams, 2010; Miller-
Adams, 2011).   
The incentives from the Kalamazoo Promise extend to a culture change for the 
community. Bartik, Eberts, and Huang (2010) identify that the announcement of the program 
reversed the outward migration of Kalamazoo’s population and enrollment within the school 
district. Hershbein (2013) follows up this research by identifying that the new student population 
mostly came from the immediate area, Kalamazoo County, but out of state migrants made up a 
statistically significant 25% of new enrollees. Surprisingly, only a small number of students 
switched from non-eligible schools within the City of Kalamazoo. Hershbein’s (2013) results on 
whether the new student population was more affluent are mixed. There is no statistical 
difference in income level for families that migrated into Kalamazoo after the scholarship was 
announced. Miller-Adams (2010; 2011) details that the first successful bond election was passed 
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allowing for the construction of the district’s first new schools in forty years. Parents increased 
their level of participation in school activities strengthening the levels of social and cultural 
capital among the community (Miller-Adams, 2010). Additionally, local business leaders 
contributed funding to develop a tutoring services center for students (Miller-Adams, 2010).  
To determine if there was an influential impact on institutional choice, Andrews, 
DesJardins, and Ranchhod (2010) conducted a quasi-experimental design immediately following 
the Kalamazoo Promise announcement. The authors determine that students became more likely 
to send standardized test scores to the state land grant institution (Michigan State University) and 
less likely to send them to the in-district community college (Kalamazoo Valley Community 
College). Andrews et al. (2010) make the argument that this is evidence that the expected cost of 
tuition is a significant determinant in how students made decisions on applying to potential 
institutions. This reasoning is especially prevalent given that students may send test scores to six 
different institutions for no additional charge. Post-Kalamazoo Promise enrollment trends 
support the conclusion of Andrews et al. (2010). The W.E. Upjohn Institute (2015) presents 
statistics for increased enrollment across all institution types in the state of Michigan. Enrollment 
gains were most pronounced at the two local, public college campuses, including Kalamazoo 
Valley Community College and Western Michigan University. The enrollment influence is also 
evident in the state flagship institutions Michigan State University and the University of 
Michigan-Ann Arbor (W.E. Upjohn, 2015). 
The immediate changes from the Kalamazoo Promise extend into long-term effects. The 
increase in postsecondary enrollment described in earlier studies remains present after nine 
graduation classes (Bartik, Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015). Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska 
(2015) show an 8-percentage point gain in enrollment and a shift to public, in-state four-year 
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institutions. A notable difference from the early years of the program is a substitution away from 
both two-year institutions and out of state alternatives (Bartik, Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015). 
Plausible explanations for the enrollment shift are the longer time period in which students have 
information on affordability, in addition to the changes in availability of tutoring networks, 
increased parent participation, and movement toward a college-preparation curriculum. 
The Kalamazoo Promise has implications for postsecondary outcomes. After enrollment, 
students exhibit increases in credit hours attempted and degree completions (Bartik, Hershbein, 
& Lachowska, 2015). Kalamazoo Promise recipients acquired 15% more credit hours, earned 
four-year degree credentials at a 9% higher rate, and earned other postsecondary credentials at an 
11% higher rate; all relative to non-recipients. Bartik, Hershbein, and Lachowska (2015) find 
that the degree earning results are consistent across income groups. Low-income students are 
equally as likely to earn more credit hours and achieve a postsecondary credential, as higher 
income students.  
A program often compared to the Kalamazoo Promise is Arkansas’ El Dorado Promise. 
The El Dorado Promise offers between 65-100% of tuition and fees to students who graduate 
from an El Dorado public school, using a percentage scale similar to the Kalamazoo Promise. 
Unlike Kalamazoo, El Dorado’s scholarship can be used at any two or four-year institution 
within the United States. Ash and Ritter (2016) find that within the school district, staff and 
personnel elevated the expectations for students after the program was created. This included 
placing more emphasis on increasing postsecondary awareness and promoting access through 
college preparatory coursework.  
The El Dorado scholarship announcement had positive outcomes on student achievement 
in high school (Ash, 2015; Ash & Ritter, 2014). Students significantly increased both math and 
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literacy scores relative to students’ from the time period before the El Dorado Promise. 
Specifically, low-income and African-American students made the largest gains in these areas, 
but only those who were previously in the top half of scores. Placing these results into 
perspective, Ash (2015) describes the gains from the program announcement offset the expected 
lower scores among students who qualify for Free/Reduced lunch. After the scholarship 
announcement, there is no statistical difference in test scores between economically 
disadvantaged students and their more affluent classmates.   
Ash and Ritter (2014) determine that high school graduation rates are not statistically 
influenced by the scholarship, despite the improved academic performances. No discernable 
difference exists in high school graduation rates pre- and post-El Dorado announcement, overall. 
There is evidence that low-income students may actually graduate at lower rates after the 
announcement. This could be an unintended consequence of the school district’s push towards a 
more academically rigorous curriculum. Students are not fully able to transfer the increased 
efforts into academic outputs, in the short term. 
The Pittsburgh Promise differs from both Kalamazoo and El Dorado in the distribution of 
aid. The Pittsburgh Promise will fund up to $10,000 per year for students who graduate from an 
approved Pittsburgh high schools with a 2.5 GPA and have at least 90% attendance (Gonzalez, 
Bozick, Taylor, & Phillips, 2011). The actual aid award is dependent on the student’s length of 
residency within the specified Pittsburgh school districts and is redeemable at any public or 
private, two- or four-year institution within the state of Pennsylvania. Unlike the Kalamazoo 
Promise there appears to have been no new migration into the city following the announcement 
(Gonzalez, Bozick, Taylor, & Phillips, 2011). Instead, parents use the availability of the 
scholarship to determine which secondary schools to enroll their child. The finding of secondary 
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school choice is most pronounced among minority households, parents with low levels of 
education, and low-income households.  
The program structure of the Pittsburgh Promise creates different student incentives 
regarding institutional choice (Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015). Students are less likely to 
enroll at a postsecondary institution following high school with the benefit of the Promise 
scholarship, however they are more likely to enroll at four-year institutions. Gonzalez, Bozick, 
Taylor, and Phillips (2011) describe that students are using the program to gauge their 
postsecondary readiness. One possible reason for this finding is that the minimum grade point 
average for program eligibility may be providing affordability information to students with 
higher grades who already planned to attend college.  
Residency-Based Financial Aid Program Sample Population  
Cluster analysis is a useful technique to identify natural groupings of objects with similar 
characteristics. Specific to this research, cluster analysis is used to identify groups of comparable 
financial aid programs where student eligibility is defined (in part) by geographic boundary. A 
necessary first step in this process is the identification of programs to be examined. Next, I 
describe the process for collecting a list of sample programs. Then, I describe the multiple 
program characteristics I require for inclusion in the sample population of the typology. Lastly, I 
detail the process of examining programs and creating the dataset to be used in the cluster 
analysis. 
Sample Collection Process. I use a multi-step process for accumulating a sample of 
residency-based aid programs. The different steps are used to collect a large sample of programs 
and avoid any potential bias in the sample of programs and characteristics, for example, only 
identifying programs with the largest endowments to fund scholarships. Programs with large 
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coffers may receive more public attention but are not necessarily representative of all residency-
based aid programs. To identify similarity across groups of programs, it is important to have a 
sample population with extensive variation. 
To identify a list of potential programs, I begin by referencing the list of programs 
created by the W.E. Upjohn Institute (2017), the Cities of Promise (2017), and Civic Nation 
(2017). The three organizations support research and offer consultation on new Promise program 
development. The W.E. Upjohn Institution (2017) defines residency-based aid communities as 
making a “long-term investment in education through place-based scholarships” seeking to first 
“expand access to and success in higher education” while creating support for local economic 
development. The Cities of Promise identify Promise programs as a subcategory of place-based 
aid (Cities of Promise, 2017). The Cities of Promise database includes only scholarships with “an 
expectation of local economic development” (Cities of Promise, 2017). Civic Nation’s College 
Promise Campaign (2017) is national program to build public support for programs which, 
“guarantee tuition and fees for eligible, hardworking students to complete a college education.” 
The benefit of using the three databases is that I am able to capture a larger number of programs 
and programs with different primary missions (postsecondary access and economic 
development). 
Next, I include programs previously referenced in scholarly research. I identify articles 
by keyword searches: “early commitment,” “place-based aid,” “Promise programs,” and 
“universally eligible.” The format labels are commonly used in prior research of programs with 
residency-based requirements. Also, I search for articles that reference three specific programs: 
Kalamazoo Promise, El Dorado Promise, and Pittsburgh Promise. I use the three programs 
because of the national attention received by each. Publications (both scholarly research and 
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popular media) frequently use the three programs as a reference or in providing context for 
information on other programs. Including the three programs in the keyword search was also 
beneficial in finding additional articles that used program labels that did not align with the 
keyword search. For instance, Vaade (2009) labels similarly structured residency-based 
programs as Postsecondary Opportunity Programs.  
I gather a list of programs using the keywords “financial aid programs + ” and add the 
terms “promise”, and “place-based” in a general internet search. From this search, I have found 
two unique websites that list financial aid programs by format category: College Greenlight and 
FinAid.org (College Greenlight, 2017; FinAid, 2017). The websites are designed to help students 
identify potential scholarships, and they contain links to the additional information for each 
program.  
Lastly, I include financial aid programs previously characterized as institutionally based 
and state-based aid programs. A number of institutions have begun adopting financial aid 
policies designed to decrease the out-of-pocket cost of attendance for students in a designated 
local, geographic region (Linsenmeier, Rosen & Rosue, 2006; Lips, 2011; van der Klaauw, 2002; 
Waddell & Singell, Jr., 2010). This format is called No Loan programs (Linsenmeier, Rosen & 
Rosue, 2006; Lips, 2011; van der Klaauw, 2002; Waddell & Singell, Jr., 2010). I identify No 
Loan programs through scholarly articles and a general internet search of scholarship websites 
using the keywords “No Loan”. 
 State-based aid programs inherently have residency-based eligibility qualifications. To 
identify state-level programs, I use the Education Commission of the States’ (ECS, 2015) State 
Financial Aid Redesign database. ECS’ State Financial Aid Redesign database includes a policy 
scan of the top 100 funded programs across all 50 states. In using the top 100 policy scan, I 
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assume that a state-level financial aid program that does not use an individual selection process 
to award aid would be among the highest-funded financial aid programs in the state. This 
assumption is based on the belief that the number of potential college-going students within any 
state is substantial enough to require funding greater than programs that select a defined number 
of students each year. 
I include No Loan programs and state-based aid in this typology to serve as a robustness 
measure of the cluster analysis. The defining characteristics of residency-based aid programs 
outlined in the literature review could be used to describe state-based and No Loan programs. 
(Andrews, 2013; Ash, 2015; Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Daun-Barnett, 2011; Miller-
Adams, 2015; Tierney & Venegas, 2009; Vaade, 2009; Vaade & McCready, 2011). In addition, 
programs from both categories have been described as comparable to community-sustained 
programs (Andrews, 2013; Blanco, 2009; Miller-Adams, 2015; Vaade, 2009; Vaade & 
McCready, 2011). Despite the previous comparisons, there may be fundamental differences 
across program types that cause students to respond differently to the program. Specifically, the 
eligibility criteria for No Loan and state-based aid programs may not provide the same amount of 
transparency for students as a local community-sustained program. By including both formats in 
the typology, I hope to find evidence that the three types of financial aid programs are dissimilar 
enough to be placed in different comparison groups. 
Sample Program Criteria. After amassing a list of sample programs, I examined the 
available information for each program prior to the 2016-2017 academic year. This step included 
creating an archive of documents, reports, applications, and flyers. When important 
characteristics were missing or unclear, I attempted to personally communicate with 
administrators through program “contact” links and search for media publications about the 
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program. The archive of documentation is used to assess the unique characteristics of each 
program, operational practices, descriptions of the students served by the program, and intended 
commitment to providing funding to all eligible students.4  
Creating a typology requires researchers to make decisions on scope, breadth, and 
program inclusion. This is an important and unavoidable endeavor for creating any typology 
(Perna et al., 2008). The focus of this typology is to identify groups of residency-based aid 
programs that are comparable based on the information they provide to students regarding 
postsecondary access and affordability. I use the following three selection criteria to distinguish 
residency-based financial aid programs from organizations/programs that have previously been 
associated with providing financial aid: defined geographic boundary, pre-2016 start date, and 
clearly defined eligibility criteria.  
First, a program must directly identify the geographic boundary for eligibility. The 
residency boundary may be a specific state, or a list of counties, cities/municipalities, or school 
districts. Residency is a transparent criterion when the boundary is clearly stipulated. Residency 
or longevity is easily discernible by students who are seeking to estimate their eligibility.  
Second, I include only programs that advertised a start date prior for the 2016-2017 
academic year or before. I define a start date as the first year that financial aid is awarded based 
on the programs eligibility criteria. The desire to develop a residency-based aid program does not 
guarantee that the program will not require design changes. The resources available to a program 
dictate the number of students who can be served (Andrews, 2013; Mumper, 2003). A program 
intending to reach a specified student population may fall short of the resources necessary to 
                                                        
4 Appendix C contains a list of websites used to identify characteristics for each program included in the cluster 
analysis. Websites include formal program websites, program’s facebook pages, links to press releases, and videos 
used to introduce programs. 
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achieve this, resulting in the program being delayed or fundamentally changing characteristics. 
Each of these obstacles alters the actual operational procedure and eligibility criteria that are 
used by the program. For example, city council funding was approved for the Milwaukee 
Promise in 2014 after years of planning, yet the program has not been finalized (OnMilwaukee, 
2014).5 Any changes to the factors used to identify an entity (operational procedures for a 
program, in this instance) can fundamentally change the grouping process in a cluster analysis 
(Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). 
Third, building from the above requirement, all programs must state upfront the criteria 
used for awarding aid. The purpose for this is to isolate competitive aid programs that select 
students based on individual characteristics or that use an application process and award aid 
based on undisclosed criteria. The criterion used for eligibility is an important component of 
students being able to estimate their eligibility (Daun-Barnett, 2011). Students cannot estimate 
their chances of achieving postsecondary affordability without advanced knowledge of what 
benchmarks must be met. Transparency is why residency-based aid programs are frequently 
associated with early information on postsecondary affordability (Andrews, 2013; Kelchen & 
Goldrick-Rab, 2013; Pluhta & Penny, 2013). 
Sample Data Description. In total, several hundred programs were examined for 
inclusion, but only 199 met the three criteria stipulated above. Awarding aid based on an 
individual selection process or using unknown criteria were the most common reasons for 
excluding state-based programs. Only 43 of the top 100 state-based programs were included 
from ECS’ State Financial Aid Redesign database (2015). Programs in the developmental stage 
                                                        
5 The planning for the Milwaukee Promise occurred separately from the Degree Project and the MATC Promise in 
Milwaukee. 
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that have not begun to distribute aid are the most common reason for omitting community-level 
programs.  
After identifying the programs to be included in the sample, I examine the resources to 
identify the variation among the programs’ operational procedures. I use the information 
accumulated for each program to create a cross-sectional dataset consisting of 12 binary 
variables. The 12 dichotomous variables are each structured as questions with the coding Yes= 1 
and No= 0. Fundamentally, the variables are designed to capture program decisions that are made 
with respect to the specified geographic location for eligibility, the timeframe when students earn 
eligibility, decisions on the program’s value and aid distribution, additional qualifications for 
eligibility, and specifications for redeemable institutions. The variables represent information 
available to students regarding their eligibility, their potential award, and how/where they may 
use the aid. Table 1 summarizes the dataset and cluster analysis results for all 199 programs 
examined for the typology. Next, I describe the specific variables and the reasons for using each. 
Geographic Scope. City identifies whether the geographic region for eligibility is a 
county, city, or high school (if yes, City= 1; if the boundary is larger than a specified city/county, 
City= 0). This category is useful in addressing how to classify the size of residency parameters 
and in determining community and population responses to the program (Bartik, Hershbein, & 
Lachowska, 2015; LeGower & Walsh, 2014; Miller-Adams, 2011). A well-defined parameter 
allows program organizers to create an epicenter for the social benefits a program may generate 
(Miller-Adams, 2015). Additionally, geographic scope may have important implications for how 
a student responds to the program’s creation (Pluhta & Penny, 2013). The geographic span for 
program eligibility may be significant to isolate differences in student demographics, economic 
conditions, and secondary school resources that could bias research results.  
 38 
Timeframe. Early denotes whether students begin the eligibility process before starting 
9th grade (if yes, Early= 1, if eligibility is determined after the start of 9th grade, Early= 0). 
Decisions made during this timeframe could have an influence on how students assess their 
likelihood of being successful in college and their decision to enroll and may have implications 
for the amount of time needed to adjust curricular decisions or social behaviors (Duan-Barnett, 
2011; Fryer, 2011; Perna, 2004; Perna, 2005; Perna & Steele, 2011). When eligibility is based 
solely on longevity of residency, Early= 1 because students can estimate their eligibility as early 
as kindergarten. For programs that do not use longevity of residency, Early is determined by the 
year the student signs a contract/pledge to enter the program or begin the first steps to earn 
eligibility. Commit describes whether the program guarantees aid award to all eligible students 
(if yes, Commit= 1). The commitment to fund all eligible students is an important signal of 
postsecondary affordability for students and a critical component in college choice models 
(Blanco, 2005; Blanco, 2006; Cabrera & LaNasa, 2000; Harnisch, 2009; St. John, 2003; Tierney 
& Venegas, 2009).  
Value. Three formats for distributing aid are used across programs: Unmet Need (Last 
Dollar) funding, Percentage of the cost of attendance, and Flat value aid award. Last Dollar 
identifies whether aid will cover all remaining unmet need without students having to obtain 
students loans. Percentage describes programs that distribute aid as a percent of the cost of 
attendance. Percentages are most commonly based on the longevity of residency. Flat value aid 
award signifies programs that award a single pre-determined aid amount that does not change 
based on postsecondary choices. No previous author has discussed the value of the aid awarded, 
but Ash (2015) notes a distinction across program types. I believe this is a clear omission and is 
relevant to understanding student outcomes across programs. Differences in aid award amount 
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can influence a student’s college-going decision (Heller, 1996; Leslie & Brinkman, 1989). In 
addition, the method for which aid amount is determined might create differences in a student’s 
perspective for enrollment. The three value variables are mutually exclusive of each other. All 
programs are coded Yes= 1 for exactly one option. 
Sub-Qualifications. The uncertainty in classifying programs with multiple qualifications 
is raised in other residency-based aid literature (Andrews, 2013; Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 
2015; Doyle, 2008; Harnisch, 2009; McPherson & Schapiro, 2010; Miller-Adams, 2015; 
Mumper, 2003; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). Beyond residency, a number of programs incorporate 
additional qualifications for eligibility (I term, Sub-Qualifications). The most common Sub-
Qualifications are based on student academic standing and financial need. GPA identifies 
whether the programs uses a specified minimum high school GPA requirement (if yes, GPA= 1). 
ACT identifies whether a minimum score on the standardized test is required for eligibility (if 
yes, ACT= 1). Income designates programs with a specified minimum household income 
requirement to be eligible (if yes, Income= 1). The inherent problem with using stipulations to 
isolate beneficiaries is that the targeted population often does not perceive that they are eligible 
(Doyle, 2008; Mumper, 2003). When the number of qualifying stipulations for a program 
increases, it creates more vagueness for students in estimating the likelihood that they will be 
eligible. Duan-Barnett (2011) labels this uncertainty “risk” of not achieving eligibility. 
Fundamentally, a risk of not achieving eligibility limits a student’s ability to use early 
information on affordability.  
Institutional Type. Select identifies whether the scholarship is redeemable at a specific 
subset of institutions that does not extend to all public or private colleges within the state. This is 
determined based on the description for where students may use aid. 2-yr and 4-yr identify 
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whether each respective institution type was included in the list of redeemable institutions. If 
only specific institutions were identified, I used the website for each college to determine what 
types of degrees were awarded. Institution type may have a number of influences on how 
students respond to the program. The number and type of institutions where aid may be 
redeemed changes the institutional choice for a student (Andrews, et al., 2010; Bartik, 
Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015; Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Carruthers & Fox, 2016).  
Cluster Analysis Methodology 
Cluster analysis is a means to observe segmentation among a specified population. 
Cluster analysis has a broad range of applications, from identifying the herding behavior of 
mammals to demonstrating the motivating factors of marathon runners (Everitt, Landau, Leese, 
& Stahl, 2011; Ogles & Masters, 2003). Clustering is used in postsecondary research to explore 
engagement patterns for community college students, identify institutional No Loan programs, 
and categorize institutional responsiveness to developmental education reform (Lips, 2011; Park, 
Tandberg, Hu, & Hankerson, 2016; Saenz, Hatch, Bukoski, Kim, Lee, & Valdez, 2011). 
I use three different hierarchical clustering approaches in this typology, Average linkage 
with coefficient matching, Weighted-Average linkage, and Ward’s linkage. Each method is 
agglomerative, so programs start in isolation and are added to a cluster based on a similarity 
calculation. Each of the three methods has distinct advantages and disadvantages that apply to 
this typology.  
The Average linkage approach calculates the distance between two groups using the 
average similarity calculation for programs within each group. The matching coefficient provides 
full weight to exact matches in the groupings (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). Weighted-
Average linkage is an adaption of the Average linkage. The notable exception is that as the sizes 
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of clusters change, the weight for exact matches is reduced. This tactic is beneficial when 
clusters do not have a uniform population (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). A drawback 
of the Average linkage and Weighted-Average linkage methods is that the program order within 
the dataset may create a bias for the group in which it is placed. To identify whether program 
order biases results, I will also use Ward’s linkage.6 Ward’s linkage uses an analysis of variance 
to calculate distance. Programs are placed in a group that minimizes the sum of squared error. 
However, Ward’s linkage does not directly consider the number of matched factors among 
programs. I use all three as a robustness check to demonstrate that the groupings are not 
contingent on using a specific clustering algorithm. 
Clustering does not result in a distinct number of groups. Clustering assigns programs to 
groups and combines groups until all programs are merged into a single category. To identify the 
natural comparison group for a program, a dendrogram tree is used. Dendrogram trees illustrate 
the net difference in similarity calculations at the point when groups are merged. The 
Dendrogram trees can be used to discern when groups of non-similar programs were combined 
to achieve the single cluster (Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). Short (vertical) “branches” 
link programs with small differences, while longer lines represent a greater degree of variation 
(larger net difference in similarity calculations). After identifying the number of comparable 
groups from the dendrogram trees, the clustering algorithms can be used to list the specific 
programs within each “branch” of the tree.  
                                                        
6 Programs are organized in the dataset based on a randomly generated number. The random number for each 
program was created use the random generating function in Stata. I use the random number as another method of 
avoiding any clustering bias based on placement in the dataset. 
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Residency-Based Aid Program Cluster Analysis Results 
In total, 199 programs are included in the typology. The results from the cluster analysis 
support the assumption that residency-based programs should not be treated uniformly. The three 
cluster analysis methods consistently demonstrate three large constellations of programs with 
similar characteristics. Furthermore, each of the three cluster analysis methods is consistent with 
the programs that are considered comparable. The cluster analysis methods find a sharp 
distinction among programs that are operated by the state, programs previously described as 
institutional-based No Loan programs, and programs developed within the community. For this 
reason, I will use State-Based, Institutional, and Community-Sustained to label the three 
clustered groups.  
Figures 1-3 illustrate the dendrogram tree for Average linkage, Weighted-Average 
linkage, and Ward’s linkage, respectively. The bottom portion of each dendrogram tree 
illustrates 15 program groupings, G1-G15, that are most similar based on the program’s 
operational procedures.7 The three individual dendrogram trees illustrate three basic clusters of 
programs. Using three as the clustering number, Table 1 provides the cluster analysis results for 
each of the three methods. All three methods identify Institutional programs first, followed by 
Community-Sustained, and State-Based. The Average linkage (Figures 1) created three groups of 
Institutional programs (G1-3), five Community-Sustained groups (G4-8), and seven State-Based 
(G9-15). The Weighted-Average linkage identified the same comparable programs, but it 
identified six groups of Community-Sustained (G4-9) and six State-Based groups (G10-15). 
Ward’s Linkage demonstrated a larger number of Institutional groups (G1-5), with smaller 
                                                        
7 The number of programs included, 199, is too large to illustrate each program individually. The decision to divide 
the figure into 15 groups was made to provide the largest number of groups while maintaining legible group 
identifications. 
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groupings for Community-Sustained (G6-11) and State-Based (G12-15). The Iowa State ISU4U 
program is an outlier in each of the three cluster analysis approaches. The program was not 
placed into a group with any other programs regardless of the number of clustering method. For 
this reason I exclude it from the remainder of the research. 
The clustering algorithm identifies groups by number. The cluster numbering is aligned 
with my group labels as follows: 1= State-Based, 2= Institutional, & 3= Community-Sustained. 
As I hypothesize, state-operated programs are separated from other programs. State policies and 
budgeting challenges often create the need to use criteria such as grade point average 
requirements, maximum income thresholds, or allowing funds to be redeemed at all public (and 
sometimes private) state institutions. For this reason, state level programs are included in this 
analysis to serve as a robustness check for the clustering process. State-based programs may 
have similar operational characteristics, differing only in the defined eligible geographic region. 
Each of the three clustering methods isolate state-based programs from programs developed 
within a community and institutionally funded programs. 
The cluster analysis separates No Loan programs (as identified in previous research) from 
the residency-based aid programs derived from W.E. Upjohn and Cities of Promise. The 
distinction between community-supported programs and No Loan programs is less obvious. 
Institutional-based aid programs use a range of geographic scopes and vary in requiring 
secondary eligibility requirements. These are comparable to a large number of community-
supported programs.  
There is a strong association among the groups within the three clusters. When I force the 
clustering algorithms to create more than three groups, the clusters split state-based programs 
and No Loan programs into more-defined groups. This is evidence that the clustering algorithms 
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view a strong distinction among the three formats of financial aid. The separation of these 
programs is further evidence that the growth of residency-based aid programs is unique. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the three clustered groups. The numbers 
identify the number of programs within the specific cluster that are coded Yes (variable= 1) and 
the percentage of all programs in that cluster that this number represents. The bottom row 
represents the full 199 program sample statistics. The conditions used to identify early 
information on affordability represent a student being able to opt into or become eligible for the 
program prior to their freshman year in high school. This condition is present in 25% of all 
programs. This is far less common among State-Based programs (17%) and Institutional No loan 
programs (that typically require admission (1%)). Community-Sustained programs provide early 
information in over half, 52%, of programs.  
A commitment to provide funding to eligible students is present when a program 
indicates that all eligible students will receive the award. A large percentage of programs abide 
by this type of promise, though not as many as the number of programs labeled “Promise.” A 
funding commitment is present in 69% of all programs. State-Based programs commit to fund all 
eligible students in 54% of the sample programs. Institutional No Loan programs commit to 
funding in 69% of the sample. Community-Sustained programs provide the largest commitment 
to funding, appearing in 77% of the sample.  
A formula-driven percentage distribution of tuition is used in 17% of Community-
Sustained programs. This is surprising given the attention generated by the Kalamazoo Promise, 
one of the programs that use a percent formula system. State-Based programs use a formula 
system in 2% of programs and no Institutional programs use this method for determining aid 
amount. Last-dollar aid programs cover remaining unmet need and guarantee that students can 
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avoid out-of-pocket expenses. Within State-Based programs, 35% use last-dollar funding, as 
opposed to 58% of Community-Sustained programs and 97% of Institutional No Loan programs. 
Programs that award a single, flat aid amount are most common at the State (60%) and 
Community (25%) level, relative to Institutions (3%).8 
Sub-Qualifications exist in all three clusters. State-Based requirements include grade 
point average and income thresholds in 50% and 56% of the programs, respectively. Institutional 
No Loan programs focus more on financial need (79%) than merit (10%), likely because they 
can uphold merit requirements through admissions. Despite the body of literature that identifies 
the benefits low-income students receive from Community-Sustained programs, academic merit 
is more frequently required (41%) than income (23%).  
In total, 68% of programs provide financial aid to students, but it may only be redeemed 
at specified institutions. This is largely the result of Institutional No Loan programs (100%) and 
Community-Sustained programs (71%). Not surprisingly, State-Based aid programs rarely (17% 
of the time) allow aid to be used only for a specific subset of the state’s public and private 
institutions. Aid is redeemable at two-year community colleges in 60% of the sampled programs, 
although this statistic is a bit misleading. State-Based (94%) and Community-Sustained 
programs (95%) each allow aid to be redeemed at traditionally low-cost two-year institutions. 
There are no programs classified as Institutional No Loan programs that can be redeemed at two-
year institutions; all 72 programs limit eligibility to four-year institutions. State-based programs 
allow aid to be redeemed at four-year institutions across 88% of programs. Community-
Sustained programs allow aid to be used at four-year institutions the least; only 47% of programs 
can be used directly at a four-year college.  
                                                        
8 Two programs, Delaware’s Inspire Scholarship and California’s PACE Promise, are included in the clustering 
group for No Loan programs. These two programs do not provide last-dollar aid funding.  
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Community-Supported Residency-Based Aid Program Distinctions 
Cluster analysis is used to examine the program characteristics (captured by the factor 
variables) to determine comparability to other programs. The end result is groups of programs 
that are similar overall. However, cluster analysis does not provide any evaluation of the ways 
that specific programs may still have small differences. As the Descriptive Statistics indicate 
above, programs have individual differences even within clusters. Next, I describe a method for 
identifying individual program comparability among the programs considered Community-
Sustained residency-based aid. A similar process could be used with State-Based and 
Institutional No Loan programs. That is a future direction of this research. 
An in-depth assessment of Community-Sustained programs is meaningful for several 
reasons. A detailed examination of the range of Community- Sustained program designs may be 
helpful to future researchers. The marginal differences across programs may have important 
implications to research and should be accounted for. For instance, Toutkoushian, Hossler, 
DesJardins, McCall, and Canche (2015) argue that residency-based aid programs that include 
mentoring services cannot generally be compared to programs without mentoring. The authors 
argue that the additional component, direct access to a network of individuals who can help 
students with college-going questions, acts as a second treatment (beyond the financial aid 
award). Consequently, the influence from financial aid cannot easily be separated from the 
influence created by the mentoring.    
Second, the number of local communities developing residency-based aid programs 
continues to grow. Databases used by Perna and Leigh (2017) and Cities of Promise (2016) 
contain hundreds of programs currently in the developmental phases (pre-dating the official start 
of distributing aid awards). Policymakers and community leaders often examine existing 
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community-supported programs during the process of developing new programs, regardless of 
geographic scope. For instance, community-supported programs are cited in the creation of the 
Tennessee Promise and the notion of nationwide “free community college” (Carruthers & Fox, 
2016; Jesse, 2015; White House, 2015).  
Table 3 provides a brief descriptive summary of the program specifications, by state, for 
the 67 programs within the Community- Sustained cluster analysis results. The 67 individual 
programs span 24 states and the District of Columbia. The states represented are spread out 
across the four Census regions of the country: Northeast (4 states), South (9 states), Midwest (5 
states), and West (8 states). Michigan has the largest population of community-sponsored 
programs (14 programs). This is not surprising given the state’s 2008 Promise Zone legislation. 
Michigan added 7 of its 14 overall programs after Governor Jennifer Granholm passed the tax 
incentive. California (11 programs) and Illinois (6 programs) have the next-highest number of 
programs in the sample, followed by Arkansas and Pennsylvania (5 each).  
A few general trends emerge from the descriptive statistics by state. First, programs tend 
to follow the same aid distribution method as other programs in the same state. Nine states have 
more than three Community- Sustained programs, but only Arkansas, Illinois, Michigan, and 
Pennsylvania have at least one program that awards a flat scholarship value, aid based on a 
percentage formula, and last-dollar aid awards. In particular, programs adopt structural designs 
similar to existing programs in the same state. This suggests either that developing programs 
examine the operational procedures of other programs when making structural decisions or that 
state-level characteristics are important considerations for community stakeholders. Second, 
programs that commit to provide aid to all eligible students tend to provide information on 
eligibility before high school. Programs making the upfront commitment to fund all students are 
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less likely to incorporate additional qualifications that reduce the amount of outgoing aid. Lastly, 
despite the benefit of aiding low-income students, income qualifications are much less likely to 
be used by programs. Instead, programs opt to use grade point average to narrow the eligible 
population.  
Community-Sustained Residency-Based Aid Program Spectrums 
The dataset created for the clustering algorithm comprises binary variables that identify 
whether a program meets a specific characteristic. Clustering algorithms do not readily recognize 
categorical variables, so classifications must be broken into binary data points. In reality, the 
qualities that make up a program are more akin to a scale where characteristics can take many 
different forms. To categorize the areas of differentiation across the 67 Community-Sustained 
programs, I have established six spectrums. A spectrum is “used to classify something, or 
suggest that it can be classified, in terms of its position on a scale between two extreme or 
opposite points” (Oxford, 2016). The benefit of transforming information on program 
characteristics into the spectrums is primarily visual. The spectrums can be combined to 
demonstrate programs that are similar over multiple characteristics. This cannot be achieved with 
the previously described typology.  
I use the basic dataset from the typology to develop the spectrums. The six main 
spectrums I have created are Timeframe for Information on Commitment, Potential Monetary 
Value of Aid, Sub-Qualifications for Eligibility, and Institutional Type and Admission 
Requirements. I also provide a sub-spectrum that more finely specifies the variation within the 
Sub-Qualifications: Grade Point Average Requirements spectrum. I include one additional area 
of operational procedure that was not included in the typology: College Access Support 
Programs. The new area does not directly relate to students obtaining early information on 
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postsecondary affordability, but still represents differences in program design that researchers 
may find beneficial when examining outcomes related to early information. The spectrums are 
illustrated in Figures 4-9. Each spectrum identifies the range of existing alternatives and 
identifies the specific programs within each alternative. Next, I describe the scope of each 
spectrum and why the range may be relevant to future researchers.  
Timeframe. Figure 4 illustrates the range of time differences for when programs provide 
information on eligibility. Timeframe for Information on Commitment (Timeframe) measures 
when students become aware of their eligibility or are able to finalize access into the program, if 
the program provides a commitment to financial aid. The Timeframe categories are based on the 
description of early information provided by previous authors and on the timing described in 
college choice literature. The spectrum categories are Kindergarten through Junior High (8th 
grade), High School (9th through 12th grade), and No Commitment. Programs that provide a 
commitment to fund students before they enroll in high school are classified as Kindergarten 
through Junior High. The Junior High classification includes the stage when, according to 
Cabrera and LaNasa (2000), college consideration begins for students. High School corresponds 
with the point at which a student begins to establish secondary school curricular paths and 
postsecondary preparation (Harnisch, 2009). No Commitment signifies programs that do not 
guarantee aid to all eligible students. The time period for when students receive a commitment 
impacts their ability to make academic adjustments (Fryer, 2011). Additionally, the decisions 
made before a financial aid commitment are still relevant to the student’s opportunity costs from 
enrolling (Perna, 2004).  
Value. Figure 5 illustrates the different values and aid distribution methods for programs. 
Potential Monetary Value of Aid (Value) is used to identify the highest amount of financial aid a 
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student has the capability to receive and the method for determining the value of aid. The three 
primary types of aid distribution are flat rate, percentage-based value, and last-dollar funding. 
The AACC (2013) estimates that the national average tuition rate among two-year institutions is 
approximately $3,000. I use this value as a cut-off point for flat rate awards. The designation 
separates programs with a value less than or equal to $3,000 (Flat or Capped, ≤ $3,000) 
compared to programs with a specified value greater than $3,000 (Flat or Capped, > $3,000). 
The percentage-based value and last-dollar funding identify whether a formula is used for 
assigning a specific aid amount to each student. This includes models based on longevity and 
ones that cover unmet need. Prior financial aid literature indicates that the value of financial aid 
impacts students’ postsecondary enrollment decisions (Heller, 1996; Leslie & Brinkman, 1989). 
For this reason, it is necessary to consider the different formats aid can take. 
Sub-Qualifications. Figure 6 illustrates the different qualifications, beyond residency, 
that programs use to determine eligibility. The Sub-Qualifications identify additional 
qualifications (beyond residency) that are used to determine student eligibility for aid. The range 
of Sub-Qualifications includes programs that use Grade Point Average (GPA) or Income 
Restrictions, programs that use Both GPA and Income Restrictions, and programs that do not 
have any requirements beyond residency (None). Income Restriction is a dichotomous category 
of whether a program requires a specified Expected Family Contribution based on filing FAFSA. 
Residency-based aid programs may have the largest impact in creating access for low-income 
student populations (Blanco, 2009; Harnisch, 2009; Tierney & Venegas, 2009). Using minimum 
income requirements may inadvertently create an information barrier for the very group of 
students it is designed to capture (Doyle, 2008). 
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The Sub-Qualification: GPA includes programs that identify grade point averages starting 
at a 2.0 minimum GPA, 2.5 minimum GPA, and at least a 3.0 GPA (as demonstrated in Figure 
7). These three grade point requirements are the most frequently used by programs, so I identify 
them as cut-off points. The use of a minimum GPA targets students with different levels of high 
school academic achievement and narrows the list of those potentially eligible (Bozick, 
Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Gonzalez, Bozick, Taylor, & Phillips, 2011). When a program uses 
a GPA requirement, it may lessen the ability to forecast eligibility, even when a student is still 
capable of achieving the academic benchmark (Duan-Barnett, 2011).  
Institutional Type. Figure 8 illustrates the range of institutional choices students have for 
redeeming a program’s aid award. The Institutional Type and Admission Requirements spectrum 
separates programs based on how aid can be redeemed at specified institutions. The spectrum 
identifies programs that are redeemable at any single, specific institution nationally, multiple 
select 2- or 4-year institutions (in-state and out of state), all 2-year institutions in the state, and all 
2- and 4-year institutions in the state. Institution type restrictions influence how students respond 
to the creation of a program (Andrews, et al., 2010; Bartik, Hershbein, & Lachowska, 2015; 
Bozick, Gonzalez, & Engberg, 2015; Carruthers & Fox, 2016). Limiting institutions may present 
additional access barriers in the form of a selective application process or “cooling out” at two-
year institutions (Clark, 1964). 
College Access Support Programs. Figure 9 illustrates whether a support network 
accompanies the financial aid award and when students have access to the additional resources. 
The College Access Support Programs spectrum is divided into categories according to whether 
a program offers additional access to information, and if it does, when students are able to 
receive it: Pre-High School, High School, or No Program. Providing financial aid without 
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supporting students through the transition may hinder a student’s ability to enroll in higher 
education (Goldrick-Rab, 2007; Vaade, 2009; Vaade, 2010; Vaade & McCready, 2011). Support 
generates both social and cultural capital that can be passed between generations and student 
networks, and the impact can extend outside the program. The presence of College Access 
Support Programs has led to some debate over how much of postsecondary outcomes are a result 
of the aid award when mentoring is included (Toutkoushian, Hossler, DesJardins, McCall, & 
Canche, 2015).  
The individual spectrums identify programs with a single similar characteristic. When 
used in conjunction with each other, the spectrums generate a list of programs comparable across 
multiple characteristics. Figures 10 and 11 provide a visual example of how the spectrums 
created in this typology can be used to illustrate program comparability across multiple 
characteristics. Here, I demonstrate the comparability of Community- Sustained residency-based 
programs in terms of early information on postsecondary affordability by merging Value and 
Timeframe (Figure 10) and Value, Timeframe, and Sub-Qualifications (Figure 10).  
Figure 10 combines the spectrums Timeframe and Value. The Timeframes spectrum 
separates the cube vertically, with the four Value columns measured along the horizontal axis. 
Figure 10 demonstrates that the largest number of programs provide students information about 
affordability prior to high school by meeting unmet need. Programs that do not provide a 
financial aid commitment are categorized as awarding an amount that covers unmet needs, 
awarding less than $3,000, and awarding a value greater than $3,000. 
Identifying programs that are comparable across the three spectrums is possible using a 
cube structure, as shown in Figure 11, which provides visual support of the how differences 
across the three spectrums separate programs into substantially smaller comparative groups. 
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Despite being considered similar in the cluster analysis, researchers may find the distinctions 
among the “squares” within the cube to be important. For example, the Kalamazoo Promise is 
located in the square with six other programs. Kalamazoo is frequently cited as the benchmark 
for residency-based aid programs. Beyond Kalamazoo, two other programs from Michigan are 
comparable: the Benton Harbor Promise and Battle Creek’s Legacy Scholars. Two programs 
from Illinois are comparable: Galesburg Promise and Peoria Promise. The El Dorado Promise is 
centered in Arkansas. The remaining 60 Community-Sustained programs have at least one 
difference within the three spectrums. 
Figure 11 is useful for illustrating a number of blank squares and the number of squares 
with a high concentration of programs. For instance, there are no programs with maximum 
income requirements or minimum grade point average thresholds that provide students a 
commitment for a flat financial aid amount prior to high school. Programs that provide a flat aid 
amount and use sub-qualifications do not provide students with a commitment prior to high 
school. By comparison, Figure 11 demonstrates that a large number of programs that use a 
percentage formula or cover remaining unmet need give students information prior to high 
school (kindergarten -8th grade) and do not use sub-qualifications. The concentration of 
programs in the K-8th/Unmet Need/Sub-Qualifications: None square, relative to the other 
squares, suggests that developing programs copy the structure of existing programs. If programs 
developed eligibility criteria, without considering neighboring programs, we would expect a 
uniform spread of programs across the three-dimensional cube. If developing programs do 
examine the structure of their existing “neighbors”, this is further justification that a typology is 
needed to promote new research on student outcomes.  
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Discussion 
This research opens several points for discussion among researchers, policymakers, and 
stakeholders charged with creating a commitment for financial aid to students. First, the cluster 
analysis results demonstrate that financial aid programs that include residency-based eligibility 
criteria should not be treated uniformly. As I hypothesize, Community-Sustained programs have 
enough differentiation in operational procedures that general comparisons with state-based 
programs and institutionally funded programs are unsuitable. The typology I present here focuses 
on the role residency-based programs play in providing students with information on 
postsecondary affordability.  
Miller-Adams (2015) argues that all Promise programs should be treated as a single 
group because residency requirements and economic development constitute sufficient 
commonality despite the distinctions across programs. I offer this typology in opposition to this 
argument. The label “Promise” has been used inconsistently in both the scholarly literature and 
popular media. The problem is exacerbated by the frequency with which Promise appears in 
program titles. I find that in terms of providing information on postsecondary affordability, only 
a small number of programs from the large number named Promise satisfy the implication of the 
label − a promise to provide funding based on location. This inconsistent use of Promise in 
program titles can send confusing messages to students who are attempting to decipher 
information on postsecondary affordability.   
I extend the typology to include the spectrums for Community-Sustained programs to 
demonstrate the variation within similarly structured programs. The cluster analysis results 
provide support for the hypothesis that residency-based aid programs are sufficiently different 
from other forms of financial aid; chiefly state-based aid programs and institutionally funded 
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programs. The findings from the cluster analysis portion of this typology should not be taken to 
signify that all Community-Sustained programs are uniform. On the contrary, the spectrums 
demonstrate that the evolution of the grassroots Promise idea has produced a wide array of 
financial aid programs.  
The spectrums for Community-Sustained programs provide a starting point for both 
qualitative and quantitative researchers to consider where potential biases may exist in their 
research. Quantitatively, the spectrums identify the differences in program procedure that should 
be accounted for when examining student outcomes. These differences may be significant in 
easing the transition into postsecondary education for students, or may represent additionally 
obstacles that mar the benefits of early information on affordability. Qualitatively, the spectrums 
may be a useful starting point for developing research related to student perceptions on 
affordability and how new information is used in the college-going decision. For instance, 
whether new information on Community-Sustained programs is considered trust worthier than 
information on other social benefit programs?  
Together, the cluster analysis results and Community-Sustained program spectrums 
reinforce my earlier hypothesis that “Promise” programs should not be used as a uniform 
descriptor. The growing trend of residency-based aid programs, and the subsequent “free 
college” political rhetoric, are not necessarily one and the same. The details and decisions made 
in the developmental stage led to vast differences.  
For policymakers, the typology presented here may offer a starting point for reassessing 
financial aid. The lack of information on affordability has prevented millions of academically 
qualified students from pursuing postsecondary credentials in the last decade alone, a problem 
labeled cost discouragement (Heller, 2006). Perna et al. (2008) argue that cost discouragement is 
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not an aid availability program but rather an aid information problem. The financial aid process 
does not provide a commitment for funding until the point directly before enrollment; however, 
the structure of a program can be useful in circumventing this problem. The Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO, 2013) recognizes this shortcoming, noting that adjusting the criteria for 
federal Pell Grants to match other social welfare programs would allow students more insight in 
estimating their eligibility.  
Residency-based aid programs have the capability to provide an efficient solution to a 
number of social problems, not the least of which is promoting a college-going environment. 
Promoting postsecondary enrollment serves to equalize social income disparities (Perna, 2004). 
These programs provide a cost-effective method for training the local workforce and sparking 
consumer spending (Andrews, 2013). Perhaps most noticeably, increasing educational attainment 
alters the incentives of students in ways that reduce spending on the criminal justice system and 
social welfare (Becker, 1964; McMahon, 2009). To maximize this level of efficiency, further 
research is needed on student responsiveness to specific program parameters. This typology 
provides a process for scholars to build upon this research.  
Budgeting challenges have monopolized the headlines, as institutions try to navigate the 
current trend of state and federal cutbacks. One response of this may be a more in-depth 
assessment for efficiently allocating information to students. The continually increasing number 
of universally eligible scholarship programs that cite economic development as the motivating 
objective can be used as evidence that social returns will follow. The typology presented here is 
a first step in working toward this research. A similar process could be used with state-based and 
institutional No Loan programs. That is a future application of this research. 
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Paper Two: The Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship 
In the last decade, hundreds of communities have become more proactive in boosting 
postsecondary access for their residents through the development of financial aid programs. I 
label the financial aid format of communities fiscally supporting postsecondary access of 
students within a pre-defined, local region as community-sustained financial aid programs in 
Paper One of this dissertation. One characteristic common among a large portion of community-
sustained aid programs is the commitment to provide an aid award to all students who meet the 
eligibility requirements. The commitment to all eligible students removes any hidden process for 
selectively awarding aid, and helps create transparent information on eligibility in a timeframe 
before the normal postsecondary financial aid process, specifically the time when students file 
the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). Early information on postsecondary 
affordability can stimulate college access at two-year institutions for students on the margin 
(Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Pluhta & Penny, 2013). Despite the growing number of community-
sustained aid programs, and the percentage aligned with two-year institutions, relatively little 
research exists that focuses on outcomes at these institutions. This research adds to the body of 
literature by focusing on a community-sustained aid program that is redeemable at a single, 
specific two-year institution. 
The Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship (Carroll Scholarship, hereafter) was formally 
announced at a high school assembly in January 2013. The scholarship’s creation came from an 
inheritance donation willed by the namesake couple (Harbour, 2013; Harbour, 2014). The 
Carroll Scholarship is last-dollar aid for all Meridian High School (Meridian) students who 
enroll in credit-bearing courses at the local, two-year institution Richland Community College 
(Richland). The last-dollar scholarship covers remaining unmet tuition and fees after all other 
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forms of financial aid have been applied. The scholarship provides a guarantee that Meridian 
students will have no out-of-pocket financial obligations or require student loans to cover the 
cost of attendance at Richland. In the short term, the surprise announcement of the program 
yields an instantaneous change in student information on postsecondary affordability that can 
produce new incentives for the college-going decision and course-taking behaviors of eligible 
students. 
The creation of the Carroll Scholarship generates different incentives for prior, 
forthcoming, and future Meridian graduates. The 2013 Meridian senior class represents the first 
group of students capable of using Carroll Scholarship information for their college-going 
decision.9 Richland has an open-enrollment policy that does not subject students to a selective 
institutional admission process beyond providing proof of a high school credential. A perspective 
student may apply, receive admittance, and enroll in Richland courses up to the first day of the 
forthcoming semester. Meridian students who previously planned to forego higher education 
were able to use the information provided at the Carroll Scholarship announcement to reassess 
their college-going decision, specifically related to enrolling at Richland. Senior class members 
who previously opted to attend another institution could use the Carroll Scholarship information 
to reconsider enrolling at Richland. The surprise announcement limited the ability for 2013 
Meridian senior class to adjust their college readiness with their schedule of classes, however. 
Students newly incentivized by the scholarship were unable to alter their academic standing and 
postsecondary preparation since high school course-taking choices were already established 
when the scholarship was announced. 
                                                        
9 Educational institutions often separate student groups according to high school “senior class,” signifying their year 
of graduation. This is common in both secondary and postsecondary schooling. To avoid confusion in my research, 
the use of senior class will signify a student’s graduation year of high school. 
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Meridian graduates from pre-2013 senior classes also received a benefit from the 
scholarship announcement, as the Carroll Scholarship was created with a grandfather clause 
granting eligibility to all former graduates of Meridian High School.10 Prior Meridian graduates 
were unable to alter their secondary school outcomes and academic preparation after the 
scholarship announcement, but were also unable to change their postsecondary outcomes from 
the semesters prior to Spring 2013 (the semester when the scholarship was announced). Prior 
Meridian graduates now had the ability to adjust their current and future postsecondary 
decisions. 
Lastly, each subsequent post-2013 Meridian senior class is incentivized by the Carroll 
Scholarship announcement. The advanced information on eligibility for the Carroll Scholarship 
can be an incentive to improve secondary school academic outcomes and increase the likelihood 
of postsecondary success. Future graduates are able to use information on postsecondary 
affordability to make strategic secondary school choices related to boosting college readiness. 
For instance, students may elect to take secondary school courses associated with college 
preparation and devote additional resources to establishing study skills. Adjusting the level of 
college preparation reduces the trade-offs associated with postsecondary enrollment (Perna, 
2004).  
The combination of incentives for students from different Meridian graduating classes 
provides a unique environment to examine the changing student decisions and outcomes that 
resulted from the scholarship. This paper will use a panel dataset identified at the student-by-
semester level, consisting of students who graduated from Richland’s 14 in-district high schools 
                                                        
10 Meridian High School was created in 1994, when the Blue Mound School District and Macon School District 
merged. Graduates from both high schools were eligible for the scholarship through the grandfather clause. The 
dataset for this research goes back to 2010, after the merger, so I will only refer to the eligible district as Meridian 
High School. 
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between 2010-2015, and who registered for credit-bearing courses at Richland. I use high school 
grade point average as a measure of college readiness to assess the likelihood a student was 
incentivized to enroll at Richland. I collapse the panel dataset to be identified at the school-by-
year level to examine changes in college readiness after the Carroll Scholarship announcement. I 
extend the analysis into measurements of postsecondary credit-enrollment decisions, credits 
earned, and the cause of unearned credit hours (course withdrawal or failing semester grade). I 
use the student-by-semester panel dataset structure to analyze changes in student’s postsecondary 
course-taking decisions and course outcomes, post Carroll Scholarship. Lastly, I evaluate 
differences in curricular decisions made by Carroll Scholarship eligible students using the 
collapsed school-by-year dataset. I apply a mixture of quasi-experimental Difference-in-
Difference research design and multiple regression methodologies address the research 
questions. Formally, the three research questions are:  
1.) What differences exist in college readiness measures among Meridian graduates 
who enrolled at Richland after the introduction of the Dell and Evelyn Carroll 
community-sustained financial aid program?  
2.) How has the Dell and Evelyn Carroll community-sustained financial aid program 
altered postsecondary curricular outcomes of Meridian graduates who enrolled 
at Richland? 
3.) How does the Dell and Evelyn Carroll community-sustained financial aid 
program alter credential-seeking decisions by Meridian graduates who enrolled 
at Richland Community College? 
 
This paper is organized as follows. I begin with a brief background of Richland and its 
surrounding community. I review the literature of programs comparable to the Carroll 
Scholarship, followed by a detailed discussion of the conceptual framework and hypotheses of 
this research. After I describe the institutional level dataset, specifications of the Difference-in-
Difference, quasi-experimental methodology, I conclude with descriptive statistics and summary 
of model results. 
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Background 
Richland is located in central Illinois and primarily serves students from Macon County 
for which descriptive demographic data is provided in Table 4. Over the years of the study, 
Macon County experienced diverging income statistics within the population. Table 4 shows an 
increase in median household income between 2010 and 2015. The same trend holds for mean 
household income and per capita income, with the exception of a single year decline in 2012. 
Average education levels slowly increased during the years of this research. The percentage of 
the population (25 yrs. or older) attaining only a high school diploma decreased between 2010 
and 2015, corresponding with an increased percentage of the population achieving Associate’s 
Degrees and Bachelor’s Degrees (RCC, n.d.). Despite income and educational gains, the 
percentage of families living in poverty changed sporadically between 2010 and 2015. In 2012, 
the percentage of families living in poverty (17.2%) and percentage of families living in poverty 
with children 18 years or younger (35.2%) each peaked (RCC, n.d.). The following year, 2013, 
represented the highest percentage of families with children 5 year or younger (41.3%) living in 
poverty (RCC, n.d.).  
Changes in Macon County poverty rates follow the unemployment rate over the same 
time period. Table 4 shows county unemployment increasing from 2010 to 2012, where it 
reached 13.1% (RCC, n.d.). The rate decreased in subsequent years, likely due to the decreasing 
size of the civilian labor force. Table 5 provides a list of all employers with more than 100 
employees. Employment in Macon County is heavily reliant on agriculture and manufacturing 
(RCC, n.d.).  
Richland represents community college District #537, a geographic region that is made 
up of 14 individual high schools. The high schools include public and private, religious and non- 
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religious affiliations. Table 6 identifies the high schools within the research sample and the 
Illinois counties where the school districts reside. All 14 high schools partner with Richland to 
provide dual-credit course offerings. Richland reports that nearly half of dual-credit students are 
high school seniors and approximately 30% continue their education at Richland after graduation 
(RCC, 2014.). Specific to Meridian High School, dual-credit course students increased from 46 
in 2009 to 119 in 2014 (RCC, 2014.).11 
Table 7 disaggregates Richland’s enrollment by in-district high school and senior class 
year. The table lists the number of high school graduates in each senior class, the number who 
enroll at Richland after graduation, and the percentage this represents of the senior class size for 
the 13 non-Meridian High Schools of the sample and Meridian High School. The in-district high 
schools not eligible for the Carroll Scholarship are recognized using a unique identifier to 
maintain their anonymity.12 There is substantial variation in the senior class size of the schools 
within the Richland district.13 The senior classes for several high schools exceed one hundred 
students each year, while the smallest senior class graduated only nine students. Meridian’s 
senior class size fell between 73 and 79 students for each year of the study.  
On average, Meridian makes up approximately 10% of Richland’s in-district enrollment. 
The percentage of Meridian students who enroll at Richland increases by 15 percentage points in 
the Fall 2013 semester. After 2013, percentage of Meridian students enrolled is larger than any 
pre-Carroll Scholarship year. Relative to the in-district high schools, Meridian had the largest 
                                                        
11 Dual credit agreements differ among the 14 in-district high schools. Some high schools cover tuition and fees for 
a student to take dual credit courses. The remaining schools require students to cover the cost. The Carroll 
Scholarship does not cover dual credit expenses.  
12 This was a stipulation made by Richland’s Office of Institutional Research in exchange for obtaining access to 
student records. 
13 The senior class size and number enrolled at Richland are not identified for the individual schools in Table 7 
because have small sample size numbers. I have made this decision because a number of schools have less than 10 
students enroll at Richland and the research design used in this study does not compare Meridian to specific in-
district schools.   
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percentage of graduating students who enrolled at Richland between 2013 and 2015. Figure 12 is 
a visual representation of the percentage of students who transitioned to Richland, separated by 
Meridian and the cumulative student population for the remaining 13 in-district schools. The 
figure provides visual support that the introduction of the Carroll Scholarship coincides with an 
enrollment boost of Meridian students at Richland and is justification that further research is 
necessary to identify the change in student enrollment incentives and the characteristics of 
students who enroll. 
Literature Review 
 A growing body of literature examines how behaviors are modified after the 
announcement of a financial aid program with the characteristics similar to the Carroll 
Scholarship. The incentives created from these programs are not uniform; rather, they depend on 
program specifications. Prior research on how secondary school incentives are influenced by the 
announcement of a community-sustained financial aid program is examined next. After, I focus 
on literature specifically aligned with two-year institutions, including college access, institutional 
choice, and postsecondary outcomes. For a more in-depth review of community-sustained 
financial aid programs that include postsecondary outcomes at four-year institutions, please 
reference the literature review in dissertation Paper One. 
Secondary School. The announcement of a community-sustained financial aid program 
presents new incentives for students with postsecondary aspirations, particularly 
underrepresented student populations (Ash, 2015; Bartik & Lachowski, 2012). Programs with 
non-selectivity based, transparent criteria for eligibility (for example, residency or longevity of 
residency) provide students upfront information on aid award and the ability to continuously 
monitor their own eligibility. Introducing financial incentives to students can immediately alter 
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input driven behaviors, like time studying (Fryer, 2011; Kelchen & Goldrick-Rab, 2013). The 
length of time after a student learns about the financial incentive and when they earn the award is 
an important factor for determining how much a student is able to transform effort into outputs 
such as elevating their grades (Fryer, 2011). There is evidence that the announcement of a local, 
community-sustained financial aid program can stimulate student responses in a manner similar 
to secondary school financial incentives like pay-for-grades.  
The Kalamazoo Promise, one of the most widely researched community-sustained 
programs, was announced in January 2006 and the aid was distributed quickly after (Miller-
Adams, 2015). Kalamazoo awards first-dollar aid (up to 100% tuition coverage at Michigan 
colleges) to all eligible students, based solely on longevity of residency in Kalamazoo Public 
Schools (KPS).14 Short-run Kalamazoo Promise research finds increased demand for Advanced 
Placement courses and decreases in the number of school suspensions (Bartik & Lachowski, 
2012; Miller-Adams, 2015). The renewed sense of postsecondary access in students after the 
creation of the program was insufficient to transform student inputs into academic outputs for the 
first cohorts of Kalamazoo Promise recipients. KPS students’ standardized test scores remained 
largely unaffected for the first three years of the program (Bartik, Eberts, & Huang, 2010). 
During the same three-year timeframe, average student grade point average did not statistically 
change either (Bartik & Lachowski, 2012; Miller-Adams, 2015).  
The Kalamazoo Promise’s outcomes are nearly identical to those of the El Dorado 
(Arkansas) Promise. The El Dorado Promise was announced in January 2007, and began 
distributing aid to eligible students in the forthcoming senior class (Ash & Ritter, 2014). El 
Dorado’s program is structured similarly to Kalamazoo’s, except the aid award can be redeemed 
                                                        
14 I provide a detailed description on the Kalamazoo Promise eligibility criteria and aid eligibility formula in 
dissertation Paper One. 
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at any two- or four-year, public or private institution across the country. Ash and Ritter (2014) 
find evidence of increased test scores in math and literacy among low-income and African-
American El Dorado students, however, the results are most pronounced for those who are 
already in the upper 50th percentile. They attribute the academic gains to students in the upper 
50th percentile most likely having prior experience transforming input driven incentives into 
outcomes. The authors find no support that the scholarship announcement had a positive 
academic impact on students with lower likelihood to transition into postsecondary education. 
The El Dorado school district’s implementation of a more academically rigorous curriculum, 
shortly after the scholarship announcement, is also attributed to lower academic outcomes. 
Despite the financial incentives provided by the El Dorado Promise announcement, curriculum 
changes lead to a reduced graduation rate among low-income students in the first cohorts of El 
Dorado’s eligible students (Ash & Ritter, 2014).  
A program with notable differences in student outcomes is Knox (TN) Achieves. The 
Knox Achieves scholarship (later known as tnAchieves) gave Knox County graduates full tuition 
coverage at any Tennessee two-year institution and required eligible students to meet with 
mentors during the timeframe associated with making a college-going decision. This stipulation 
is intended to help students overcome obstacles in the college-going process; specifically, 
navigating the process of transforming effort into outcomes. Carruthers and Fox (2016) 
attributed the program with increased high school completion rates, and with a stronger influence 
among female and African-American students. The authors were not able to discern how much 
of this influence is the result of the scholarship compared to mentoring (Carruthers & Fox, 
2016). 
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College Access. The incentives generated by a community-sustained financial aid 
program are dependent on the value of the aid, and where the aid award can be carried. To date, 
the only research that examines a community-sustained financial aid programs impact on college 
access at a single, two-year institution is the three-year controlled experiment from Pluhta and 
Penny (2013). Pluhta and Penny (2013) examined the influence of a scholarship award based 
solely on high school completion. The scholarship is redeemable at a single, two-year institution 
for graduates of a specific low-income, inner-city school district. In the three years prior to the 
scholarship creation, only 6% of high school graduates applied to any type of postsecondary 
institution. After the implementation of the scholarship, postsecondary enrollment rose to 
approximately 61% of senior class members. Pluhta and Penny (2013) described the cost of 
operating the scholarship program as relatively low because a large portion of students qualified 
for financial need-based aid and did not require any funds directly from the scholarship. The 
authors attributed the increased college-going decision to the scholarship’s commitment to fund 
all eligible students and the transparent eligibility criteria that was based solely on residency. The 
single eligibility requirement of residency left students with little doubt as to whether they would 
receive aid and how much out-of-pocket expense would be associated with enrollment. The 
scholarship did not actually create postsecondary affordability, but rather reduced perceived 
barriers to the specific student population. The authors also noted that a majority of students in 
the post-scholarship timeframe qualified for the full value of federal Pell grants indicating that 
most pre-scholarship students would have also likely qualified. The findings from Pluhta and 
Penny make a substantial contribution to financial aid research by illustrating that the early 
commitment from a community-based program produces a stronger signal of affordability for 
students than programs without a local connection. 
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Institutional Choice. Prior research finds that a financial aid program that stipulates the 
institutions or institution types that aid may be redeemed can impact the institutional choice of 
eligible students. For the aforementioned Kalamazoo Promise, Andrews, DesJardins and 
Ranchhod (2010) determined that eligible students became less likely to report ACT scores to the 
local, two-year institution, Kalamazoo Valley Community College (KVCC). The authors found 
that students simultaneously became more likely to send them to the in-state, four-year 
institutions Western Michigan University, Michigan State University, and University of 
Michigan-Ann Arbor (Andrews, et. al, 2010). This is telling of students institutional 
considerations because ACT scores can be delivered free to six different institutions, and KVCC 
enrolled the largest percentage of Kalamazoo Promise recipients in the years following the 
scholarship’s announcement (Miller-Adams, 2015). Conversely, a program with a shorter, 
restricted list of redeemable institutions may narrow where a student considers attending. 
Postsecondary enrollment increases among Knox Achieves’ students were concentrated at 
eligible two-year colleges. The two-year institution enrollment gains appear to represent students 
who would have enrolled at in-state, four-year institutions (Carruthers & Fox, 2016).  
When aid award allows institutional choice, descriptive statistics indicate that students 
typically opt to attend an institution close in proximity. The nearest two- and four-year 
institutions to KPS enrolled the largest percentage of eligible Kalamazoo Promise students: 
KVCC enrolled 39% of the first class and Western Michigan University enrolled 34% of eligible 
students (Miller-Adams, 2015). The same two institutions have enrolled the highest percentage 
of Kalamazoo Promise scholars in each year since the program’s announcement (Miller-Adams, 
2015). Similarly, El Dorado’s two-year institution, South Arkansas Community College, enrolled 
29% of El Dorado Promise students in first year of the scholarship (El Dorado Promise, 2015).  
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Postsecondary Outcomes. Carruthers and Fox’s (2016) examination of the Knox 
Achieves program is the only research that disaggregates the postsecondary outcomes of a 
community-sustained financial aid program specifically at two-year institutions. They found that 
the Knox Achieves program had mixed results for student’s postsecondary outcomes. 
Scholarship recipients statistically achieve more credit hours, but demonstrate no other academic 
differences. The authors found no difference in grades for students who do and do not earn the 
award. Additionally, Carruthers and Fox (2016) found no evidence that Knox Achieves students 
earned college credentials at a rate different from non-eligible students. 
The research I present here makes a needed contribution to the community-sustained 
financial aid program literature in a number of areas. In the existing research, no studies link 
college access, postsecondary outcomes, and curricular decisions as I do here. The dataset I have 
compiled for this research is a unique combination of postsecondary records (that specific 
includes high school transcript information) for all students who enroll at Richland, from the 14 
surrounding in-district high schools (including the Carroll Scholarship eligible, Meridian High 
School). The dataset allows me to examine incentives from multiple perspectives. I am able to 
examine how the Carroll Scholarship provides different types of treatment conditions to students: 
early information on postsecondary affordability versus the actual scholarship value necessary to 
cover remaining cost of attendance. This is important for assessing how students’ college-going 
decision was instantaneously changed as a result of the scholarship announcement, how 
scholarship information and actual scholarship award may produce differentiated results, and 
how multiple student outcomes may be impacted.  
Additionally, my work provides a contribution to the field by examining a program not 
previously studied. There is little research focusing on the effects of a community-sustained 
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financial aid program that is only redeemable at a single, two-year institution. This is a 
substantial limitation because a growing number of programs restrict enrollment to two-year 
institutions or a specific two-year institution. The incentives produced by the Carroll Scholarship 
may be unique to the programs examined in prior research. For instance, Meridian is unlike the 
low-income, inner-city school district with little college-going culture described in Pluhta and 
Penny’s (2013) research. The percentage of pre-scholarship Meridian senior class members 
enrolling at Richland varied from 20.5% to 46.8%, compared to 6% in Pluhta and Penny’s 
research. Additionally, on average, the Expected Family Contribution (EFC) for Meridian 
students is above the level for Pell Grant eligibility, demonstrating the household income 
difference between the programs. Therefore, my findings for Research Question #1 contribute to 
the literature on how middle-income students at the margin are incentivized to transition into 
higher education by a community-sustained financial aid program.  
No research to date examines the change in student’s postsecondary outcomes at a single, 
two-year institution after the announcement of a community-sustained financial aid program as 
this research does. Examining postsecondary outcomes at two-year institutions is distinct from 
outcomes expected from students at four-year institutions. The change in student’s postsecondary 
outcomes is the basis for Research Question #2. Two-year institutions are more likely to capture 
students who previously planned to forego higher education, are the least academically prepared 
for higher education, and come from academically underrepresented populations (AACC, 2013).  
Finally, Research Question #3 assess whether a community-sustained financial aid 
program influences the postsecondary curriculum a student selects to follow while enrolled at 
Richland. This question is missing in the current body of literature surrounding community-
sustained financial aid programs. Prior financial aid research describes the presence of 
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Substitution Effects, which occur when financial aid programs designed to increase educational 
attainment inadvertently incentivize students to reduce their academic expectations (Becker, 
1964; Long, 2004; Peltzman, 1973). The reduction in the cost of attendance causes students to 
reassess and reprioritize all forms of financial decisions, such as examining their foregone 
earnings differently when choosing to pursue either a terminal two-year degree or certificate. 
Substitution effects may also be an application of Burton Clark’s (1964) “cooling out,” where 
students at two-year institutions are redirected away from higher degree aspirations. In either 
case, community-sustained financial aid programs redeemable at two-year institutions may have 
a differentiated influence on the type of courses a student selects. This difference may be 
important to the communities funding these programs and warrants research.  
Conceptual Framework 
I use Perna’s (2005) conceptual framework as a guide for student’s college-going choice: 
a college choice conceptual framework that incorporates economic and sociological aspects into 
the students’ decision. This conceptual framework describes four layers from which students 
receive information and context on postsecondary access. The layers are organized so context is 
funneled from the macro-environment through consecutively smaller levels representative of a 
student’s environment and network for receiving feedback. Context is not linear or sequential so 
students are constantly receiving pertinent information to apply to their college-going decision. 
Perna (2005) states, “although college choice is ultimately based on a comparison of the benefits 
and costs of enrolling, assessments of the benefits and costs are shaped not only by the demand 
for higher education and supply of resources to pay the costs but also by an individual’s habitus 
and, directly and indirectly, by the family, school and community context, higher education 
context, and social, economic, and policy context” (p. 119). Details on the application of Perna’s 
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framework to this research are covered next. Figure 13 is an illustration of the framework and 
includes the alignment of the covariates included in this research.  
The outer layer, Social, Economic, and Policy Context, directly and indirectly impact a 
student’s perception of postsecondary affordability and the opportunity costs associated with 
college choice. This influence occurs through federal, state, and local policy/budgets; as well as 
economic conditions. For example, students may receive context about the availability of state-
based financial aid programs and the potential fiscal returns from entering the labor force directly 
(Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 2013; Freeman, 1997; Heller, 2006; Kane, 1994; St. John & Tuttle, 
2004; Zumeta, 2004). The Higher Education Context captures indicators students receive from 
institutions about admission potential, affordability, and their fit within the campus community 
(Adelman, 2006; College Board, 2010; Greene & Winters, 2005; Horn, Kojaku, & Carroll, 2001; 
Wyatt, Wiley, & Camara, 2010). Higher Education Context can range from generic, mass 
advertising to personal, direct communication/interaction between potential students and college 
representatives. In the School and Community Context, students receive feedback on college 
opportunities and their potential academic success from guidance counselors or other 
professional networks (De LaRosa, 2006; Deming & Dynarski, 2009; Freeman, 1997; 
McDonough & Calderone, 2006; Perna, 2005; Tierney & Venegas, 2007). In the School and 
Community context, students may begin to experience postsecondary academic expectations in 
the form of advanced placement courses and dual credit classes. The innermost layer, Habitus, 
embodies feedback from a student’s immediate environment. In this layer, social and cultural 
capital provides perceptions, beliefs, and values regarding postsecondary potential (Coleman, 
1988; McDonough, 1997; Perna, 2005). The feedback from the Habitus layer is individualized to 
the student based on his or her own unique circumstances. 
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The decision-making point in Perna’s conceptual framework is similar to the Human 
Capital Theory and Price Theory in economics (Perna, 2004). The demand for postsecondary 
credentials is formed by the expected future need for higher education relative to the availability 
of resources to cover the cost of attendance, representing the preliminary college decision before 
considering the information received from the contextual layers. Feedback from the contextual 
layers reinforces or negates the preliminary perception of college access. Context supporting the 
expected benefits from receiving higher education or signals that a student will be successful in 
college increase the amount of education they will seek, shifting the theoretical demand for 
purchasing a postsecondary degree to the right. Context that diminishes the student’s prior 
impression of higher education lowers the amount the student is willing to purchase, decreasing 
demand. Feedback regarding the trade-offs associated with the perceived opportunity cost of 
attendance also shifts demand, depending on whether the context adds to the list of sacrifices 
(left) or offsets the trade-offs (right). The result is the student’s decision whether to enter higher 
education (i.e. purchase a degree).  
I am applying the Carroll Scholarship announcement to two layers of context in Perna’s 
framework. First, the announcement of the scholarship at a Meridian High School function (an 
all-school assembly) strengthens the perceived accessibility of Richland. Students were told that 
they could still pursue a college degree by enrolling at Richland, and that the scholarship 
guaranteed no out-of-pocket cost for attendance. The announcement also served as an 
advertisement of Richland’s open-enrollment policy. This positively alters the level of 
information available to Meridian students about postsecondary access within the School and 
Community Context, relative to students from neighboring high schools. 
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Second, the guarantee of the scholarship provides information on postsecondary 
affordability to all Meridian students, in advance of filing for financial aid (for example, via 
FAFSA). The commitment to cover a student’s remaining unmet financial need represents an 
increase in the supply of financial resources. Because of the Carroll Scholarship, all Meridian 
students have the ability to obtain 64 credit hours without relying on student loans or incurring 
out-of-pocket expenses for tuition and fees. The commitment from the Carroll Scholarship does 
not depend on individual characteristics or a selection process, providing students with greater 
confidence in obtaining the scholarship.  
Hypotheses. Hypotheses for each of the three research questions poised in this study are 
presented below. The hypotheses build from the conclusions of prior research and Perna’s 
conceptual framework, and are broken down into multiple parts as the Carroll Scholarship is 
likely to provide a different influence on students based on the students’ previous college 
aspirations.  
Research Question #1 asks, what differences exist in college readiness measures among 
Meridian graduates who enrolled at Richland after the introduction of the Dell and Evelyn 
Carroll community-sustained financial aid program? I am not able to directly observe whether a 
student changed their college-going decision after learning about the Carroll Scholarship, but 
examining college readiness measures can be used to give some insight to whether a student was 
likely to transition into postsecondary education. I hypothesize for Research Question #1 that the 
new information on postsecondary affordability will increase lead to increased levels of college 
readiness for Meridian students who enroll at Richland. I expect the rationale for the influence 
will vary based on the student’s level of college readiness. Students consider prior academic 
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achievements, like grade point average, in their assessment of the opportunity costs of enrolling 
in higher education.  
Students who perceive they have experienced a limited amount of prior academic success 
believe that success in college will require higher opportunity costs (Perna, 2004); for instance, 
more time spent developing study skills, taking developmental course work to prepare of credit-
bearing courses, and incurring the expenses of higher education with a higher risk of not 
completing. I believe this will explain why Meridian students in the bottom two high school 
grade point average quartiles, who gain new information about postsecondary affordability, will 
attempt to improve their level of college readiness after the scholarship announcement. I will 
identify this as hypothesis P2:H1a.15 The Carroll Scholarship reduces the opportunity costs 
associated with enrollment by eliminating the out-of-pocket cost of attendance. Similar to the 
findings from other community-sustained aid programs, the reduced opportunity costs will 
incentivize students on the margin to enroll at the two-year institution, relative to non-eligible 
students (Ash & Ritter, 2014; Bartik, Eberts, & Huang, 2010; Bartik & Lachowski, 2012; 
Carruthers & Fox, 2016; Pluhta & Penny, 2013).  
I expect that the Carroll Scholarship announcement will lead to a statistically significant 
increase in college readiness for Meridian students from the top two high school grade point 
average quartiles, that enroll at Richland, relative to non-eligible students. I expect students with 
higher grade point averages are likely to have devoted additional attention to academically 
preparing for college, to increase the chances of acceptance at their preferred institution, 
potentially earning merit based financial aid awards, and to increase the probability of academic 
                                                        
15 The notation for hypotheses is used to help make a distinction between the research questions and three papers in 
this dissertation. P2 signifies the second paper of the dissertation. H1 signifies the hypothesis for Research Question 
#1. a. signifies the first hypothesis for Research Question #1 
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success. Similar to Carruthers and Fox’s (2016) outcomes, a scholarship program that is 
redeemable at a single, two-year institution may influence students to change their institutional 
choice away from enrolling at a four-year institution. In this instance, the Carroll Scholarship 
reduces the financial opportunity costs associated with enrollment at the two-year college by 
providing a guarantee of tuition-free credit hours. I will refer to this as hypothesis P2:H1b. 
I have provided two different explanations for the hypothesis of Research Question #1 
because students may experience different types of postsecondary outcomes and curricular 
decisions based on their level of college readiness. Moving forward, I will refer to students from 
the bottom two high school grade point average quartiles, who were incentivized to transition 
into higher education (instead of seeking non-academic alternatives like entering the labor force), 
as infra-marginal students. This term is consistent with other financial aid research to identify 
students who were induced to attend college after a change at affordability (For example, see 
Dynarski, 2010). I will refer to the student population from the upper two grade point average 
quartiles, who are most likely to have been incentivized to enroll at Richland instead of other 
institutional alternatives (four-year institutions, for example), as college qualified students. I use 
both terms for simplicity and do not intend any other connotation.  
Research Question #2 asks, how has the Dell and Evelyn Carroll community-sustained 
financial aid program altered postsecondary curricular outcomes of Meridian graduates who 
enrolled at Richland? Here, I assess if the Carroll Scholarship incentivizes students to alter their 
course registration decisions at Richland, and how course outcomes are influenced. My first 
hypothesis for Research Question #2 (P2:H2a) is that I expect the guaranteed zero cost of tuition 
will allow all Meridian students (infra-marginal and college qualified) to register for more credit 
hours at Richland, relative to non-eligible students. Access to a greater amount of financial 
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resources increases student’s ability to purchase additional education. This is a basic application 
of Price Theory and is at the core of the decision-making point of Perna’s conceptual model 
(Perna, 2004; Perna, 2005).  
In addition to the Carroll Scholarships incentives to register for more credit hours, I will 
also examine if there is a difference in credit hours earned and credit hours unearned for eligible 
students. My second hypothesis for Research Question #2 (P2:H2b) is that Meridian’s infra-
marginal students will not be able to transform the financial incentive to enroll at Richland into 
successful course completion outcomes in the short term. As a result, they will have a higher rate 
of failed or withdrawn credit hours relative to non-eligible students. The basis for this hypothesis 
is previous research on financial incentives (Fryer, 2011; Kelchen & Goldrick-Rab, 2012). The 
Carroll Scholarship incentivizes a student to register for additional credit hours, but does not 
provide academic support to increase the possibility for success.  
My third hypothesis for Research Question #2 (P2:H2c) is that Meridian’s college 
qualified students will earn a more credit hours, relative to students who are not eligible for the 
scholarship. Stated differently, I expect that Meridian’s college qualified students will not only 
take additional credit hours (P2:H2a), but they will earn the credits from the additional credit 
hours. I expect that college qualified students are better prepared to transition into higher 
education, on average, and will not have the same challenges transforming input driven 
incentives into outcomes. This hypothesis is based on the findings from a comparable program, 
Knox Achieves, which incentivized students to alter their enrollment decision to a two-year 
institution (Carruthers & Fox, 2016).  
Research Question #3 asks, how does the Dell and Evelyn Carroll community-sustained 
financial aid program alter credential-seeking decisions by Meridian graduates who enrolled at 
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Richland Community College? In other words, will students be more or less likely to take 
courses aligned with earning an Associate’s Degree (the highest degree awarded at Richland, 
fully transferrable to other institutions). Prior research describes two dissimilar outcomes related 
to a student’s degree progression when first enrolling in a two-year institution following high 
school completion. 
The function of community colleges as a transition to higher-level degrees has been a 
point of debate over decades of research; increasingly, as a larger share of students use two-year 
institutions to transition into higher education. Most notably, Burton Clark (1964) describes a 
theory that community colleges may inadvertently guide students towards credentials beneath a 
Bachelor’s Degree. Clark labels this “cooling out”. More recently, Rouse (1995) details differing 
viewpoints on two-year enrollment starting with an assessment of the population of students who 
enroll at two-year colleges. She describes that students who opt to enroll at a two-year institution 
are mostly from two different groups: students who would not have normally attended higher 
education and students who elect to attend a two-year college instead of enrolling at a four-year 
institution; labeling the two potential influences of the two-year system democratization and 
diversion, respectively. Democratization provides a net positive effect on higher education 
attainment, as these students opt to gain additional education they would not previously have 
earned. The direction of effect for diversion is less evident. If students are able to use the credits 
earned at a two-year institution to better prepare them to succeed at a four-year institution, the 
net effect of beginning at a community college is positive. Rouse notes that some students 
“might be better off by starting in a four-year school where a greater fraction of the students 
attend full-time keeping students focused on attaining a bachelor’s degree” (p. 218). Applied to 
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this research, students who opted not to attend a four-year institution may lose focus on attaining 
a Bachelor’s Degree and exit higher education early. 
Quantitative research examining these possibilities has shown mixed results. Hilmer 
(1997) finds that students are able to improve their academic standing enough to gain admission 
to higher quality four-year institutions when starting a community college. The academic 
improvements are largest among students from low-income households and with lower high 
school academic measures. Leigh and Gill (2003) describe Rouse’s democratization versus 
diversion in their research on community college enrollment. The authors find that students with 
the intent of earning a Bachelor’s Degree improve their odds by selecting a community college 
for their transition into higher education. 
In contrast, Reynolds (2012) identifies negative, significant educational attainment 
among students who begin at two-year institutions and expect to earn a four-year degree. 
Reynolds (2012) shows that the negative influence from beginning at a two-year institution may 
carry over into labor market returns, as well. Doyle (2009) finds that students who enroll first at 
a community college have a lower likelihood of completing a Bachelor’s Degree. Each of the 
aforementioned authors references the inability to control for unobservable characteristics in 
their research designs, as am I. 
Given the mixed results from prior research I base my hypotheses for Research Question 
#3 on the opportunity costs associated with following different curricular paths. I hypothesize 
(P2:H3a) that Meridian’s infra-marginal students will be more likely to follow shorter curricular 
paths that align with skilled trade professions, instead of earning an Associate’s Degree. Infra-
marginal students likely planned to enter the labor force before learning of the Carroll 
Scholarship. Infra-marginal students preparation for the labor force likely included acquire the 
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non-academic skills they would need for their chosen career field. The Carroll Scholarship 
represents a financial means to add to the human capital the student previously accumulated for a 
career in a skilled trade profession. Assuming that the student’s chosen skilled trade profession 
does not require a college degree, I expect students will minimize their foregone earnings by 
selecting a non-Associates degree curricular path. For example, students may choose to earn 
certificates. This hypothesis is an application of Price Theory’s Substitution Effect (Becker, 
1964; Long, 2004; Peltzman, 1973).  
For my final hypothesis (P2:H3b), I expect Meridian’s college qualified students will be 
more likely to follow a curricular path that aligns with transferring. These students previously 
may have considered earning a degree beyond an Associate’s Degree, but opted to enroll at 
Richland because of the zero cost of tuition. Richland has a large number of articulation 
agreements with four-year institutions within the state of Illinois, guaranteeing that all course 
work resulting in an Associate’s Degree will be accepted as transfer credits to the four-year 
institution. I expect that college qualified students will use the scholarships commitment to earn 
the maximum amount of transferable credit hours by following an Associate’s Degree 
curriculum or transfer curriculum. I expect that students I classified as college qualified will 
select this curricular path regardless of their intentions to transition into a four-year institution. I 
expect that they will select this path to increase their future alternatives. Specifically, by 
following a transferable degree path, if they opt to enroll in a four-year institution in the future, 
the credits they accumulate at Richland will replace credit hours that may require out-of-pocket 
or student loan-based financing at another institution. It is important to note that I am not testing 
whether a student earned a college credential, but rather how the Carroll Scholarship changed the 
type of courses and credential aspirations that a student sought. 
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Data Description 
This research uses a unique student-by-semester panel dataset constructed from 
institutional records accumulated from different Richland departments and at different stages, 
including the yearly FAFSA application, Richland enrollment application form, Richland 
transcripts, and academic advisor notes. Data is collected for all students registered at Richland 
who attended one of the 14 in-district high schools and graduated between 2010-2015. The 
dataset consists of 1,837 Richland student semester records covering the Fall 2010 to Summer 
2016 academic semesters. The 13 high schools that are not eligible for the Carroll Scholarship 
are de-identified within the sample for anonymity but they each have a unique, random ID to 
assure student alignment. All data collection was organized through Richland Community 
College’s Office of Institutional Effectiveness and Planning, which acts as the Institutional 
Research office within the college. 
Richland staff creates a college record for each student at the time of application and 
hand enters all secondary school and demographic information (age, gender, and race and 
ethnicity), which are self-reported by students on their enrollment application form. A high 
school transcript is required when a student submits their application to verify diploma receipt 
and courses taken.16 The high school transcript is used to record a student’s graduating high 
school grade point average, senior class rank, and senior class size. Richland policy is to accept 
partial and unofficial transcripts to speed up the enrollment process and only follows up for 
official transcripts when additional information is needed. High school transcripts do not capture 
dual credit courses. I assume that students with a Richland registration record that pre-dates their 
                                                        
16 High school transcripts are frequently received as .pdf files. Richland hand enters any high school transcript 
information that is used to satisfy a course pre-requisite into the college’s registration system by hand. The hand-
entered data is made available for this research. Full copies of high school transcripts are not available.  
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high school graduation are dual credit courses, and I add the dual credit courses to the student’s 
high school transcript data to reflect postsecondary exposure prior to their official transition to 
Richland.  
Financial aid information details the students’ yearly FAFSA application results, and aid 
awarded and distributed to students. Prior to 2015, Richland did not require students to file a 
FAFSA to be eligible for institutional aid, so students may have other forms of Richland 
financial aid without FAFSA calculations. FAFSA application however is required for students 
receiving the Carroll Scholarship.  
Richland transcript information is separated by semester, and identifies course 
registration and the final course outcome: a passing letter grade (A-D), failing letter grade (F), or 
a Withdrawal (W). Letter grades are used to calculate college grade point average, but a W is 
not, although a course resulting in a W still appears on a student’s Richland transcript. Students 
may retake any course to replace the course outcome for grade point average purposes, however 
all courses and outcomes remain on their transcript.  
Students are asked about their academic aspirations during enrollment and advising 
meetings, and may choose from specific degrees, certificates, or the general transfer curriculum 
that contains courses articulated with other institutions. The curricular path is updated each time 
a student elects to make a change. Richland only keeps the most recent student response. 
Treatment Conditions. Last-dollar programs structured like the Carroll Scholarship 
allow for multiple treatment effects. First, the scholarship provides all Meridian students with 
information on postsecondary affordability because each student is able to ascertain if they 
qualify in advance of filing for financial aid. The guarantee promoted by the program does not 
necessarily mean that students will require funding from the Carroll Scholarship. The 
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information provided by the Carroll Scholarship creates two different treatment potentials. First, 
students who do not require Carroll Scholarship funds because the cost of attendance is 
ultimately covered by other forms of financial aid. A second potential treatment exists for 
students who either have remaining unmet need or higher Expected Family Contributions (EFC) 
from their FAFSA application results. The second group of students would receive Carroll 
Scholarship funds taking the place of paying out-of-pocket or through student loans. The two 
treatment variations promote different student incentives and should be examined individually.  
The first type of treatment condition assessing the influence on Meridian students from 
receiving information on the Carroll Scholarship is represented as an interaction term of binary 
variables identifying whether a student is a graduate of Meridian High School (if a student 
graduates from Meridian High School, Meridian=1; if a student graduates from one of the other 
13 in-district high schools, Meridian= 0), enrolled in 2013 or after (years 2010-2012, Post= 0; 
years 2013-2015, Post= 1). The primary variable of interest is the interaction term, Meridian x 
Post. The interaction term represents the Intention-to-Treat (ITT); because not all Meridian 
students in this model will need Carroll Scholarship funding. Instead, each Meridian student is 
receiving information on postsecondary affordability in the form of the guarantee of Carroll 
funding, if needed. 
The second type of treatment condition measures the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
for Meridian students who receive Carroll Scholarship funding. I assess the effect of receiving 
the Carroll Scholarship using a binary and a continuous variable. I will use a binary variable for 
students who receive Carroll Scholarship funds (Receives scholarship, Carroll Scholarship 
Recipient= 1; Does not receive scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Recipient= 0). I also use a 
continuous variable for the value of the Carroll Scholarship funds received by a student, Carroll 
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Scholarship Amount (Receives scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Amount= “value”; Does not 
receive scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Amount= 0). The benefit of using Carroll Scholarship 
Amount is the ability to decipher different dosages of the treatment. I am not assuming that 
Carroll Scholarship recipients understand the distinction between financial aid types, rather the 
second treatment is being used to determine whether the additional funding from the last-dollar 
scholarship provides any influential effect. I will examine this second form of treatment under 
several different conditions related to the total cost to tuition and remaining unmet financial 
need. 
Table 8 illustrates the breakdown of the sample student population. In total, 178 students 
transitioned to Richland from Meridian High School from the 2010-2015 senior classes. The 
grandfather clause in the Carroll Scholarship means that these students represent three groups: 
pre-2013 Meridian graduates who only took courses at Richland before the Carroll Scholarship 
(39, total), pre-2013 Meridian graduates who took courses in both pre- and post-Carroll 
Scholarship time periods (36, total), and Meridian students who graduated in 2013 or later only 
taking courses at Richland in post- Carroll Scholarship time periods (103, total).17 
Students from the remaining 13 Richland in-district high schools are not eligible to 
receive the Carroll Scholarship. I describe them below in the same three time categories as 
Meridian students for comparison purposes only. There are 1,659 in-district students within the 
sample, 489 students registered only at Richland prior to 2013, 395 students registered at 
Richland in pre- and post-Carroll Scholarship time-periods, and 755 students graduated in 2013 
or later only taking courses at Richland in post- Carroll Scholarship time periods.  
                                                        
17 The dataset constructed for this research includes students who transitioned to Richland immediately following 
high school completion. A fourth potential group exists of students who delayed enrollment. The fourth group of 
students is omitted from this research. 
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Dependent Variables. The outcome of interest for Research Question #1 is a continuous 
variable of student’s graduating high school grade point average (HS GPA). Each student has 
only a single measurement for HS GPA. For Research Question #2, the dependent variables used 
to measure student postsecondary outcomes are continuous variables for the number of Richland 
credit hours a student attempts in each academic semester (Credit Hours: Attempted), the number 
of Richland credit hours a student successfully earned in an academic semester (Credits Hours: 
Earned), how many Richland credit hours resulted in the student receiving a failing course grade 
during the academic semester (Credit Hours: Failed), and how many Richland credit hours 
resulted in a withdrawal during the academic semester (Credit Hours: Withdrawn). Lastly, the 
dependent variables for Research Question #3 are binary variables for Associates Degree Path 
(the student identifies a curricular path that aligns with any Associate’s Degree, Associates 
Degree Path= 1; the student identifies a curricular path that does not align with any Associate’s 
Degree, Associates Degree Path= 0). Richland students intending to transfer can also identify as 
a transfer enrollee. I assume that the decision to be a transfer enrollee aligns with earning a 
degree beyond an Associate’s Degree, so I will examine this curricular path separately. The 
variable Transferable Degree Path is additive and includes students positively identified as 
Associates Degree Path and students selecting the transfer enrollee curriculum (the student 
identifies a curricular path that aligns with an Associate’s Degree or the transfer enrollee status, 
Transferable Degree Path= 1; the student does not identify a curricular path that aligns with an 
Associate’s Degree and has not selected the transfer enrollee status, Transferable Degree Path= 
0). I include the additive Transferable Degree Path variable because four-year institutions do not 
distinguish between a non-degree-based transfer curriculum and an Associate’s Degree 
curriculum in accepting transfer credits, per articulation agreements. This may cause students 
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who are planning to transfer to view these two options as interchangeable, especially if a student 
does not intend to enroll at Richland for the number of credit hours necessary to earn an 
Associate’s Degree. The dependent variables for Research Question #3 do not imply that a 
student received any form of postsecondary degree; the variables only capture the curriculum 
being followed by the student. 
Model Covariates. Covariates are included in each model to account for variation in the 
dependent variable that is not associated with the treatment condition. Including covariates in 
regression models is important to minimize the potential of omitted variable bias (Cellini, 2008). 
Student race and ethnicity is a categorical variable with five predetermined options on the 
Richland application: White, Black or African-American, Hispanic, Two or More Races, and All 
Others. I use a binary variable White (if the student self-reports identifying as White, White= 1; 
if the student reports identifying as any other race and ethnicity, White=0) for models with low 
sample sizes. This is necessary because of the low percentage of Meridian students that are non-
White. Dual Credit is a binary variable recognizing whether a student was previously enrolled at 
Richland in dual credit courses (if a student had a Richland record prior to their high school 
graduation date, Dual Credit Enrollee= 1; if not, Dual Credit Enrollee= 0).  
To account for differences in financial resources I create a series of variables of financial 
aid award. Pell Grant Recipient is a binary variable determining whether the student meets 
federal need-based aid criteria (if student received a Pell grant award in the time period, Pell 
Grant Recipient= 1; if they did not, Pell Grant Recipient= 0), and Pell Grant Amount is a 
continuous variables for the amount awarded for Pell Grants (if the student does not receive Pell 
Grant, Pell Grant Amount=0). All remaining Non-Carroll Scholarship and Non-Pell Grant 
financial aid is captured using a continuous variable Other Aid Amount (if the student does not 
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receive any financial aid beyond the Carroll Scholarship or Pell Grants, Other Aid Amount=0). 
The specific covariates used for each model will be described in the Model Specifications. 
Data Limitations. Using institutional level data presents unique challenges and 
limitations. Institutional level data may be susceptible to errors and changes in measurement. 
The amount of data entered across a large number of divisions and departments within Richland 
increases the potential for misidentification and variation in how different characteristics are 
coded. For instance, I am not able to identify the specific section a student takes because of 
changes in how Richland codes individual courses. The data is also susceptible to human error, 
particularly in data entry. One such error has been found in entering the high school grade point 
average for incoming students. In five transcripts the HS GPA calculation exceeded 1,000. This 
is likely due to an error in entering a “0” in place of a decimal. To adjust for this, I have divided 
all GPA calculations that exceed 5.0 by a value of 1,000. The range of HS GPA after the 
modification was 1.085 to 5.000. 
Methodology 
 Higher education research is susceptible to omitted variable bias and selection bias 
(Cellini, 2008). One method to account for the potential biases is a quasi-experimental research 
design. The quasi-experimental research design I use here is a Difference-in-Difference (DID) 
model. Angrist and Pischke (2009) described a benefit of DID is its ability to capture omitted 
variables at the group level. Here, those would be unobservable characteristics that led families 
to locate within the Meridian High School district.  
A DID methodology works well for this research. Students did not have prior information 
about the development of the scholarship because it was organized a few months prior to the 
announcement (Harbour, 2013; Harbour, 2014); therefore, I am able to define the announcement 
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date as the official start of students’ receiving the treatment condition – information on 
postsecondary affordability at Richland. The research design and panel dataset allow me to 
examine how students responded, in the short term, to the surprise scholarship announcement, 
specifically, how students altered their college-going decision, postsecondary credit-taking 
behavior, and curricular decisions. 
Model Specification. A recurring challenge in financial aid research is disentangling 
outcomes related to a program’s monetary award and the psychological impact on students that 
occurs through signaling. A signaling influence is likely prevalent in this research. The high 
school assembly used to announce the Carroll Scholarship makes students aware of monetary 
resources, but also provides information that may be motivational to students. Information and 
signaling cannot completely be separated into distinct treatment conditions because each is 
present for all treated students. Additionally, how students conceptualize the new information 
and signal will be unique based on personal characteristics. While it is not possible to separate 
these influences it is important to use different approaches to address the biases that may present. 
For this reason I consider different methods for assessing the Carroll Scholarship treatment; and 
simultaneously acknowledge that there is no way to fully overcome this limitation. Next, I 
describe the models I use in this research and how I intend for them to provide different 
perspectives on the influence present after the Carroll Scholarship announcement. 
The research questions that I pose here require the use of multiple DID models. I will 
first describe the general DID model followed by the specific models for the three research 
questions. Υ𝑖𝑡 is the outcome variable for student i observed in a time period t. The coefficient for 
Meridian, 𝛽1, identifies the average difference in outcome for students who attended Meridian 
High School, relative to the control group. The coefficient for Post, 𝛽2, identifies the average 
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difference in outcome for students during a time period t, after the Carroll Scholarship began 
disbursing aid.  The coefficient of interest, lambda, 𝜆, measures the average difference in 
outcome for student i, who graduated from Meridian High School in a Post Carroll Scholarship 
time period, t, relative to all other students. The notation lambda, 𝜆, will be associated with the 
coefficient of interest in all models to maintain consistency. The general model includes a 
position for fixed effects, kappa, Κ. The list of relevant covariates included in the model is 
designated as 𝕏 for student i in year t, and is followed by an error term. Equation 1 represents the 
general DID model form and the notation I will use throughout this research. Equation 1 does not 
contain specific model elements that are needed for this research. I present Equation 1 here only 
to illustrate the basic DID model format. 
 
Υ𝑖𝑡 =    𝛽1 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 +  𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) +  Κ +  𝛽3 𝕏𝑖𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (1) 
 
 
The three research questions for this paper use dependent variables captured in different 
measures of time. The Post variable for each time measurement identifies when students may 
begin to receive the Carroll Scholarship. Research Question #1 asks about changes in HS GPA 
after the introduction of the Carroll Scholarship. This dependent variable is collected from 
secondary school transcripts. The time measurement for Research Question #1 is high school 
graduation year represented by the time subscript tau, 𝜏. Post =1 when 𝜏 ≥ 2013. Research 
Question #2 records student course-taking observations and outcomes semester-by-semester. The 
time measurement used for semesters is sigma, 𝜍. Post=1 when 𝜍 ≥10 (Fall Semester 2013).  
Lastly, Research Question #3 examines the last curricular decision made by students. The time 
measurement for the most recent student curricular decision is the last academic year the student 
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registers for courses at Richland. The time measurement for academic year is rho, 𝜌. Post= 1 
when 𝜌 ≥ 2013. 
The hypotheses for Research Question #1 (P2:H1a and P2:H1b) expect the Carroll 
Scholarship will incentivize an increase in college readiness for infra-marginal students and 
college qualified students that will enroll at Richland. For this question, I collapse the student-
by-semester panel dataset to aggregate to the individual high school level. This creates a high 
school-by-year cross-sectional dataset containing student characteristics that do not change 
between time periods. This is necessary because each student only has a single HS GPA 
calculation. Equation 2 demonstrates the DID model for the collapsed dataset.  
 
𝐻𝑆 𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 =  𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜏 + 𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜏) + 𝜂ℎ +  𝛿𝜏 + 𝛽 𝕏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝜏       
(2) 
 
Equation 2 includes high school dummy variables (𝜂ℎ) to identify whether student i 
graduated from one of the 13, h, Non-Meridian in-district high schools. Meridian is a dummy 
variable that identifies if a student graduated from the Carroll-eligible Meridian High School. I 
also include year fixed effects (𝛿𝜏) capturing the high school graduation year 𝜏, 2010-2015. The 
dummy variables and fixed effects are important for accounting for variance that may result from 
different resources, across high schools and from year-to-year. The high school dummy variables 
align with the School and Community Context in Perna’s framework. I include student 
characteristics (𝕏𝑖) gender and race and ethnicity to account for differences in social and cultural 
networks, as described by the Habitus layer in Perna’s framework. In addition, I include Dual 
Credit Enrollee to capture the expected benefits and costs of enrollment from Perna’s model. 
Equation 2 is tested using six different populations: the full student sample, the full 
sample with HS GPA quartile dummy variables, and restricting the model to the four HS GPA 
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quartiles. The HS GPA restricted models will identify if there is a statistical difference in grade 
point average unique to each of the HS GPA quartiles. Restricting the model is important because 
the two hypotheses for Research Question #1 may result in different magnitudes for the 
coefficient of interest. This could cause the models to appear insignificant when two significant 
differences exist. Figure 14 presents the quintile distribution of high school grade point average. 
The curve measures the total fraction of the student population (measured along the X-axis) with 
a high school grade point average below a specific calculation (measured along the Y-axis). 
Figure 14 illustrates that the HS GPA distribution is non-linear. A small fraction of students has a 
HS GPA below 2.0 and above 4.0. An increased enrollment of students at either end of the 
distribution may not be substantial to the full sample, but would represent significant population 
changes within the quartile. Restricting the sample by HS GPA quartile is important to identify 
and isolate the presence of incentives that create differing outcomes for students with different 
expectations on postsecondary enrollment. Specifically, the Carroll Scholarship may create 
different incentives and outcomes for Meridian’s infra-marginal student population relative to 
the Meridian’s college-qualified student population. 
Research Question #2 hypotheses (P2:H2a) state that all students who receive the Carroll 
Scholarship will register for more credit hours than will their peers. Additionally, Meridian’s 
infra-marginal students will be less successful in completing their credit hours (P2:H2b) at 
Richland, while Meridian students who are college-qualified will successfully earn a larger 
fraction of their credits (P2:H2c). Equation 3 illustrates an example using the dependent variable, 
Credit Hours: Attempted.  
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 =  𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜍)  +  𝜇𝑖  +   𝜃𝜍 +  𝜓𝑖𝜍 +  𝜀𝑖𝜍       (3) 
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I include student fixed effects (𝜇𝑖) and semester fixed effects (𝜃𝜍) to account for the 
School and Community and Habitus contextual layers. The notation sigma, 𝜍, is used to 
distinguish the 19 semesters of the data sample. I include the vector (𝜓𝑖𝜍) of financial aid 
covariates to account for the supply of financial resources as in Perna’s model: Pell Grant 
Recipient, Pell Grant Amount, and Other Aid Amount. The student and semester fixed effects 
negate the need for covariates that are unchanging within the time-periods, including Meridian 
and Post. Students are aligned with a single high school based on the transcript they supply to 
Richland; as a result, the Meridian variable and high school dummy variables would be perfectly 
identified and drop from the models. The semester fixed effect captures variance within each 
semester, including all semesters in the Post Carroll time period. This would drop Post from any 
model due to perfect identification.  
The DID design and panel dataset for this research question are useful for avoiding 
potential contamination of the control group by Meridian students who enrolled prior to the 
scholarship announcement. The student-by-semester panel dataset captures student observations 
for each semester and applies the Carroll Scholarship at the time period the student would be 
eligible to receive it. Meridian students who enrolled prior to Fall 2013 begin in the control 
group and are switched to the treatment group in the appropriate semester. Equation 3 is tested 
using five different populations: the full student sample and restricting the model to the four HS 
GPA quartiles. I do not include the full sample model with HS GPA quartile dummy variables in 
these models because a student’s graduating GPA does not change across postsecondary 
semesters. Therefore, the HS GPA quartile dummy variables would be perfectly identified and 
drop from the models. All four dependent variables (Credit Hours: Attempted, Credit Hours: 
Earned, Credit Hours: Withdrawn, and Credit Hours: Failed) will follow the same format. 
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There is a range of possible signals created from the Carroll Scholarship announcement 
and they are present when students make enrollment and registration decisions. The benefit 
students receive from the Carroll Scholarship is not solely a monetary award. Students also 
receive signals from the Carroll Scholarship announcement. This creates the need to consider 
how students may be responding differently to the actual Carroll Scholarship funding and 
information about Carroll Scholarship eligibility. I run a set of models designed to assess how 
the monetary influence and signaling influence separately from the scholarship may differ in 
Credit Hours: Attempted and Credit Hours: Earned using several different student populations. 
First, to examine the difference of receiving funding from the Carroll Scholarship relative 
to Meridian students who only have Carroll Scholarship information, I examine Carroll 
Scholarship Recipient and Carroll Scholarship Amount treatment conditions. The treatment 
group for the two new conditions is Meridian students who received Carroll Scholarship funding 
in the specific semester. For the models examining students who receive Carroll Scholarship 
funds I limit the panel dataset to include only students from Meridian High School. This test is 
intended to identify signaling from the Carroll Scholarship. This is necessary to strictly define 
the control group as students with information on the Carroll Scholarship but whom did not 
receive funding, relative to the treatment group of students who receive funding from the Carroll 
Scholarship. Omitting students from the other high schools means I no longer have students who 
were never eligible, so I am unable to perform a DID model. Instead, I execute a set of linear 
models that include student covariates. This approach does not fully account for omitted variable 
bias, however it does make a needed contribution to the literature on how the dosage of the 
scholarship treatment may be influential (Bettinger, 2010). In Equation 4 I test the influence of 
receiving any amount of Carroll Scholarship funding, Carroll Scholarship Recipient.  
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𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 =  𝜆 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝜍 + 𝜃𝜍  + 𝜓𝑖𝜍 +  𝛽 𝕏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝜍, 
if MERIDIANi = 1  (4) 
 
 I include semester fixed effects (𝜃𝜍) and a vector for other types of financial aid, 𝜓𝑖𝜍 (Pell 
Grant Recipient, Pell Grant Amount, and Other Aid Amount). I include student characteristics 
(represented by 𝕏𝑖) White, gender, and HS GPA to align with Perna’s Habitus layer. I include 
Dual Credit Enrollee to capture the expected benefits and costs of enrollment from Perna’s 
model. Equation 4 is tested using six different populations: the full student sample, the full 
sample with HS GPA quartile dummy variables, and restricting the model to the four HS GPA 
quartiles. Equation 4 demonstrates the model for the Carroll Scholarship Recipient treatment on 
Credit Hours: Attempted. I use the same model format for the continuous treatment, Carroll 
Scholarship Amount, and using the dependent variable Credit Hours: Earned. 
Next, I examine Credit Hours: Attempted and Credit Hours: Earned for students who are 
able to cover the cost of tuition using only financial aid; they do not have to pay out-of-pocket or 
through student loans. Unmet need is calculated using Richland’s tuition rate per credit hour 
multiplied by the number of registered credit hours; subtracting all financial aid awarded. This 
calculation does not provide me with the precise cost of enrollment, as I am unable to identify 
additional fees that may exist for certain classes. The value only gives me an estimation of the 
total expense of tuition. 
I limit the panel dataset to include students from all Meridian and In-District high schools 
that have zero unmet need based on the number of registered credit hours. I further limit the 
Meridian student sample to include only Meridian students who were able to cover the cost of 
tuition without requiring funds from the Carroll Scholarship; therefore, I am directly comparing 
Meridian students with no unmet need to In-District and pre-Carroll students without any unmet 
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need. I consider unmet need because of potential biases that may be created with information on 
the Carroll Scholarship. When Meridian students received information on eligibility it may not 
have added to their perception of postsecondary affordability; particularly if they believe they 
would qualify for other financial aid to cover the cost of tuition. As with the previous model, this 
test is intended to distinguish the role of Carroll Scholarship as a signaling mechanism relative to 
the monetary influence. Equation 5 illustrates the model I use for tests of students with no 
remaining unmet need.  
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 =  𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜍)  +  𝜇𝑖  +   𝜃𝜍 +  𝜓𝑖𝜍 +  𝜀𝑖𝜍, 
if 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 = 0 & 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝜍 = 0      (5) 
 
In Equation 5 I use the student-by-semester panel dataset and include student fixed 
effects (𝜇𝑖) and semester fixed effects (𝜃𝜍). The notation is consistent with Equation 3. I include 
the vector (𝜓𝑖𝜍) of financial aid covariates: Pell Grant Recipient, Pell Grant Amount, and Other 
Aid Amount. Equation 5 is tested in five different populations: the full student sample and 
restricting the model to the four HS GPA quartiles. 
The Carroll Scholarship is a last-dollar award and would cover the expenses of all extra 
courses taken, so Meridian students may choose to take courses beyond what would be covered 
with the other forms of financial aid. This may present a registration and credits earned bias. To 
examine this possibility I reassess Credit Hours: Attempted and Credit Hours: Earned for 
Meridian students who used the Carroll Scholarship to fill unmet need, relative to students from 
In-District high schools with no unmet need and pre-Carroll students who did not have access to 
the scholarship. I illustrate this model with Equation 6. 
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 =  𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜍)  +  𝜇𝑖  +   𝜃𝜍 +  𝜓𝑖𝜍 +  𝜀𝑖𝜍, 
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if 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 = 0      (6) 
 
 
I restrict the post-Carroll Scholarship Meridian student sample to only include students 
who required the Carroll Scholarship to cover the cost of tuition. The In-District and pre-2013 
Meridian student population remain the same for both of the previous two models. This 
compares Meridian students with accept Carroll funding to cover tuition costs, to students who 
are ineligible for Carroll and used other forms of financial aid to cover the full cost of 
enrollment. The models for Equation 5 and 6 directly compare students with no out-of-pocket 
costs from enrollment. The differences across the two models will inform whether students view 
the source of financial aid differently or if the cumulative monetary value of aid is the driving 
influence. I use the same modeling as Equation 5. 
Lastly, I restrict the model to include only students who receive Pell Grant funding. Pell 
Grant eligibility is not formally determined until a student completes the FAFSA application 
each year; however, students who qualify for free and reduced lunch in secondary school are 
typically also Pell qualifiers. Pell Grants are a first-dollar aid award that is applied to a student’s 
cost of enrollment upfront. Students who qualify for full Pell Grant awards may have no 
remaining unmet need. Pell Grant recipients may also represent a different population because of 
the income requirement.  
 
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 =  𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 𝑥 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜍)  +  𝜇𝑖  +   𝜃𝜍 +  𝜓𝑖𝜍 +  𝜀𝑖𝜍,  
if 𝑈𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑡 𝑁𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑖𝜍 = 0 & 𝑃𝐸𝐿𝐿𝑖𝜍 = 1 & 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟. 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝜍 = 0        (7) 
 
I restrict the model to include just the Meridian students who are Pell Grant recipients, 
have no unmet need, and did not require the Carroll Scholarship to cover any remaining unmet 
need. I do not consider Meridian Pell Grant recipients who also receive the Carroll Scholarship 
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because of the small sample size. I use this model to determine how students, who would likely 
have the cost of tuition covered using Pell Grants, receive a signal from the Carroll Scholarship 
announcement. Equation 7 uses the student-by-semester panel dataset with student fixed effects 
(𝜇𝑖) and semester fixed effects (𝜃𝜍). I include the vector (𝜓𝑖𝜍) of financial aid covariates: Pell 
Grant Amount and Other Aid Amount, only. Equation 7 is tested in five different populations: 
the full student sample and restricting the model to the four HS GPA quartiles. 
For the last research question, Research Question #3, I hypothesize that infra-marginal 
students who are eligible to receive the Carroll Scholarship will be less likely to follow a 
transferable curricular path in order to reduce the opportunity costs associated with the longer 
timeframe for earning an Associate’s Degree (P2:H3a). I expect the coefficient of interest to 
have a negative sign reflecting a significant effect on students avoiding the degree path. 
Conversely, college qualified students who are eligible to receive the Carroll Scholarship will 
elect to follow a curricular path that aligns with a transferable credential, such as an Associate’s 
Degree or transfer curriculum (P2:H3b). I expect the coefficient of interest to have a positive 
sign reflecting a positive effect on students selecting a transferable curricular path. I collapse the 
panel dataset to aggregate to the individual high school level to examine the dependent variable. 
This creates a high school-by-year cross-sectional dataset similar to Research Question #1 and is 
necessary because I am only able to identify the last curricular decision that a student makes 
before graduation, transferring, or no longer enrolling at Richland for any reason. The dataset is 
collapsed to a cross-sectional dataset using postsecondary academic year for Research Question 
#3. Equation 8 demonstrates the DID model for the Associates Degree Path dependent variable. 
 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑐. 𝐷𝑒𝑔. 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑖 = 𝛽1𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜌 + 𝜆(𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑥𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝜌) + 𝜂ℎ +  𝛿𝜌 + 𝛽 𝕏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖ℎ𝜌 
(8) 
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Equation 8 includes a vector of dummy variables for the 13 Non-Meridian high schools 
(𝜂ℎ). I include year fixed effects (𝛿𝜌) to capture the last postsecondary academic year a student 
was enrolled. The time measurement for academic year is rho, 𝜌. This is necessary because 
students could change their curricular decisions throughout their time at Richland. I assume that 
the decision in their last semester enrolled is the final curricular path they chose to follow. I 
include the student characteristic vector (represented by 𝕏𝑖) with race and ethnicity, gender, and 
Dual Credit Enrollee. Similar to Research Question #1, Meridian is a dummy variable 
identifying if a student graduated for Meridian High School. I test this model using three 
different populations: the full sample population and restricting the model to two HS GPA 
quartiles, HS GPA quartile 1-2 and quartile 3-4. I am not able to separate these models by 
individual quartiles because of small sample sizes in the dependent variable. I use the same 
model format for the Transferable Degree Path treatment. 
Prior Year Trends and Counterfactual Verification. One key assumption of a DID 
design is students from Meridian and in-district high schools behaving in similar patterns prior to 
the treatment being introduced. Angrist and Pischke (2009) label this the common trends 
assumption. The prior-year common trends assumption is necessary for assuming that post-
treatment differences in outcome are attributable to being exposed to the scholarship. If the 
assumption of similar trends is valid, the non-eligible, in-district high school student population 
can be used as an acceptable proxy for the counterfactual outcomes of Meridian students who 
receive the Carroll Scholarship. The prior-year common trends assumption is largely untestable, 
however Angrist and Pischke (2009) describe that regressing the variable of interest with lag and 
lead covariates onto the dependent variables can be used to provide evidence that prior year 
trends do not exist.   
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 One limitation of the Angrist and Pischke approach is that it cannot be used on dependent 
variables that maintain a single value over time periods. This limitation is pertinent because the 
dependent variables HS GPA (Research Question #1), Associates Degree Path (Research 
Question #3), and Transferable Degree Path (Research Question #3) have a single value for each 
student in my dataset. To adjust for the limitations described I will use a modification of the 
Angrist and Pischke approach designed to illustrate any trends in Meridian student behavior prior 
to receiving information on the Carroll Scholarship. The Angrist and Pischke approach is 
appropriate for the dependent variables for Research Question #2 (Credit Hours: Attempted, 
Earned, Failed, and Withdrew) because the research includes observations for Meridian 
student’s course-taking behavior over multiple time periods. I will describe the approach I use 
for all three Research Questions next. 
To examine whether there is a statistical difference in the HS GPA of Meridian students 
who enroll at Richland prior to the Carroll Scholarship announcement, I run linear regressions 
that include all students who enrolled at Richland before the Carroll Scholarship announcement 
was made; senior class years 2010-2012. I collapse the student-by-semester panel dataset to 
aggregate to the high school level creating a high school-by-year cross-sectional dataset. 
Collapsing the dataset is necessary because graduating students only possess a single graduating 
high school grade point average. HS GPA does not change during the postsecondary time period 
of this research. In the prior year trend models, I include covariates for gender, race and 
ethnicity, and Dual Credit Enrollee. I also include year fixed effects for the year of high school 
completion and Non-Meridian high school dummy variables. Additionally, I halve each of the 
models based on student graduating high school grade point average (HS GPA) allowing me to 
determine if there are differences among Meridian’s infra-marginal (bottom two HS GPA 
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quartiles) and college qualified (upper two HS GPA quartiles) student populations. The variable 
of interest in this regression is a Meridian High School dummy coefficient. Table 9 demonstrates 
that no statistical difference exists across HS GPA quartiles between Meridian students and 
students from all other non-eligible in-district high schools for any of the three dependent 
variables. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the Meridian coefficient estimate is equal to 
zero. This is evidence that no enrollment trends existed for Meridian students in the years before 
the Carroll Scholarship announcement. 
To examine prior year trends in Meridian students’ Credit Hours: Attempted, Earned, 
Failed, and Withdrew behavior I use the approach described by Angrist and Pischke (2009). To 
identify if Meridian students exhibited different course-taking trends I will use interaction terms 
for Meridian students and all postsecondary academic years. For instance, Meridian x 2010 will 
identify if there is a mean difference in the dependent variables between Meridian students in 
2010 relative to the rest of sample population. Meridian= 1 if the student is from Meridian and 
2010= 1 if the dependent variable occurs in academic year 2010. If either indicator is untrue, the 
interaction term Meridian x 2010= 0. The interaction terms with academic years prior to 2013 
serve as a falsification test of the data. If there is no difference in the years before the Carroll 
Scholarship announcement I will conclude that the treatment from the scholarship did not bias 
the control group. The models will include covariates for gender, race and ethnicity, Dual Credit 
Enrollee, Pell Grant Recipient, Pell Grant Amount, and the value of any Other Aid Amount. I 
include year fixed effects for the postsecondary academic year and a vector of Non-Meridian 
high school dummy variables.  
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Figures 15-18 display the results of these models for the dependent variables Credit 
Hours: Attempted, Earned, Failed, and Withdrew, separated by HS GPA quartile.18 I find no 
evidence that Meridian students exhibited different Credit Hours: Attempted behaviors or 
experienced a statistically significant difference in Credit Hours: Earned in the academic years 
leading up to the Carroll Scholarship announcement. It is important to note that Credit Hours: 
Withdrawn (Figure 17) is significant in the 2010 academic year for Meridian’s HS GPA quartile 
4 students. Additionally, 2010 and 2012’s Credit Hours: Failed (Figure 18) is significant for 
Meridian’s HS GPA quartile 3 students. Credit Hours: Withdrawn and Failed are not the 
primary dependent variables of this research so I will elect to move forward with the analysis. 
The results for these variables and quartiles will be discussed in relation to the fact that they do 
not pass this prior year trend assessment.    
Lastly, I use a similar approach for the dependent variables used for Research Question 
#3, Associates Degree Path and Transferable Degree Path, as I do for Research Question #1. 
Richland overwrites a student’s curricular path with each update. This means the Associates 
Degree Path and Transferable Degree Path variables only identify the last choice made by 
students. The dataset does not allow me to assess the progression of student choices. Again, this 
equates to each student record containing only a single Associates Degree Path and Transferable 
Degree Path identifier. To identify a prior trend in curricular path I collapse the dataset to 
aggregate to the high school level creating a high school-by-semester cross-sectional dataset. 
This is similar to the explanation above for Research Question #1 with the exception that I use a 
postsecondary semester time period. I restrict the sample to include only students who attended 
Richland in the pre-Carroll Scholarship time period and identify the last semester that a student 
                                                        
18 The regression tables for the Credit Hours: Attempted, Earned, Failed, and Withdrew Prior Year trend models are 
in Appendix D. 
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registered at Richland. This omits any student who registered for courses at Richland after the 
Carroll Scholarship announcement. As before, I split the model by HS GPA quartile and the 
variable of interest is Meridian. Table 10 shows the results of the models for Associates Degree 
Path and Transferable Degree Path. The models include covariates for gender, race and 
ethnicity, and Dual Credit Enrollee. Table 10 provides no evidence that there is a statistical 
difference in the student’s curricular path, by HS GPA quartile, between Meridian students and 
students from all other non-eligible in-district high schools, in the time period before students 
gained information on the Carroll Scholarship.   
I find from the previously described tests that Meridian students do not behave 
statistically different from the average Non-Meridian student in the years before the Carroll 
Scholarship announcement. However, the Prior Year trend assessment is not sufficient to justify 
whether students from the Non-Meridian high schools can be used as a counterfactual population 
in this research. The introduction of the Carroll Scholarship may change important demographic 
characteristics of Meridian students who enroll at Richland and create biased results for the 
coefficients of interest. Specifically, the announcement may influence the college choice 
decision or the income demographic for Meridian students in an unknown direction.  
To assess whether there are differences in post-scholarship populations I will test for 
differences in the proportion of Meridian students who enroll at Richland from the four HS GPA 
quartiles and differences in the proportion of Meridian students who are Pell Grant eligible. 
Differences in this population will create bias results for all three research questions, because I 
will be capturing changes in the number of students who enroll, not just the differences in 
outcomes from students who would have enrolled otherwise. Stated differently, I cannot assume 
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that Non-Meridian students remain similar to Meridian students after the Carroll Scholarship 
announcement. 
First, I consider differences in Richland enrollment based on HS GPA. Figure 14 
illustrates the HS GPA distribution for the full sample, and separated by Meridian and Non-
Meridian high schools. Figure 14 demonstrates a slightly lower HS GPA for Meridian students; 
however I see that the two groups follow the same general trend in the HS GPA distribution. 
Next, I test whether being a Meridian student from a post-Carroll Scholarship senior class (2013-
2015) predicts their HS GPA quartile placement. The variable of interest is the interaction term 
Meridian x Post. I collapse the dataset to a high school-by-year cross-sectional dataset. The 
models include covariates for gender, race and ethnicity, and Dual Credit Enrollee. I include 
senior class year fixed effects and Non-Meridian high school dummy variables. The coding and 
dataset transformation coincide with the description for Research Question #1 in the Model 
Specifications section. Table 11 shows the OLS and Logistic regression results for these models. 
I find no evidence that there are differences in the number of students who graduated from 
Meridian, in the years after the Carroll Scholarship announcement, in any of the four HS GPA 
quartiles. The coefficient of interest is not statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval 
for any of the models; signaling that there is no difference in the mean for Meridian and Non-
Meridian students. 
Second, I consider differences in Richland enrollment for Pell Grant recipient students. I 
use Pell Grant award as a proxy for enrollment of low-income students. Differences in income 
level impact the availability of other forms of financial aid and may bias results on course 
registration behaviors. The variable of interest is the Meridian x Post variable and I collapse the 
dataset to a high school-by-academic year cross-sectional dataset. I use academic year as the 
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timeframe because students may only apply for federal financial aid once per year. The models 
include covariates for gender, race and ethnicity, Dual Credit Enrollee, HS GPA quartile dummy 
variables, and Non-Meridian high school dummy variables. The coding and dataset 
transformation coincide with the description for Research Question #3 in the Model 
Specifications section. Table 12 shows the OLS and Logistic regression results for whether 
Meridian students enrolled during the Carroll Scholarship eligible postsecondary academic years 
qualify for Pell Grants at statistically different rates. I find no statistical difference in the 
proportion of Meridian students, who are Pell Grant recipients, in the years after the Carroll 
Scholarship announcement.   
Tables 11 and 12 provide evidence that the proportions of Meridian students, who enroll 
at Richland, after the Carroll Scholarship announcement, are not statistically different. There is 
no evidence to suggest increased proportion of Meridian students, from the infra-marginal group 
or the college-qualified group, enrolled at Richland. The Pell Grant findings give no indication 
that more or less wealthy students from Meridian enroll at Richland after the scholarship 
announcement. I believe that the insignificant findings, coupled with the model specifications, 
strongly suggest that the In-District sample population is an adequate counterfactual. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Student demographic information for Richland enrollees is presented in Table 7 and 
Tables 13-15. All tables separate statistics by high school (Meridian and in-district students), and 
senior class. Table 7 provides descriptive statistics on the number of students to enroll at 
Richland from the surrounding high schools, demographic information on RCC enrolled 
students, and secondary school characteristics. Richland enrollment from all in-district schools 
contains slightly more female than male students, ranging from 51-59%. The race and ethnicity 
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demographic of the in-district student enrollment is approximately 80% White, falling between 
79% and 82%.  
Student demographics for Meridian students who enroll at Richland mirror the overall in-
district demographics. The smaller Meridian senior class sizes create percentage variations that 
are larger than the in-district population. Meridian’s student population is proportionally more 
female than male, with the exception of the 2015 senior class. Richland enrollees from Meridian 
are in excess of 90% White, with the exception of 2012 when the population was 80%. Over the 
six years of enrollment data, only 12 non-White students from Meridian have enrolled at 
Richland. 
The average reported high school grade point average for in-district students is within 
one-eighth point in all years of study, ranging between 3.11 and 3.26. The average ACT scores 
among students who report their score to Richland fall between 19.23 and 20.32. ACT scores are 
reported to Richland for over 80% of in-district enrollees in all years. In-district students 
enrolling at Richland show sporadic changes in the number of secondary school mathematics 
courses taken in excess of graduation requirements. The number of mathematics courses taken is 
a signal of student postsecondary preparation (Adelman, 2006; Greene & Winters, 2005; Perna, 
2004; Wiley, Wyatt, & Camara, 2010).  
The average reported high school grade point average is lower and has a slightly larger 
range among Meridian students enrolling at Richland, as seen in Table 7, ranging from 2.70 to 
2.93. The range for average ACT scores among Meridian students is also slightly larger than in-
district students although it follows the same alternating trend. The number of high school 
courses in mathematics taken by students from Meridian trends upward starting with the 2013 
senior class.  
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Table 13 shows financial aid outcomes for students in their first postsecondary year. I 
report the first postsecondary year because the number of semesters students enroll varies 
drastically in the study and restricting the descriptive statistics to a common timeframe is helpful 
for illustrating trends. The percentage of in-district students that file Free Application for Federal 
Student Aid (FAFSA) applications increases over the years of the study and reaches 88% in 
2015. Richland’s financial aid policy did not require students to file the yearly FAFSA form to 
be eligible for institutional aid until 2015; however, FAFSA submission was required for the 
Carroll Scholarship in all years after the announcement. The Expected Family Contribution 
(EFC) for in-district students who file FAFSA varies between $6,062 and $9,331. Student 
income remains within a thousand dollars in all years with a 2015 high of $2,877. Institutional 
grants are awarded to about one-quarter (18-28%) of entering students and range in value and 
funding source. This is evident by the increased average aid award in the years after the Carroll 
Scholarship creation. Institutional grant aid is small relative to Pell Grant awards. Pell Grant 
awards are distributed to between 38-49% of in-district students, in the years of the study. The 
percentage of eligible students slowly rises from 2012 through 2015, but average award varies 
significantly during that same time-period. Scholarship aid award (not including the Carroll 
Scholarship) is consistently between $1,312 and $1,496 in all years of the study. The highest 
percentage of in-district students awarded scholarships from the three years after 2013, 
coinciding with the introduction of the Carroll Scholarship. The percentage of tuition waiver 
awards and the average value increase after 2013, as well. The relationship between tuition 
waiver distribution and Carroll Scholarship awards may be the result of a substitution effect. 
Examining the impact of the Carroll Scholarship on other forms of institutional aid award is a 
future direction of this research. Each of the statistics described above are based on the aid 
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categories identified by Richland’s Financial Aid Department, however the college does not have 
an official definition for identifying aid categories. 
Meridian students’ financial aid outcomes are distinctly different after the 2013 Carroll 
announcement, demonstrated in Table 13. The percentage of Meridian students who submit 
FAFSA applications is at a low of 61% in 2010, but increases to 100% in 2013. The EFC and 
student income calculations are both higher than the in-district student population calculations. 
This would seem to indicate higher income levels for incoming students from Meridian, but the 
percentage of Meridian students who are awarded Pell grants is 53% in 2013, the highest rate 
among Meridian and in-district students. The percentage of Meridian students who receive 
scholarships and tuition waivers decreases dramatically in 2013. This could be the result of an 
increased number of students who do not qualify for aid or a potential substitution effect for 
institutionally-driven financial aid.  
The percentages and values reported in Table 13 omit the Carroll Scholarship award but 
Table 14 provides the statistics for students who are awarded Carroll Scholarship funds. The top 
row of Table 14 illustrates the number of students from each senior class who received Carroll 
Scholarship funding and the total amount they received over all semesters after the program 
began distributing aid in Fall 2013. Despite the scholarship having a clause that permitted past 
graduate’s eligibility, only a small number of students from the 2010-2012 senior classes 
received funding. Not surprisingly, the number of students who received Carroll Scholarship 
funding increases drastically starting with the 2013 senior class, as does the total amount of 
funding they receive in the time periods of the study. The bottom row of Table 14 illustrates the 
number of students who receive the Carroll Scholarship and the academic year in which they 
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receive funding. The number of students using the scholarship in a given academic year 
increases from 2013 to 2015, due to the new incoming students from the most recent senior class.   
First-year postsecondary outcomes are demonstrated in Table 15. I report only first 
postsecondary year course-taking and course outcomes because the number of semesters students 
enroll varies drastically in the study. The percentage of in-district students registering for 12+ 
credit hours in the Fall and Spring semesters (full-time status) remains close to 50% (47% to 
53%). The number of registered credit hours per year is consistently between 21 and 24 during 
the time of the study. The number of credit hours a student successfully completes slowly 
increases after 2011, reaching 85.2% of credit hours resulting in a letter grade of above F. 
Successful course completion is the result of decreases in the number of courses failed and the 
number of courses a student withdraws from (or are withdrawn from).  
Meridian students display multiple enrollment changes starting with the 2013 senior 
class. After the Carroll introduction, the number of Meridian students who register for a full-time 
course load jumps by 25 percentage points (40% to 65.4%). In addition to full-time enrollment, 
Meridian students also exhibited immediate academic results, demonstrating a 12-percentage 
point increase in successfully completing a course, starting with the Fall 2013 incoming student 
group (77% to 90%). The percent of Meridian students who failed a course decreased from 30 
percent in 2010 to 7.7 percent in 2013. The academic improvements are short lived, however. In 
2014, the percentage of Meridian students who fail a course increased by 35 percentage points 
and the number of students who withdrew from a course increased nominally (40% to 42.3%) in 
2013 and by 14.5 percentage points in 2014. Meridian students do not demonstrate the same 
increased desire to seek Associate’s Degrees or transfer curriculum course-taking paths as their 
in-district counterparts in the years after 2013. 
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Not surprisingly, the statistics illustrated in Table 7 and Tables 13-15 demonstrate 
substantial variation between the in-district enrolling student population and Meridian students. 
This may be the result of the unexpected announcement of the program. The descriptive statistics 
that illustrate student decision-making offer support to the notion that the Carroll Scholarship is 
providing an influential effect in the short term. Variations in the average values between pre- 
and post-Carroll years, relative to in-district student population, are a signal that statistically 
significant outcomes may be present.  
Results 
A Difference-in-Difference quasi-experimental design was applied to identify the 
influence the Carroll Scholarship had on Meridian students’ postsecondary college-going 
decisions and postsecondary course-taking outcomes. The secondary school outcome models for 
HS GPA are presented in Table 16 and postsecondary outcome models for Credit Hours: 
Attempted, Earned, Withdrawn, and Failed are presented in Tables 17-20, respectively. Tables 
17-20 assess the influence of Carroll Scholarship information, MERIDIAN x POST. Tables 21-24 
present results from re-evaluated dependent variables Credit Hours: Attempted and Credit 
Hours: Earned that contained a binary variable for receiving the Carroll Scholarship (Carroll 
Scholarship Recipient) and a continuous variable for amount of Carroll Scholarship funds 
received (Carroll Scholarship Amount) as the treatment conditions. Tables 25-30 test for 
differences between Meridian students who do not need the Carroll Scholarship to cover the cost 
of tuition, Meridian students who do use the last-dollar funding, and Meridian students who have 
Carroll Scholarship information and receive first-dollar Pell Grant federal aid. The identified 
curricular paths for students are presented in Tables 31-32, Associates Degree Path and 
Transferable Degree Path. All tables are organized by model numbers and identify if they 
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contain the full sample population or are a restricted sample based on HS GPA quartile (Quartile 
1- 4, respectively).  
I use OLS regression for all models. All models contain the covariates and fixed effects 
described in the Model Specification section, and the results are organized by research question. 
The coefficients from binary treatment conditions are transformed into percentage estimates by 
multiplying the coefficients by 100 (such as, 𝜆 𝑥 100). The coefficient result for the continuous 
treatment condition, Carroll Scholarship Amount, is converted to illustrate the influence for an 
additional $100 dollars in aid award. This approach will also be used for the coefficient results of 
Pell Grant Amount and Other Aid Amount. The tables reflect these alterations. I add Logistic 
regression results to models with binary dependent variables (Associates Degree Path and 
Transferable Degree Path). I do this to illustrate model robustness. The Logistic models provide 
estimates of the Odds Ratio (OR). ORs are non-linear estimators. All OR coefficients are 
positive. A coefficient greater than one is a signal that a Carroll Scholarship eligible student has 
greater odds of selecting a Associates Degree Path or Transferable Degree Path. Agresti (2007) 
notes that OLS regression provides a more intuitive interpretation of binary dependent variables; 
for this reason I will only interpret the OLS coefficients in the Results section.  
Students in different quartiles of HS GPA, Credit Hours: Attempted, and Credit Hours: 
Earned, may experience a different impact from the Carroll Scholarship. For example, a student 
who enrolls at Richland part time (for instance taking a single three-credit course) may perceive 
eligibility from the Carroll Scholarship differently than a student who is enrolling with a full, 12 
credit hours course load. If this is true, it is appropriate to include quantile regressions. Figure 19 
illustrates the estimated quantile regression coefficient estimates of Meridian x Post for HS GPA, 
Credit Hours: Attempted, and Credit Hours: Earned. The graph charts changes in the quantile 
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regression coefficient and the 95% confidence interval band using the model detailed in the 
Model Specification section. The horizontal line and confidence interval represent the OLS fixed 
effects regression model. The confidence interval for the quantile regression estimates fall within 
the OLS fixed effects regression estimates over a substantial portion of the quantiles. For this 
reason I opt not to run quantile regression models in addition to the models already specified. I 
find no compelling evidence that the quantile regression models provide a better fit than the OLS 
fixed effects regression models.  
HS GPA. Table 16 illustrates the results for the HS GPA models used for Research 
Question #1. Model 1 shows that Meridian students from all years are likely to have a HS GPA 
lower than students from the in-district high schools. I anticipate the Carroll Scholarship will 
increase the enrollment of Meridian students at the lower end of high school grade point 
averages (P2:H1a). The increased number of Meridian students with low grade point averages 
will lower the mean HS GPA and produce a negative coefficient estimate. I find no evidence that 
HS GPA for infra-marginal students is significantly different after the introduction of the Carroll 
Scholarship. I also expect to find an increased number of Meridian students with high grade 
point averages enrolling at Richland (P2:H1b). This will increase the mean HS GPA and produce 
a positive coefficient estimate. Model 5 illustrates an increased percentage of Meridian students 
with HS GPA above 3.70 enrolled at Richland after the Carroll Scholarship announcement 
relative to the control group. The increased HS GPA, 0.19 (p<0.01), is in addition to the 0.11 
(p<0.05) point increase among all students after 2013. Meridian students from both pre- and 
post-Carroll time periods have a 0.125 (p<0.01) lower HS GPA in quartile 4. In addition, 
Meridian students after 2013 in HS GPA quartile 3 have 0.05 (p<0.01) lower HS GPA after the 
 111 
Carroll Scholarship announcement. All Meridian students in the HS GPA quartile 3 have 0.066 
(p<0.01) lower HS GPA. 
Postsecondary Credit Hours. Table 17 presents the results for the postsecondary student 
decision Credit Hours: Attempted. I hypothesized positive results for both infra-marginal 
students and college-qualified students (P2:H2a). In Model 1, I find Meridian students, after the 
announcement of the Carroll Scholarship, exhibit a statistically significant 1.15 (p<0.05) increase 
in registered credit hours, and I find evidence that college-qualified students are heavily 
influenced. After the Fall 2013 academic semester, Meridian students from the top half of the HS 
GPA distribution (quartiles 3-4) increased their registered yearly credit hours by a statistically 
significant 2.47 (p<0.05) and 3.52 (p<0.01), respectively. Credit bearing courses at Richland are 
typically either three or four credit hours. Therefore, the results for Meridian students in the HS 
GPA 4th quartile, likely represent an additional three or four credit hour course taken relative to 
a comparative in-district student and to Meridian student registration prior to the Carroll 
Scholarship. The significant results in Table 17 are in addition to the statistically significant 
influences for non-Carroll Scholarship financial aid and Pell Grant award amount. The value of 
scholarship aid not associated with the Carroll Scholarship or Pell grants, Other Aid Amount, 
statistically increases the number of registered credits between 0.15 (p<0.01) and 0.30 (p<0.01) 
for every additional $100 dollars in aid. The influence from Other Aid Amount increases with 
each HS GPA quartile. The opposite trend is true for Pell Grant aid received. Students in HS 
GPA quartile 1 increase credit hours by 0.24 (p<0.01), for each additional $100 received and this 
rate decreases with each subsequent quartile. The influence could be the result of students who 
do not qualify for the maximum Pell value, the opportunity costs associated with enrollment 
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(such as foregoing work), or issues related to information on Pell eligibility, such as those 
described by Pluhta and Penny (2013). 
Table 18 shows the results for the models of Credit Hours: Earned. I predict dissimilar 
results from students on the opposite end of the HS GPA quartiles. I expect Meridian’s infra-
marginal students will earn fewer credit hours (P2:H2b) and the college-qualified population will 
earn a larger number of credit hours (P2:H2c). In Model 1, I find that all post-Carroll Meridian 
students earned additional credit hours, a statistically significant increase of 1.87 (p<0.01) credit 
hours. The magnitude of this finding is larger than for the full model results for Credit Hours: 
Attempted (Table 17), however I failed to reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are 
statistically the same. I did find statistical significance among students from the top 2 HS GPA 
quartiles. Meridian students from HS GPA quartile 3 earned an additional 2.48 (p<0.01) credit 
hours, relative to a comparable student from the control group. Meridian students from the 
highest HS GPA quartile earned 3.91 (p<0.01) extra credit hours per semester. Placing these 
results in relation to Credit Hours: Attempted, the coefficients for Credit Hours: Earned are not 
statistically different than they were at registration. There is no evidence that Carroll-eligible 
students improved their academic standing. The results indicate that students successfully earn 
credit hours at a rate equal to the additional credit hours taken. Pell recipient students earn less 
credit hours, overall. The reduced credit hours are offset by the amount of Pell aid they receive. 
Pell recipients in all four HS GPA quartiles have positive rates for credit hours earned with 
higher award values. 
I examined models for Credit Hours: Withdrawn and Credit Hours: Failed in Tables 19-
20. I find that Carroll-eligible students withdraw from fewer credit hours, -0.69 (p<0.05), than 
their counterparts from the control group. This finding is concentrated among students in HS 
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GPA quartile 2 who withdraw from a statistically significant 1.50 (p<0.05) fewer credit hours. 
This equates to approximately half of a single, three credit hour course, or approximately one 
extra three credit hour course withdrawn from every two semesters of enrollment. In Table 20, I 
find evidence that Meridian students from HS GPA quartile 3 fail courses at a different rate after 
the Carroll Scholarship announcement. Carroll-eligible students fail an additional 0.65 (p<0.01) 
credit hours per semester.  
Carroll Scholarship Recipient and Amount. The Carroll Scholarship provides two 
different forms of treatment conditions to Meridian students: a monetary aid award to be used 
toward the cost of tuition and a signal of postsecondary affordability. The previous models do 
not distinguish between the two but rather they look at the net outcome from both. Next, I run a 
serious of models designed to indicate whether students react differently to the Carroll 
Scholarship when they receive funds and whether the signal of affordability has a different, 
psychological impact on the enrollment decisions made by students. 
In Tables 21-22, Credit Hours: Attempted is re-assessed using two new treatment 
conditions: a binary variable for receiving the Carroll Scholarship (Carroll Scholarship 
Recipient) and a continuous variable for the amount of Carroll Scholarship funding received 
(Carroll Scholarship Amount). The sample populations for Tables 21-22 were restricted to 
include only students from Meridian High School. The new treatment group identifies Meridian 
students who received Carroll Scholarship funding and the new control group represents 
Meridian students who did not receive the specific scholarship. 
From the results in Table 21, I find that receiving any Carroll Scholarship funding 
statistically associated with increasing registered credit hours by 3.97 (p<0.01). This result is 
consistent across the first three HS GPA quartiles. Students among the low HS GPA group 
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increased registered credit hours by 3.98 (p<0.01), students in HS GPA quartile 2 increased by 
3.60 (p<0.01) and Carroll Scholarship recipients from HS GPA quartile 3 increased registered 
credits by 5.21 (p<0.01). The results from each quartile are statistically significant. The results 
likely represent that the Meridian students use the Carroll Scholarship to take an additional 
course per semester, after accounting for any other form of financial aid that they receive. Pell 
Grant Amount and Other Aid Amount also increase the number of enrolled credits. 
Table 22 reinforces the prior results. I observe that students take an additional 0.365 
(p<0.01) credit hours with each extra $100 increment of Carroll Scholarship. Similar to the 
results from Table 21, the trend is consistent across HS GPA quartiles 1-3: 0.43 (p<0.01), 0.31 
(p<0.01), and 0.36 (p<0.01), respectively. Again, funding from the Carroll Scholarship is aligned 
with a statistically larger magnitude than the total value of Other Aid Amount, 0.22 (p<0.01) and 
the value of Pell Grant Amount, 0.16 (p<0.01).  
Tables 23-24 re-assess the Credit Hours: Earned using Carroll Scholarship reception and 
the scholarships value. I find significant results that students who receive the Carroll Scholarship 
earn additional credit hours, presented in Table 23. Regardless of senior class year, Meridian 
students who receive the scholarship earn an estimated 4.38 (p<0.01) additional credit hours. 
Similar to Credit Hours: Attempted, the results are concentrated in the first three HS GPA 
quartiles, 4.77 (p<0.01), 3.99 (p<0.01), and 4.22 (p<0.01), respectively. The coefficient estimates 
are not statistically different than the findings from Credit Hours: Attempted. There is no 
evidence that Carroll Scholarship funding improves academic performance. The same influence 
is found in Table 24, which shows that each $100 of Carroll Scholarship coincides with an 
additional 0.42 (p<0.01) Credit Hours: Earned for Meridian students. The effect of the 
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scholarship is centered on students in HS GPA quartiles 1-3: 0.53 (p<0.01), 0.38 (p<0.01), and 
0.34 (p<0.01), respectively.  
In Tables 25-30 I examine Credit Hours: Attempted and Credit Hours: Earned for all 
students who have the full cost of tuition covered by some form of financial aid. Tables 25-26 
include Meridian students who are able to cover the cost of tuition using non-Carroll Scholarship 
financial aid. Tables 27-28 include only Meridian students who required the Carroll Scholarship 
to cover the remaining unmet need. Additionally, in Tables 29-30 I further limit the full sample 
population to students with no unmet need and who receive Pell Grant funding. Here, the 
Meridian treatment population includes only students who did not need Carroll Scholarship 
funding to cover the remaining cost of tuition.19 
In Table 25, I find significant results only among students in highest HS GPA quartile. 
Among all students who have no remaining unmet need from course registration, Meridian 
students with information on Carroll Scholarship eligibility take 3.03 (p<0.01) credit hours. 
Table 26 shows that this same HS GPA quartile also earns more credit hours, 3.00 (p<0.01). 
Table 27 shows no significant results for increased credit hour taking decisions for Meridian 
students who use the Carroll Scholarship to cover unmet need, relative to the sample population 
who has no remaining unmet need. However, Table 28 illustrates that students from the lowest 
HS GPA quartiles statistically earn more credit hours despite the insignificant results from the 
course registration models. Lastly, Meridian’s infra-marginal students who receive Pell Grant 
funding enroll in an additional 9.65 (p<0.01) credit hours, shown in Table 29. A larger group of 
Carroll Scholarship eligible students earn a statistically significant additional number of credit 
hours at Richland, demonstrated in Table 30. This finding supports the idea that the source of 
                                                        
19 25 Meridian students receive both Pell Grant funding and still require Carroll Scholarship funding to cover the 
cost of tuition. I omit these students because the sample size is too small. 
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funding may be irrelevant to students or that Meridian students do not opt to take extra courses 
just because they would be covered by the scholarship. Despite the insignificant credit taking 
outcomes, it appears that infra-marginal students may receive a psychologically benefit from 
Carroll eligibility. 
Curricular Path. Tables 31-32 present the curricular path that directs the course 
selection of students. The models in Tables 31-32 are separated by HS GPA quartile 1-2 and HS 
GPA quartile 3-4. This is necessary because Logistic regression is based off the dependent 
variables observations equal to one (for instance, Associates Degree Path= 1). Separating the 
sample by HS GPA quartiles creates small sample size problems for Meridian students with 
either Associates Degree Path= 1 or Transferable Degree Path= 1. For this reason I combine the 
lower two and upper two HS GPA quartiles. I anticipated a reduced likelihood of Associate’s 
degree seeking infra-marginal students (P2:H3a), and expected that this group would instead opt 
to follow the curricular path that ends with a certificate. I also hypothesized (P2:H3b) that 
college-qualified students would elect to follow the Associate’s degree or transferable credential 
curriculum at higher rates. I find significant results for both groups of students.  
In Table 31, I find that all Meridian students among the top two HS GPA quartiles 
(quartile 3-4) are more likely, 4.5% (p<0.01), to follow an Associates Degree Path. The 
influence of the Carroll Scholarship offsets this finding. Carroll-eligible students are 9.3% 
(p<0.01) less likely to follow an Associates Degree Path. Logistic regression results are 
significant for the corresponding models which demonstrate robust results. I do not find any 
results that suggest infra-marginal students are influenced toward selecting a different curricular 
path after the introduction of the Carroll Scholarship.  
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Table 32 shows the results for Transferable Degree Path. In this research I assume that 
students within from HS GPA quartiles (quartile 3-4), the highest-grade earners in high school, 
could have academically met the admission standards for four-year institutions. Students who 
were likely incentivized to enroll at Richland instead of a four-year university are exposed to 
different postsecondary credential options; specifically programs that promote a shorter, two-
year curricular path and do not promote further education at a four-year institution. 
Consequently, students who would have elected to enroll at a four-year institution, prior to 
information about the Carroll Scholarship, may be altering their postsecondary expectations 
away from earning a Bachelor’s Degree. I find that Carroll-eligible students from HS GPA 
quartile 3-4 are 7.2% (p<0.01) less likely to follow a Transferable Degree Path. The Logistic 
model results provide a robustness check for these findings. A Transferable Degree Path is 
defined as coursework that would be accepted by another institution toward a higher degree 
requirement.  
This finding suggests the presence of Burton Clark’s (1964) cooling out among students 
who are qualified to earn higher-level degrees and negative returns of Rouse’s (1995) diversion. 
Clark states that students with greater academic capabilities, who elect to enroll at two-year 
institutions, first, may be inadvertently guided to exit higher education prior to earning a four-
year degree. Rouse (1995) describes that students who able to use the credits earned at a two-
year institution to better prepare them to succeed at a four-year institution represent a net effect 
of beginning at a community college. Rouse notes the alternative possibility is that some 
students, “might be better off by starting in a four-year school where a greater fraction of the 
students attend full-time keeping students focused on attaining a bachelor’s degree” (p. 218).  
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My research does not directly assess whether a student transitions into a four-year 
institution; rather I consider the transferable curriculum options as an alternative to leave the 
possibility of transfer available to college qualified students. The estimated effects coincide with 
the descriptions offered by Reynolds (2012) and Doyle’s (2009) research that enrolling in a two-
year institution can diminish the potential for students to move forward toward a four-year 
degree. My findings suggest that college qualified students are less likely to use the Carroll 
Scholarship to earn credits that would be applicable at bachelor’s degree granting institutions. 
Policy Implications 
 This research presents a number of interesting findings in relation to community-
sustained financial aid programs redeemable at single two-year institutions. The introduction of 
the Carroll Scholarship in January 2013 provided Meridian High School students with early 
information on postsecondary affordability. The model of providing financial aid based on 
residency is growing across the country and is becoming increasingly centered on enrollment at 
two-year institutions. That communities have a vested interest in addressing issues of 
postsecondary affordability is unsurprising given the range of theoretical economic, labor force, 
and societal benefits of higher education. This makes research on the Carroll Scholarship 
relevant to future policy creation. 
 Using a unique panel dataset I examine how the Carroll Scholarship alters students 
college-going decisions and postsecondary outcomes. I find that the scholarship incentivizes 
students from the highest high school grade point average quartile to enroll at Richland. This 
group of students is likely to have to have made the college-going decision prior to the Carroll 
Scholarship announcement. Information about scholarship eligibility may have altered their 
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institutional choice to the eligible institution. The extent to which the affordability information 
shifted student’s enrollment decisions is untestable given this dataset.  
Surprisingly, I do not find clear evidence of college access for Meridian’s infra-marginal 
student population. There may be a number of rationales for this. The relatively low cost of 
Richland means that students may not have previously felt that postsecondary access was fiscally 
unattainable. Stated differently, the cost of higher education is only one factor in the complex 
decision-making process related to postsecondary enrollment. The Carroll Scholarship reduces 
the out-of-pocket tuition expenses to zero; however, a number of opportunity costs associated 
with enrollment still exist.  
The Carroll Scholarship findings present a new perspective on the role of community-
sustained financial aid program’s role in promoting college access. Pluhta and Penny’s (2013) 
prior research describes a large increase in college-going behavior after the announcement of a 
similarly structured scholarship. The population sample from their research was a low-income 
community with a relatively low college-going rate. The same is not true of Meridian High 
School. Differences in the surrounding community cannot be ignored when examining student 
responsiveness. It can be assumed that students within Meridian High School have different 
levels of context regarding the postsecondary enrollment decision. This would explain variation 
in student responsiveness to financial aid incentives relative to other programs. The variation in 
responsiveness has important implications for communities reallocating resources into residency-
based aid programs.   
This research demonstrates that Meridian students register for a statistically significant 
increased number of credit hours that leads to an increased number of credits earned. This 
finding is on par with results from Carruthers and Fox (2016). Carruthers and Fox (2016) 
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identify that the Knox (TN) Achieves program was influential in increasing credit hours earned 
after two years within higher education. These findings may be of interest to program 
stakeholders. The results validate that community-sustained programs can lead to improved 
levels of local human capital. As a growing number of programs cite both education-based and 
economic missions, these findings present a positive sign.  
Additionally, the results indicate that students who would have been most likely to attend 
a four-year institution, absent the scholarship, may reduce their degree earning aspirations. The 
findings of this research raise questions to whether these programs are beneficial in propelling 
students to seek postsecondary degrees versus postsecondary certificates. This finding is 
substantial because the motivation for the Carroll Scholarship was to increase the number of 
students who could “get to their junior year of college debt-free” (Harbour, 2013). 
This research has a number of future directions. This research considered the short-term 
impact of the scholarship announcement when Meridian students have relatively little time to 
adjust postsecondary preparation strategies in high school. A long-run examination of the same 
program will illuminate how additional years of affordability information alters students 
decisions on college-going and their postsecondary outcomes. 
Lastly, the descriptive statistics illustrate a potential change in institutional financial aid 
award. The number of Carroll Scholarship eligible students who were awarded other forms of 
financial aid decreased after 2013, relative to the control group. Additional research is warranted 
to identify if the Carroll Scholarship has a financial aid spillover onto neighboring high schools 
reducing the out-of-pocket cost of attendance for non-eligible students.  
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Paper Three: The Influence of Parents’ College Assets on College-going Behavior 
Saving in advance of a student’s postsecondary enrollment allows a family to circumvent 
the shock of postsecondary tuition payments by spreading the monetary sacrifice over multiple 
time periods. The accumulation of parents’ savings decisions – hereafter parents’ college assets – 
is becoming an increasingly important aspect of postsecondary affordability as reductions in 
federal and state funded financial aid are shifting a greater share of the costs of postsecondary 
enrollment onto students and their families (Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010; Ma, 2004). 
Currently, little research exists on the outcomes from households paying a larger share of the 
cost of postsecondary attendance. This research is a descriptive assessment of how different 
parents’ savings strategies are correlated to the likelihood of their children attending a 
postsecondary institution, specifically addressing diverse student demographics and educational 
expectations.  
Parents’ college assets are comparable to an investment portfolio, where specific 
strategies are combined to maximize an objective, in this case college attendance of their child. 
Saving toward a college education however, is not fully comparable to other large-scale savings 
decisions, such as financially planning for retirement. The time period to accumulate 
postsecondary savings is less than half the typical duration for retirement. Retirement savings is 
often redirected from the employee’s income. The savings vehicles used for retirement savings 
are frequently chosen from a limited number of predetermined options with different levels of 
identified risk. The finances and strategies to build college assets are not as straightforward.  
The decision to develop college savings requires families to select and gain access to 
financial institutions (Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010; Ma, 2004). Next, families must make a 
decision on the type of financial vehicle (savings account, U.S. bonds, stock market investment, 
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mutual funds, etc.) and consider the inherent risks associated with each vehicle. A large number 
of federal, state, and private education-based savings programs, such as college 529 plans or 
state pre-paid tuition programs, have been created in an attempt to induce families to undertake 
financial planning for college (Doyle, McLendon, & Hearn, 2010; Ma, 2004). The decision to 
use one of the education-specific programs is not straightforward. Differences across programs 
on cost of attendance coverage, required principal down payment, and penalties for non-qualified 
use complicate assessing their benefits and trade-offs (Dynarski, 2004; Hillman, Gast, and 
George-Jackson, 2015, Ma, 2004; Olivas, 2003). The complexity and variation of tax 
implications influence the decision to use these accounts but may not be fully comprehendible by 
families with little experience saving (Baum, 1999; Olivas, 2003). Non-education based savings 
vehicles such as traditional savings accounts and U.S bonds are more frequently used to save for 
college because of the complications associated with developing an education-based savings 
account (Sallie Mae, 2013).  
Parents’ college assets present an influence on a student’s decision to enroll beyond the 
increased availability of monetary assets (Kim & Johnson, 2012; Scanlon & Adams, 2009; 
(Sherraden, 1991; Yeung & Conley, 2008; Zhan & Sherraden, 2011). Savings decisions produce 
a fundamentally different response from students, relative to other types of financial aid. 
Financial aid dollars from external entities are anonymous. Students have little or no insight on 
how any unused award dollars will be redirected or to whom. By contrast, students directly 
experience both the trade-offs associated with savings and the sacrifice by the household when 
parents’ college assets are used. This gives students some awareness on how savings might be 
redirected if not spent on postsecondary expenses. Decisions made to accumulate postsecondary 
savings may alter students psychologically, for instance, impacting outlook and motivation 
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(Sherraden, 1991; Zhan & Sherraden, 2011). All else equal, the decisions made regarding 
postsecondary savings change the opportunity costs of enrollment for a student and may present 
a counterproductive influence on their college-going decision. This difference in student 
perceptions is not included in most research of parents’ college assets. 
This research fills a gap in the literature related to the strategies used by parents for 
saving for their student’s postsecondary education and how parents’ college assets align with 
observable students’ college-going behaviors. I develop multiple strategy (treatment) groups 
made up of the individual decisions made by households to develop parents’ college assets and 
describe the correlation between how student enrollment outcomes differ based on each. I 
employ a quasi-experimental design to account for biases in likelihood that a household saves 
and other characteristics that impact a student’s decision to enroll. I find a correlation between 
the overall strategies used by families and the observed enrollment decision by the student, both 
for the sample population and among socioeconomic and sociodemographic sub-groups. 
Additionally, I find evidence that some of the individual decisions made by households to 
develop postsecondary savings may be leading to a counterproductive effect on observed student 
enrollment. The two research questions used in this work are:  
1.) What correlations exist between parents’ college assets acquired by 10th grade and 
the observed college enrollment for different student demographics?  
2.) How much do parents’ college assets align with the observed college enrollment for 
different student demographics when parents identify both individual savings 
vehicles and household asset reallocation tactics as part of their postsecondary 
savings strategies?  
 
This paper is organized as follows. First, I describe the previous literature related to 
households’ saving for postsecondary expenses and observed student enrollment decisions. I use 
this research to outline the conceptual framework and the hypotheses being applied to the 
research questions. Second, I provide a description of the National Center for Educational 
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Statistics’ Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (NCES, 2002) (hereafter, ELS:2002) dataset, 
the ELS:2002 survey questions regarding parents’ postsecondary savings decisions, and the 
savings-based treatment strategies I have created from parent survey responses. Next, I describe 
the quantitative, quasi-experimental Propensity Score Matching methodology used to address 
bias in the statistical models. Finally, I provide descriptive statistics and results from the 
specified models. The model results are separated by treatment strategies and the individual 
methods corresponding with each strategy, as well as select socioeconomic and 
sociodemographic sub-groups. 
Literature Review 
Parents are present in their student’s college-going decision in different capacities, 
including psychologically, physically, and monetarily. Parents play a pivotal role in the process 
of acquiring, placing context, and interpreting the value of postsecondary information (De 
LaRosa, 2006; Deming & Dynarski, 2009). The family’s physical environment, a consequence of 
parent decisions, impacts the availability and accuracy of postsecondary information (Bourdieu, 
1986; Coleman, 1988; McDonough, 1997; Perna, 2006). Family norms, social networks, and 
cultural capital shape how students personalize information and are a key component to the 
college choice decision (Flint, 1993; Heller, 2006; McDonough & Calderone, 2006; Perna, 2006; 
Tierney & Venegas, 2009).  
Postsecondary Savings Decision. Decisions to save for postsecondary expenses can be 
thought of as a relationship between information on higher education expenses, family structure 
and composition, and the availability of family income and wealth. The direction of causation for 
these factors is not easily generalizable because the existing research surrounding parents’ 
savings is relatively mixed. Anticipating exorbitant out-of-pocket postsecondary expenses may 
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increase the desire to develop savings or reduce the willingness to save (Feldstein, 1995; Hossler 
& Vesper, 1993). Families uncertain in the ability to meet postsecondary expenses may develop 
savings to lessen the immediate financial impact from enrollment (Hossler & Vesper, 1993). 
However, limited household resources may promote the disincentive to save, a concept referred 
to as reverse savings (Shanks, Nicoll, & Johnson, 2014). If parents believe household savings 
replaces external financial aid sources they have less incentive to develop savings (Sallie Mae, 
2013). Martin Feldstein (1995) equated the latter to financially savvy parents taking advantage of 
the financial aid system. The trade-off between savings and financial aid create the same 
incentives among households with a greater ability to develop savings. Families with greater 
access to financial resources may use the tax incentives from postsecondary savings as a wealth 
accumulation strategy, or they may strategically opt against savings to maximize eligibility of 
alternative forms of financial aid (Dynarski, 2004; Feldstein, 1995; Ma, 2004). 
The decision to develop parents’ college assets is linked to household characteristics. The 
student’s gender and the total number of children in the family influence the decision to save 
(Stage & Hossler, 1989; Hossler & Vesper, 1993; Shanks, Nicoll, & Johnson, 2014). Race and 
ethnicity create different dynamics in the decision to develop parents’ college assets (Elliott, 
2011; Elliot & Beverly, 2010; Hossler & Vesper, 1993; Stage & Hossler, 1989). African-
American families are more likely to develop savings later in their child’s secondary school 
career (Hillman, Gast & George-Jackson, 2015). The delayed savings decision is partially a 
result of economic disadvantages that limit savings capability (Charles, Roscigno & Torres, 
2007). Access to financial institutions to hold savings is a relevant consideration that is not 
uniform across all demographics. A lack of trust in financial institutions, particularly for 
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minority populations, diminishes the desire to save (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Hillman, Gast 
& George-Jackson, 2015; Okech, Little & Shanks, 2011).  
Household income is an important characteristic for postsecondary savings decisions. 
Current finances are the primary reason parents do not save, even when the initial deposit is $25 
or less (Charles, Roscigno & Torres, 2007; Shanks, Nicoll, & Johnson, 2014). Among families 
that do save, household income predicts the number of savings methods used (Manly & Wells, 
2009). Parents with higher levels of education and income are more likely to devote more 
resources towards savings, but not by reducing spending habits (Hillman, Gast & George-
Jackson, 2015; Manly & Wells, 2009; Stage & Hossler, 1989). Similar to diversifying a 
portfolio, higher-income families use more strategies (Manly & Wells, 2009). This is not 
necessarily new savings. Education-related tax benefits (both state and federal) create the 
appearance of new savings but are most likely just resources that are relocated from different 
savings mechanisms (Dynarski, 2004; Ma, 2004; Olivas, 2003).  
Postsecondary Savings Outcomes. The limited research on how parents’ college assets 
promote enrollment behavior among students is mixed. Hossler and Vesper (1993) find a 
significant influence on enrollment overall. Their results argue that establishing parents’ college 
asses by early high school, 9th grade is critical for influencing postsecondary enrollment. Elliott 
and Beverly (2010) found that neither parents’ savings nor family wealth reduces the likelihood 
of enrollment directly after high school but the level of students’ saving does. The process of 
maintaining and using a small funds account can signal financial management capabilities and 
promote enrollment (Elliott, Song, & Nam; 2013). This underscores the perception that the 
process for creating fiscal access can promote a psychological impact on students and influence 
the expectation of postsecondary attainment.  
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Parent savings research from Elliott (2011) uses the same ELS:2002 dataset as I use here. 
Elliott (2011) determines that using mutual funds provides the greatest influence for enrollment 
at four-year institutions.20 My research builds upon Elliott’s by making a few key deviations. I 
include all parent savings survey variables in the treatment conditions and consider enrollment in 
both two- and four-year institutions for the dependent variable. These contribute an important 
addition to the literature. Elliott (2011) omitted a number of survey options that are commonly 
used among households, such as investments in stock and real estate, sponsored college savings 
programs, and household sacrifices made to build savings. The omitted options account for 
approximately 10,000 observations in the dataset (ELS, 2002). Non-education based savings 
methods are the most commonly used among parents who save (Sallie Mae, 2013). By 
withholding these variables from the models, Elliott’s results are less generalizable to the 
population.  
I include the survey variables that identify household sacrifices to build savings. I use 
these variables to examine how students may be incentivized differently based on the trade-offs 
incurred from savings. Trade-offs are a missing aspect of the literature on parents’ saving. 
Families make multiple decisions regarding savings vehicles and household assets when they 
develop their postsecondary savings portfolio; examining a single mechanism or omitting family 
sacrifices produces results that do not capture the full influence from savings. Lastly, I include 
students who enroll at two-year institutions in the models. Community colleges enroll the largest 
share of students who transition into higher education directly from high school (AACC, 2013). 
This institution type captures students on the margin, so including it in my research improves the 
chances of finding an enrollment influence. The growing cost of attendance in higher education 
                                                        
20 Elliott (2011) interpreted the savings survey question “set up a college investment fund” as a mutual fund. In this 
research I include this survey question as part of the college 529 plan individual savings vehicle. 
 128 
may push a larger share of students with uncertainty in postsecondary affordability to enroll at 
two-year institutions.  
Conceptual Framework 
The literature outlined above contains important implications for this study. First, parents 
are essential in obtaining information on college access and interpreting the magnitude of 
educational returns for students. Second, factors associated with cultural, social, and human 
capital are important indicators for acquiring parents’ college assets and describing the influence 
that savings has on a student’s decision to enroll. A model that includes the role of parents and 
postsecondary finances in explaining a student’s college-going decision is the conceptual 
framework presented by Perna (2005), an adaption of which is illustrated in Figure 20. 
Perna (2005) describes a contextual progression based on information and feedback from 
four layers: Social, Economic, & Policy Context, Higher Education Context, School & 
Community Context, and Habitus. The outer two layers, Social, Economic, & Policy Context and 
Higher Education Context deliver public policy and economic information related to the explicit 
and implicit, opportunity costs of college attendance/enrollment (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 
2013; Kane, 2003; Rodriquez, Guido-DiBirto, Torres and Talbot, 2000; Paulsen & St. John, 
2002). The School and Community Context embodies the availability of school resources and 
how they steer students’ consideration of postsecondary enrollment. For instance, the types of 
courses offered, accessibility to counselors, qualifications of teachers, and the community’s 
engagement with academic institutions indicate postsecondary accessibility to students (De 
LaRosa, 2006; Perna, 2004). A family’s immediate environment, Habitus, captures individual 
characteristics, perceptions, beliefs, and values. In Habitus, feedback and impressions from 
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social and cultural networks help to identify how information aligns to their own unique 
circumstances and background (Manly & Wells, 2009; Stage & Hossler, 1989).  
The contexts from these four layers are funneled into the core of the framework. Here, 
students use the information and context as either reaffirming or weakening their college-going 
consideration. A student’s demand for higher education comes from the expected need for 
further education and the likelihood of being successful. Previous academic success, 
postsecondary readiness, and future employment anticipations are few examples. The context a 
student receives from the previous layers strengthens or diminishes how they view the returns 
from higher education. The supply of accessible financial resources determines the amount of 
education a student deems they can purchase. Accessible resources are all physical resources 
available to a student; for example, personal finances to cover the cost of attendance or 
knowledge of financial aid. The student’s view of the implicit costs associated with enrollment 
contributes to whether a student feels the financial resources will be sufficient to meet their 
academic goal (i.e. a college credential). Finally, the college-going decision is made based on the 
interaction between a student’s demand for education and the supply of available resources. 
Perna (2005) describes the framework as a useful tool for assessing policy implications, 
specifically referencing the growing number of savings programs; but does not directly include a 
description of how savings fits within the framework. For this research I am applying the 
influence of parents’ college assets to Perna’s framework in two ways. The most direct 
application is a traditional view of how savings incentivizes enrollment. The availability of 
parents’ college assets represents physical financial resources to cover the cost of enrollment. 
This aligns with the description of the supply of accessible resources in Perna’s framework. All 
else equal, parents’ college assets increase the available resources to purchase education. 
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Second, I apply Perna’s description of the Habitus layer to identify how students may 
assess household decisions to build postsecondary savings. A student’s evaluation of cultural and 
community beliefs influences how they view the process used to develop savings (Dynarski, 
2004; Elliott, 2011; Kim & Johnson, 2012; Scanlon & Adams, 2009; Shanks, Nicoll, & Johnson, 
2014). First, the process of savings may provide students with a more in-depth financial 
understanding and awareness. Prior research has described this a mental accounting (Elliott, 
2009; Elliott, Song, & Nam, 2013). Second, a student’s Habitus may lead to conflicting beliefs 
surrounding the individual household decisions made to accumulate savings. Students have 
insight on alternative uses for internally generated funds because they experience the sacrifices 
from developing this form of savings. Consequently, the opportunity cost of enrollment is not 
only foregone earnings, but also a student’s perception of the household’s trade-offs. The 
direction of effect on postsecondary enrollment for these two perceptions may be opposite. 
Hypotheses. Building from the aforementioned framework, I have hypotheses for each of 
the research questions. In Research Question #1, what correlations exist between parents’ 
college assets acquired by 10th grade and the observed college enrollment for different student 
demographics?, I expect that the cumulative savings decisions used to acquire parents’ college 
assets will predict student enrollment into a postsecondary institution (P3:H1). This aligns with 
the traditional view of savings and a direct application to the core of Perna’s framework. All else 
equal, increasing the financial resources available to a student will promote the decision to 
transition into higher education, relative to their matched peers. This will result in a positive 
coefficient for the savings methods for predicting postsecondary enrollment. I expect that this 
will be true for all socioeconomic and sociodemographic subgroups, including models that 
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restrict the sample based on race and ethnicity, household income, student’s expectations, and 
specific institution types.  
In Research Question #2, how much do parents’ college assets align with the observed 
college enrollment for different student demographics when parents identify both individual 
savings vehicles and household asset reallocation tactics as part of their postsecondary savings 
strategies?, I expect that educationally underrepresented student populations will respond 
adversely when household sacrifices are used to accumulate savings. Specifically, I hypothesize 
that parents’ college asset portfolios identifying specific household trade-offs as a part of their 
strategy among the sample of non-White students, students from low-income households, and 
students with uncertainty in their postsecondary expectations, will predict a diminished 
likelihood of transitioning into higher education, relative to their matched peers. I expect that the 
savings vehicles used to hold savings will maintain a significant, positive coefficient on 
enrollment (P3:H2a), but the variables for household sacrifices will have a significant, negative 
coefficient (P3:H2b). Coefficients with opposite signs work to move the net effect of parents’ 
college assets towards zero. This aligns with my second application of parents’ college assets to 
Perna’s framework: a student’s evaluation of their Habitus and the trade-offs incurred to develop 
savings will increase the perceived opportunity costs of enrollment and diminish the probability 
of transitioning into higher education. 
Data Description 
Created by the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Educational 
Statistics, the Education Longitudinal Study of 2002 (ELS:2002) dataset provides longitudinal 
information on approximately 16,200 students of the 2004 Senior Class (NCES, 2002). The data 
is organized as a single cohort panel dataset consisting of multiple survey sources: students, 
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parents, and school administrators and staff. The variables used for this study originate from the 
2002 base year (2002 BY) survey corresponding with the student’s 10th grade year, and the 
second follow-up survey (2005 F2) intended to be a student’s first post- high school year.  
The variables of interest for this research are constructed from parents’ responses to the 
2002 BY survey question referencing savings specifically designated for “education after high 
school” (NCES, 2002). The first question in the survey sequence asks whether parents have 
made savings efforts for their student’s education after high school and is followed by twelve 
survey questions identifying different savings methods and savings decisions. I examine the 
treatment that students receive from parents’ college assets in two different ways: individual 
savings decisions and combined treatment strategies. I consider the subject of each of the twelve 
ELS:2002 parent survey questions to be an individual savings decision. The accumulation of 
individual savings decisions creates the combined savings strategy – a parents’ college asset 
portfolio. Combined strategies are determined by the characteristics of all the individual 
treatment strategies. Table 33 identifies the specific wording for each survey question, 
descriptive statistics on the number of households that positively identified using each individual 
savings decision, and how I align each savings decision with a combined savings strategy.  
Each survey question presented parents multiple options for answering, including “Yes,” 
“No,” and several reasons why the question could not be answered.21 I transform the survey 
responses into binary variables where Yes = 1 if the parent identified using that method/decision 
for savings and No= 0 if the parent identified they did not use that method. I use three different 
procedures for coding missing answers. If a parent identified that they did not have savings 
                                                        
21 For instance, a survey question was considered a legitimate skip if the parents had already answered that they did 
not have savings efforts for 10th grader’s education after high school of if parents did not aspire for their child to 
attend a postsecondary institution. 
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efforts for education after high school and skipped the twelve individual questions (considered a 
legitimate skip in the ELS:2002 codebook), I coded “No” for all individual methods. If a parent 
identified “Yes” for any of the individual options, I assumed all skipped questions represented a 
“No” response. Lastly, I omitted a student from the sample if all questions related to savings 
were skipped. This was necessary because there is no method to identify if a student should be 
included in the treatment or control group.  
Treatment Conditions. Most studies that examine the relationship between parents’ 
savings and student enrollment behavior omit certain forms of savings or consider savings as a 
dichotomous treatment with a single effect. This contributes to a general understanding of 
parents’ savings, but it does not adequately address whether various components of the savings 
strategy have differential, and potentially confounding, influences. One strength of this study is 
the assessment of how the full combination of savings strategies influences the likelihood of 
enrollment, and the influence of the individual decisions present within parents’ college asset 
portfolio.  
The wording of the twelve individual 2002 BY survey questions suggests a natural 
separation into three overarching areas for developing a postsecondary savings strategy. Prior 
savings research (Sherraden, 1991; Yeung & Conley, 2008; Zhan & Sherraden, 2011) identifies 
that student’s may have different perceptions of savings depending on the type of asset. 
Specifically, Sherraden (Sherraden, 1991; Zhan & Sherraden, 2011) look at the distinction 
between financial and non-financial assets. Financial assets are described as easily liquidated, 
“ready-to-use” (Zhan & Sherraden, 2011, p. 847) to help smooth economic stress. The examples 
provided of Non-financial assets liabilities include debt related assets, such as homeownership. 
Similarly, Orr (2013) discusses that student’s may have a different perception of household 
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savings based on how the asset is held. Orr (2013) uses the descriptors Liquid and Non-Liquid. I 
use the general description for savings methods as the bases for creating the treatment categories 
from the survey questions.  
I interpret the survey questions starting with Started, Bought, Established, Made, 
Participated, and Set up as verbs and the subject of the survey question as the vehicle used to 
hold savings. This most closely coincides to the idea of financial assets presented by Zhan and 
Sherraden (2011). I include the decisions using verbs Remortgaged, Reduced, and Working in a 
separate category. I treat the methods associated with these verbs as the Non-Financial, Non-
Liquid group. Lastly, I assume that the verb Planned indicates methods intended as a future 
action to be used after the 2002 BY survey. I am unable to determine if households took these 
actions after the survey date. A large number of families identify these intentions in their survey 
responses so I opt to include this as a separate category. I identify the three different categories 
that parents have used to develop savings as past tense actions made to develop a method to 
holding savings, past tense actions used to accumulate savings value, and future intentions for 
actions to accumulate savings and value. Next I describe the three treatment groups I have 
created using the survey question responses. 
The survey questions that I consider past financial actions made holding savings are 
positive responses to whether a parent started a savings account (Savings), bought an insurance 
policy (Insurance), bought U.S. savings bonds (U.S. Bonds), established another form of savings 
(Other Savings), made an investment in stocks/real estate (Stocks/Real Estate), participated in 
state-sponsored college savings program (529 plan), and/or set up a college investment fund (529 
plan). Using a general savings account, Savings, is the most popular method identified by parent 
responses. A general savings account is included in the parents’ college asset portfolio of 78% of 
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households that save. Savings accounts are traditionally a risk-free vehicle for savings. Insurance 
policies (Insurance) are frequently associated with longer-term, risk-free savings that allow 
multiple withdrawal provisions such as life, health, and education (Williams, 2015). Purchasing 
U.S. savings bonds (U.S. Bonds) is another risk-free form of savings that matures based on the 
specific bond rate and maturation date. Investing in real estate or the stock market (Stock/Real 
Estate) is likely a risky form of savings but with the potential for high returns. The alternative 
savings method (Other Savings) asks if parents established another form of savings. No further 
description is available about this survey option. The survey questions that inquire to whether a 
parent set up a college investment fund or participated in state-sponsored college savings 
programs, are worded to imply a college targeted savings method (529 plan). College specific 
plans typically have intricate tax and tuition coverage policies, with variation in withdrawal 
eligibility. ELS:2002 does not provide additional insight on the distinctions between these two 
mechanisms so I combine them to represent savings vehicles designed specifically for 
postsecondary use.  
The first combined savings treatment I create for this research is labeled Past Account 
Creation. I classify households as having a Past Account Creation strategy for parents’ college 
assets if they only selected at least one option from: Savings, Insurance, U.S. Bonds, Other 
Savings, Stocks/Real Estate, or 529 plans. Conceptually, this is the most basic idea of what 
savings represents: a family depositing capital into an account. The savings amount increases 
through additional deposits and the incurred return on investment. In the ELS:2002 dataset, 
families falling within the Past Account Creation combined strategy use an average of 2.85 
different vehicles to make up their savings portfolio.  
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The second grouping of savings strategies I term Past Asset Reallocation. This category 
identifies how household assets were previously redirected to accrue college savings. This 
strategy includes all the survey questions that were not readily liquid, increase liability, or could 
be considered non-financial in nature. The survey questions aligning with this category are: 
remortgaged property/took out a home-equity loan (Remortgaged), reduced other expenses in 
some way (Reduce Expense), and started working another job/more hours (Add Job). The Past 
Asset Reallocation category provides insight to the sacrifices that each family is making to 
accrue savings and represents the physical decisions that are most observable to students or that 
would impact the student’s immediate environment. These sacrifices may alter the postsecondary 
expectations or the perception students have of postsecondary affordability. Students may view 
this type of savings strategy differently based on their Habitus (Perna, 2005). I am not assuming 
that each of these options is equally visible to students, that parents have discussed them with 
their student, or that the student is capable of comprehending the decision. Instead, this group of 
savings strategies consists of decisions made by parents that will impose an influence on the 
student’s environment. Families in both the Past Account Creation and Past Asset Reallocation 
groupings have an average of 4.18 different individual methods/decisions represented in their 
parents’ college asset portfolio.  
Future Intentions is the final grouping, which indicates whether families have chosen to 
either continue or add a strategy after the 2002 BY survey. The survey questions for this group 
are: planned to reduce other expenses in some way (Plan to Reduce Expenses) and planned to 
remortgage property/take out a home-equity loan (Plan to Remortgage). An average of 4.37 
different mechanisms are used among households whose survey responses are positive for all 
three approaches: Past Account Creation, Past Asset Reallocation and Future Intentions. 
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Dependent Variables. The dependent variable for this analysis distinguishes whether an 
individual student enrolled into a postsecondary institution immediately following high school 
graduation.  Enrollment is a binary variable (Yes= 1) collected from the 2005 follow-up (F2) 
student survey. This corresponds with the year a student would be a college freshman if they 
completed high school in the two years following their 10th grade year. Unlike previous research, 
the measure for enrollment does not require enrollment into a four-year institution. Enrollment 
may be at a public or private college, as well as two- or four-year institutions. This is an 
important contribution of this study, since a growing share of all students is deciding to attend 
two-year institutions. Omitting this institution type has been a substantial limitation in prior 
literature (AACC, 2013).  
Data Limitations. Using a pre-existing dataset has limitations, the most notable is that I 
am not able to identify specific savings programs. For instance, the Coverdell Education Savings 
Account and 529 Savings Plans are both generally considered savings mechanisms for 
postsecondary financing, but they are not separately identified in the ELS:2002 survey. As a 
result, I use a single, combined measure (529 plan).  
In the ELS:2002 dataset, a substantial number of parents (3,000) do not respond to any of 
the savings-based survey questions. These students are omitted from this research due to missing 
values. An unobserved bias may be present with these families. This bias does not appear to be 
related to college enrollment as 66% of the omitted sample entered college after completing high 
school, as compared to 77% in the total sample. Nonetheless, the results of this research only 
apply to the usable sub-sample. 
Any students who drop out of high school prior to receiving a diploma or who were 
required to repeat a grade between 10th and 12th are omitted from this research. These students 
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may eventually experience an effect from parental savings towards college enrollment, but this 
would not be observed in the ELS:2002 follow-up survey. This narrows the usable sample to 
students who are academically and socially able to complete the final three years of high school 
uninterrupted.  
A different limitation exists that is data-driven and conceptual in nature. The rising cost 
of postsecondary tuition is among the reasons identified for increased household savings. 
Unfortunately, this does not address a household’s belief for how much savings is needed. A 
limitation in the data is the inability to identify how much savings family’s intent to accrue for 
college expenses, or an insight into how much they think will be necessary. The expected cost of 
higher education is likely one driver for the individual decisions on postsecondary savings; 
failing to account for this in the models creates an unknown bias. One way to lessen this 
potential bias is with information on the price of tuition at the institution a student first enrolled 
in. This information can be determined through the restricted access ELS:2002 dataset. Using 
this data is a future direction of this research. 
Methodology 
Higher education research intending to identify a causal effect on postsecondary 
outcomes is subject to omitted variable and selection bias (Cellini, 2008). Quasi-experimental 
design methods offer an appropriate solution to address these biases. The quasi-experimental 
research design used here is Propensity-Score Matching (PSM). Specific to this research, PSM 
uses relevant factors identified from prior literature to create an estimate that parents would 
establish college savings prior to their student entering 10th grade. The matching process aligns 
students from the treatment group, students with parents’ college assets, to students from the 
control group, Non-Intent.  
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The control group of this study, Non-Intent, consists of parents who did not select any of 
the twelve individual savings decisions or answered “No” to the survey question for whether 
they have made savings efforts for their student’s education after high school. The three 
combined savings strategies are mutually exclusive from each other and the control group. The 
intent of this research is to identify an influence from developing postsecondary savings in the 
time period before students typically begin to make college-going decisions, relative to peers 
who differ only in their parent’s decision to save. Non-Intent provides a consistent control group 
to examine the difference in outcomes from students who, all else equal, vary only in access to 
parents’ college assets. Non-Intent is an appropriate control group for this study because the 
research questions are focused on the difference in observed enrollment for students whose 
parents have developed college savings and the household decisions made to accumulate 
savings. One limitation of using Non-Intent as the control group is that I am not able to discuss 
the difference in magnitude across the treatment groups. 
The Non-Intent student population has the same statistical probability of possessing 
parents’ college assets, but their parents have opted against savings. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) find that matching students directly on the estimate, called propensity scores (pscores), 
provide model outcomes that are approximately the same as comparing students individually on 
the study’s full vector of covariates. When a student with savings is matched with multiple 
students from the Non-Intent group, an inverse weighting process is applied. The weighting 
process assigns a fraction value to each Non-Intent paired student, such that the fractions for all 
students matched to a single treatment student sum to one. For instance, if two Non-Intent 
students are matched to a single student with savings, the two Non-Intent students are each given 
one-half weight; if three Non-Intent students are matched, each are given a one-third weight, etc.  
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Post-Matching Tests. Austin (2011) examines different methods for applying PSM to 
sociological research and concludes that PSM results have the ability to mimic randomized 
control experiments contingent on verifying population characteristics; for instance, a balanced, 
post-weight sample population with insignificant difference in pscores between matched 
students. I use two different methods to verify the close proximity of matches. First, Figures 21-
23 demonstrate kernel density plots for pre- and post-weighting. The distance under each curve 
represents the full portion of the group with a particular pscore, and extends horizontally across 
the full range of pscores. The vertical distance between curves, the kernel density, measures the 
sample’s proportional difference between the two groups. After applying the matched weighting 
there should be no discernable difference in curves horizontally or vertically, as is the case for 
this data.  
Second, I use a statistical test to verify that the sub-populations within a sample remain 
equal after applying the post-match weights. Austin (2011) asserts that a regression of each 
covariate onto the savings treatment and a test of the coefficient estimate will identify if there is 
a standardized difference between the means of the treatment and Non-Intent population. In this 
regression, the intercept will take the value of the mean for the Non-Intent population and the 
coefficient (𝛽1) for the treatment variable will represent the difference in mean between the 
treatment and control group. The null hypothesis for the test is that 𝛽1= 0, where failing to reject 
the null hypothesis indicates statistically similar means. In the event that the means are not 
statistically different from zero, a difference of 0.10 or less is considered negligible, so that any 
particular population is not unduly influencing results in either the savings or control condition 
(Austin, 2011). Tables 34-36 chart the standardized difference and the p-value for significance 
that the standardized difference between the treatment and control group is equal to zero. 
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Unbalance can be dealt with in numerous ways, most notably to drop the affected 
observations or simply leave the population unbalanced. In this research, I have dropped the 
population with household income greater than $250,000 annually from all models because of 
unbalance. High-income households are much more likely to accumulate parents’ college assets 
but this likely does not represent new savings, rather the reallocation of different savings 
(Dynarski, 2004; Ma, 2004). I believe that removing this population will improve matches 
without diminishing model results. This demographic is made up of 438 households total, with 
378 of these possessing college savings. By omitting this group of households, I am not able to 
apply any results or implications to families with reported incomes above $250,000.  
Matching Estimators. Figure 20 identifies the matching estimators used from the 
ELS:2002 dataset and their alignment in Perna’s conceptual framework. Matching on categorical 
variables can be less precise than other variable types, so all matching estimators are coded as 
binary variables (if a student is positively identifiable by the estimator, variable=1) or continuous 
variables.22 The outer layers from Perna’s conceptual framework are assumed to be constant in 
this research because the ELS:2002 dataset contains only a single cohort of students. The 
macroeconomic factors present during the time of the survey are identical for all students, so a 
unique influence is not present. The School and Community Context is represented by covariates 
that describe the educational environment for each student: secondary school type (Catholic, 
private but non-Catholic, or public), a continuous variable for the percentage of students within 
the school that qualify for federal free/reduced lunch, and a continuous variable for the number 
of full-time guidance counselors.  
                                                        
22 For example, the secondary school type variable “Catholic” is coded as 1= Yes, the student attends Catholic 
schools and 0= No, the student does not attend Catholic schools.  
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The student’s physical environment is captured through geographic location (Northeast, 
South, Midwest, or West) and regional location (suburban, rural or urban). The inner layer, 
Habitus, includes covariates for gender (male), race and ethnicity (White, African-American, 
Hispanic, Asian/pacific islander, American Indian/Alaskan Native, or two/more identified 
categories), number of siblings (no siblings - 4 or more siblings). To account for student 
information on postsecondary enrollment I include measures for whether a parent and student 
discuss college and if the father and/or mother attended college. Demand for higher education is 
measured using variables for whether the student stated an expectation of postsecondary 
enrollment, whether parents stated the expectation of postsecondary enrollment, and a 
continuous variable for students’ scores from standardized tests administered in 10th grade. 
Resources for postsecondary affordability are reported by household income (Income Quartiles 1 
- 4).  
The value of savings amassed at the time of the 2002 BY survey and changes in academic 
behavior after 10th grade have explanatory power in predicting enrollment, but cannot be used to 
predict the availability of parents’ college assets. PSM requires all matching estimators to be 
observed prior to the treatment (parents’ college assets) being introduced. This helps assure that 
the influence of the treatment is captured by the coefficient of the treatment variable. Logically, 
the amount of money saved has to occur after savings is developed. Similarly, a student 
graduates high school after 10th grade; the point in time the survey identifies whether a student 
has parents’ college assets. To avoid potential biases from omitting these factors, I will include 
them in the post-match models as covariates. Amount saved is a categorical variable with eight 
different ordered groups, ranging from parents having savings accounts but no current value, to 
parents with savings in excess of $50,000. High School GPA is an ordered categorical variable 
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starting with student GPA between 0.0 and 1.0, and increasing in 0.5 GPA increments to 3.5-4.0 
GPA. 
Model Specification. I use PSM to estimate the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT) for students who have parents’ college assets. This provides an assessment of the average 
treatment outcome for members of the treatment group – postsecondary enrollment for students 
with parents’ college assets. To arrive at estimations for the treatment condition, each model will 
be run as OLS and Logistic regressions. Employing both regression methods is useful in 
identifying the potential existence of linear and quadratic trends and is necessary when using a 
binary dependent variable (Agresti, 2007).  
Equations 1-4 illustrate the general estimation equations. The dependent variable, 
Enrollment, is a binary variable identifying if a student enrolled in a Public or Private, two- or 
four-year institution. Here, I use PCA as a generic abbreviation for the binary combined savings 
treatment and only illustrate the OLS regressions, both for simplicity. As shown in Equation 1, I 
run unweighted, naïve regression estimates of the savings strategies to demonstrate a trend 
between parents’ college assets and postsecondary enrollment. Equation 2 demonstrates post-
matching, weighted estimates that reintroduce the pscore estimate (𝑝𝑖) for student i into the 
model to capture bias between households that do and do not save (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). 
Equation 3 includes the pscore (𝑝𝑖) and individual matching estimators (𝕏𝑖) for student i, to 
account for any additional variation not captured by the pscore. In Equation 4, I include the 
pscore (𝑝𝑖), individual matching estimators (𝕏𝑖), and account for student level factors that 
influence enrollment behavior, but that cannot be matched on: graduating high school GPA 
(𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖) and the value of parent’s college assets at the time of the 2002 BY (𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖).  
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𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖                    (1) 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖          (2) 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝕏𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖              (3) 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽3 𝕏𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖       (4) 
Next, I repeat the models demonstrated in Equations 1-4, but replace the binary combined 
treatment condition with the individual savings options nested within that treatment strategy, 
identified in Table 33. The vector for savings alternatives is represented by 𝜆𝑖. Each of the 
individual savings options is binary, identifying if the parents’ college asset portfolio for student 
i has that specific savings option. This is necessary to control for savings options that may be 
creating contradicting influences. I only illustrate this once for simplicity using Equation 5. 
Equation 5 is comparable to Equation 4, including the pscore (𝑝𝑖), individual matching 
estimators (vector 𝕏𝑖), high school graduating GPA (𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖), and 2002 BY amount saved 
(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖).  
 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝜆𝑖 +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽3 𝕏𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖          (5) 
 
 
 After executing the matching models I perform a series of post-match, heterogeneous 
models. The heterogeneous models restrict the sample to a single group. This permits me to 
identify if the parents’ college asset treatment is having a different influence across 
demographics. The post-match, heterogeneous models are run separately, restricted by race and 
ethnicity (White, African-American, and Hispanic), Household Income (Income Q1-Q4), 
student’s postsecondary expectation (Unsure, expected enrollment, beyond a 4-year degree), and 
specific institution type of enrollment (2-year, 4-year, Public, 4-year, and Private, 4-year). These 
models use the same weighting as the full sample matching models described in Equations 1-5, 
but only include pscore (𝑝𝑖), high school graduating GPA (𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖), and 2002 BY amount saved 
(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖). It is necessary to omit the vector for individual matching estimators to increase the 
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degrees of freedom in the model as the restricted populations have far fewer observations. 
Equation 6 provides an example of heterogeneous post-match models, using race and ethnicity: 
White. 
 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑖  +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖,   if 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖  = 1    (6) 
𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝜆𝑖  +  𝛽2 𝑝𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐺𝑃𝐴𝑖 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑖  +  𝜀𝑖,   if 𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑖 = 1      (7) 
 
  
Methodological Limitations. In this research I must make assumptions regarding the 
decisions and communication of parents’ college assets. I am unable to ascertain the exact point 
when parents began to save for their child’s future education, I am only able to determine that it 
happened prior to the BY ELS:2002 survey. As a consequence I am unable to isolate the length 
of exposure to the treatment condition. I am also unable to identify whether students comprehend 
issues surrounding parents’ postsecondary savings. While I cannot isolate direct communication 
on parents’ college assets, I am able to identify if parents had any communication with their 
child regarding college.  
The Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA) must be met for PSM to be valid. CIA 
states that no influential characteristics that predict savings are left unidentified in the model. 
The assumption implies that implementing covariates to explain participation in the treatment 
condition reduces selection bias; however, this assumption is largely untestable. Frolich (2007) 
has more recently questioned the degree of influence from failing to meet the CIA assumption, 
particularly as pscores move away from zero. Nonetheless, I have included all measurable 
covariates in calculating the pscore in accordance with Austin (2008).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 37-42 provide descriptive statistics for the sample. The number of observations 
and the sample percentage for households that save and households in the Non-Intent group, 
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broken up by student and household characteristics are first. In addition, I provide the number of 
observations omitted from the sample for missing information. I also provide statistics on the 
specific decisions made by households who have begun establishing savings. First, is the number 
of households that fall within the three combined savings strategies and the percentage 
representative of the specific demographic, and second, is the number of observations and 
percentage representative to the specific demographic for households that include each of the 
individual savings components nested in the Past Account Creation strategy. To complete Tables 
37-41, I show the average number of savings components used by households within the specific 
student or household characteristic. Table 42 illustrates the correlation between pairs of savings 
components and the number of parents’ college asset portfolios that include that pairing. 
Table 37 illustrates that there are small differences in parents’ college assets based on 
student gender. The full sample contains slightly more females than males, 52% vs. 48%, though 
the difference in savings is smaller than the four-percentage point difference. Past Account 
Creation (31.4% vs. 30.1%) and Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future 
Intention (41% vs. 39.7%) each have a higher representation for male students. Among the 
individual savings vehicles, only Insurance is less common among male students relative to 
female. Total, male students have a slightly higher number of savings components in their 
parents’ college asset portfolio, 4.21 vs. 4.17. 
Table 37 also shows that differences in savings strategies are more evident across racial 
and ethnic groups (listed in the order White, African-American, and Hispanic). White 
households are the most likely to develop parents’ college, 56% vs. 46% vs. 35%. White 
households are more prone to fall within the savings strategies Past Account Creation (34.4% vs. 
20.6% vs. 26%) and Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation (11.3% vs. 10% vs. 
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8.2%). Hispanic families are more likely to use household sacrifices than African-American 
families, and both African-American and Hispanic families exhibit a greater likelihood to 
identify future household sacrifices than White families, 36.2% vs. 52.1% vs. 44.6%. Savings 
accounts are the most commonly used savings vehicle for each group, present in 73.3%, 80.9%, 
and 71.7%, of White, African-American, and Hispanic households, respectively. After Savings, 
Stock/Real Estate and college 529 plans are the next most commonly used individual savings 
vehicles among White households (58.4% and 44%), while Other Savings and Insurance are the 
least common (28% and 32.9%). Insurance policies are present in 47.8% of African-American 
households parents’ college assets, whereas Other Savings and U.S. Bonds are the least often 
used (30.9% and 31.8%). Stock/Real Estate and Other Savings are present in 42.4% and 35.7% 
of Hispanic parents’ college asset portfolios. Less frequently used among Hispanic households 
are U.S. Bonds and college 529 plans, 21.9% and 30.5%. On average, African-American 
households include the most individual components in their savings portfolio (4.42), but only 16 
percentage points separate the most and least commonly used mechanisms. White households 
have slightly fewer savings methods in their portfolio, averaging 4.14, and Hispanic households 
apply the fewest with an average of 4.01. 
The statistics on parents’ college assets relative to income offer a few stark contrasts to 
the previous literature. Establishing parents’ college asset increases with reported household 
income, as shown in Table 38. The likelihood of having parents’ college assets increases by 
more than 12 percentage points with each higher income quartile. Combing Past Account 
Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention is the most common strategy in all income 
groups. This statistic is counter to Manly and Wells’ (2009) assessment that, as household 
income increases, families are less likely to sacrifice household resources such as those included 
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in Past Asset Reallocation and Future Intention. A Savings account is the most common method 
of savings for all income groups; however, the average number of savings methods included in 
the parents’ college asset portfolio increase with each income quartile. The inclusion of college 
529 plans, Stock/Real Estate, and U.S. Bonds increase in each higher income quartile, while 
Other Savings is the only category that decreases in frequency with higher income.  
Tables 39-40 provides statistics on savings behavior by educational expectations and 
enrollment outcomes. Table 39 demonstrates that the percentage of students with parents’ 
college assets increases with each high school grade point average category. The method used 
for savings does not appear to have any pattern. In the survey population, parents largely expect 
their student to attend a postsecondary institution. Approximately 59% of parents expect their 
student to earn up to a Bachelor’s degree, whereas an additional 33% expect their student to 
enter graduate school. Stock/Real Estate is present in more than half of parents’ college asset 
portfolios when the parents’ expectation is for students to earn a 4-year degree. When parents 
expect a graduate degree, use of college 529 plans increases. The number of savings mechanisms 
used by parents also increases with elevated degree expectations. When students are expected to 
attend higher education through a four-year degree, the average number of methods in the 
parent’s college asset portfolio is 4.01, but inflates to 4.45 with higher degrees.  
A student’s own expectations for postsecondary enrollment align with parent’s 
willingness to save and the number of devices they include in their savings strategy. Only one-in-
three students who are unsure of their academic expectations—either they expect not to enroll, or 
have not established a college going plan by 10th grade—have parents that save. In comparison, 
nearly 50% of students expecting to attend a 4-year institution as their highest educational 
attainment have parents’ college assets. Students with graduate school expectations have the 
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greatest likelihood of parents that save. Regardless of student expectations, Stock/Real Estate is 
present in over 50% of parents’ college assets. Again, college 529 plans increase in use with the 
expectation of graduate school. 
In my sample, 77% (8,547 out of 11,039) of surveyed students enrolled in postsecondary 
institution immediately following high school. The largest number of these students (5,404) 
enrolled at a 4-year institution. The trend for enrollment reflects possession of parents’ college 
assets. Among students who have any form of savings, enrollment rates are higher at 4-year 
institution types. In particular, 58.9% of families who established Stock/Real Estate in their 
portfolio saw their student enroll in a 4-year institution. College 529 plans are associated with 
the lowest enrollment at 2-year institutions and the lowest rate of non-enrollment. The control, 
Non-Intent group represented the largest percentage of students who did not enroll or who 
enrolled in a 2-year institution. 
The correlation between different savings mechanisms used in a savings portfolio and the 
number of families that employ each combination is reported in Table 42. The correlation matrix 
demonstrates that families use savings options on the opposite end of the perceived risk 
spectrum: higher-risk alternatives are paired with low-return, safer methods. This is most evident 
with investing in Stock/Real Estate with traditional Savings accounts and U.S. Bonds. The 
number of families that use this specific combination outnumber families at the top of the 
income distribution. This is evidence that low and middle-income families are among the 
population that uses high risk/high reward strategies to finance education. Parents’ college asset 
portfolios that include 529 plans have low correlations with other methods. Given the alignment 
with tuition, families likely feel more secure that these are the best chance for a return that will 
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cover educational costs. This indicates that parents are less willing to spread savings to other 
vehicles.  
Results 
PSM is used to reduce the bias in the prediction estimates for the decision to enroll in 
higher education based on the postsecondary savings decisions made by parents. All models are 
run using both OLS and Logistic regression. A binary dependent variable, such as Enrollment, 
allows the OLS parameter estimates to be interpreted as percentages by multiplying the 
coefficient of interest by 100 (𝛽1x100). The Logistic models provide estimates of the Odds Ratio 
(OR). ORs are non-linear estimators based on the probability of having parents’ college assets: a 
one-unit increase in the pscore elevates the odds of enrolling, above a student in the Non-Intent 
control group, by the value of the coefficient. All OR coefficients are positive. A coefficient 
greater than one is a signal that a student with parents’ college assets has greater odds of 
enrolling. A coefficient value between zero and one identifies a negative influence − a student 
with parents’ college assets having lower odds of enrolling. Percentages are typically more 
intuitive to interpret, so I will use these results in the following explanations. I will discuss the 
results of the Logistic models only when they conflict with the OLS estimator. 
I present the results for the models in two different ways. First, I present the results using 
the binary combined strategy as the treatment condition. After, I substitute the combined strategy 
treatment variable for the individual methods that align with the strategy. The first set of 
outcomes identify if the cumulative savings portfolio can statistically predict a student’s decision 
to enroll. The second set of outcomes identify if any of the individual savings decisions used by 
parents are statistically associated with a student’s enrollment decision; and whether any 
individual components of a savings portfolio have a negative coefficient which would reduce the 
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net estimated association. If the coefficients for various savings methods have opposite signs, the 
combined strategies are biased toward zero.  
The model results are presented in Tables 43a-57b. The table numbering is ordered by 
combined treatment strategy: Past Account Creation (Tables 43a-47b), Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation (Tables 48a-52b), and Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation 
+ Future Intention (Tables 53a-57b). Tables lettered “a” present the model results using the 
combined treatment variables. Tables lettered “b” provides the results for models that use the 
individual savings methods treatment variables in place of the combined strategy. For example, 
the Past Account Creation treatment variable is replaced with the six savings methods Savings, 
Insurance, U.S. Bonds, Stock/Real Estate, Other Savings, and 529 plan. The tables for both 
letters are organized in the same manner.  
Tables 43a-b, 48a-b, and 53a-b present the results for each treatment condition including 
naïve, unweighted models (Models 1-2), the PSM matched estimator (Model 3), and post-match, 
weighted models (Models 4-9). The post-match models are conditioned on pscore (Models 4-5), 
pscore and the matched covariates (Models 6-7), and pscore, matched covariates, amount saved 
by 10th grade, and high school graduating GPA (Models 8-9). PSM does not provide estimates 
for the individual variables used in the matching process, so Model 3 is omitted in Tables 
lettered “b”. The sample size and r-squared/pseudo r-squared values are reported for all tables. 
There are a number of demographic combinations can provide valuable insight into 
savings behaviors and outcomes. For example, prior research has described differences in 
household saving behavior based on student’s gender and race and ethnicity (Beverly & 
Sherraden, 1999; Elliott, 2011; Elliot & Beverly, 2010; Hillman, Gast & George-Jackson, 2015; 
Hossler & Vesper, 1993; Okech, Little & Shanks, 2011; Stage & Hossler, 1989). I will examine 
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models by gender and race and ethnicity. Ideally, I would like to assess models for more 
specified student populations. Splitting the sample population further results in small sample 
sizes so I am unable to examine multiple student demographics simultaneously (for instance, 
gender by race and ethnicity). For this reason I opt to only include models for single 
demographic characteristics for this assessment. 
Tables 44a-b, 49a-b, and 54a-b present treatment results restricting the sample population 
based on student’s gender and race and ethnicity: Male (Models 1-2), Female (Models 3-4), 
White (Models 5-6), African-American (Models 7-8), and Hispanic (Models 9-10). Tables 45a-b, 
50a-b, and 55a-b present the results based on reported household income: $0-25,000 (Models 1-
2), $25,001-50,000 (Models 3-4), $50,001-75,000 (Models 5-6), and $75,001-100,000 (Models 
7-8). Tables 46a-b, 51a-b, and 56a-b present the results based on student’s postsecondary 
expectations in 10th grade: Unsure (Models 1-2), Postsecondary Expectations for enrollment 
(Models 3-4), Postsecondary Expectations to earn a college degree beyond a Bachelor’s degree 
(Models 5-6). Finally, Table 47a-b, 526a-b, and 57a-b presents the results of the specific 
institutional enrollment type: 2-yr (Models 1-2), 4-yr (Models 3-4), Public, 4-yr (Models 5-6), 
and Private, 4-yr (Models 7-8). The tables for the heterogeneous model results are conditioned 
on pscore, amount saved by 10th grade, and high school graduating GPA. This is necessary to 
avoid overly specifying the models. 
Past Account Creation. Tables 43a-b includes families with a savings strategy that 
qualifies as Past Account Creation, those that possess individual financial accounts to hold 
savings but have not identified any specific methods to accrue resources. The naïve results 
demonstrate that households with the combined Past Account Creation strategy (Table 43a) are 
significantly associated with positive enrollment behaviors 20.2 percentage points (p<0.001) 
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above students from the Non-Intent, control group (Models 1-2). For the matched result (Model 
3), Past Account Creation is statistically linked to increase the chances of enrollment by 4.3 
percentage points (p<0.001). This finding is consistent across the post-match Models 4-7. The 
parameter estimates become insignificant in Models 8-9 after adding post-treatment variables for 
amount saved by 10th grade and graduating high school GPA. Table 43b demonstrates that the 
naïve estimators (Models 1-2) for the combined strategy are being driven by households that use 
Savings, U.S. Bonds, Stocks/Real Estate, and college 529 plans. I find in the weighted, post-
treatment models that opening a college 529 plan provides a non-linear, significant enrollment 
increase in Model 7 (1.61 OR)(p<0.05) and Model 9 (1.71 OR)(p<0.05). Additionally, Models 8-
9 illustrate that Other Savings is providing a significant, negative coefficient on enrollment of 4.3 
percentage points (p<0.05).  
 I find the combined Past Account Creation strategy has no significant influence on 
enrollment when restricting the models by student’s gender or race and ethnicity in Table 44a. 
Table 44b shows that using a college 529 plan is significantly associated with a 5.3 percentage 
point (p<0.001) (Models 5-6) increase in enrollment for White students.  
In Tables 45a-b, I restrict the models by income quartile and find Past Account Creation 
significantly increases the likelihood of enrollment by 15.8 percentage points (p<0.001) (Table 
45a, Models 5-6) for families who make between $50,001 and $75,000 annually. After 
substituting the combined strategy for the individual options in Table 45b I find college 529 
plans and Other Savings have contradicting magnitudes. College 529 plans has significant, 
positive non-linear results (2.84 OR)(p<0.05) for households in Income Q3 (Model 6) and 
predicts enrollment increases of 8.1 percentage points (p<0.05) for households in Income Q4 
(Models 7-8). Among Income Q2 households (Models 3-4), Other Savings statistically predicts a 
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decreased likelihood of student enrollment by 15.9 percentage points. Families within Income 
Q3 are statistically 11.3 percentage points (p<0.05) less likely to have a child enroll when they 
include Other Savings in their strategy.  
Tables 46a-b present results based on student’s postsecondary expectations. I find no 
significant results that the combined Past Account Creation strategy (Table 46a) increases 
observed enrollment. Table 46b shows that college 529 plans predicts a positive 3.1 percentage 
point (p<0.05)(Models 5-6) for enrollment among students with expectations to earn beyond a 
four-year degree.  
Lastly, Tables 47a-b details the results for institutional enrollment type. In Table 47a I 
find that Past Account Creation is not significantly associated with enrollment at a specific 
postsecondary institutional type. Shown in Table 47b, college 529 plans are statistically linked 
with increased observed enrollment by 5 percentage points (p<0.05) at any four-year institution 
type (Models 3-4) and a 1.36 (p<0.05) non-linear increase at Private, four-year institutions 
(Model 8). 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation. The combined strategy, Past 
Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation, represents households with a savings strategy 
including individual savings vehicles and specific household decisions for redirecting resources 
for postsecondary savings. The naïve models in Table 48a show that households with Past 
Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation significantly more likely to enroll by 18.1 
percentage points (p<0.001), relative to students from the Non-Intent, control group (Models 1-
2). The matched results (Model 3) and post-match results (Models 4-7) are insignificant for this 
combined strategy. Interestingly, after conditioning on the amount saved and graduating GPA, 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation increases the likelihood of a student’s 
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postsecondary enrollment by 9.6 percentage points (p<0.001)(Models 8-9). The naïve, 
unweighted estimators for the individual savings decisions show U.S. Bonds, Stock/Real Estate, 
college 529 plans, Add Job, Reduce Expenses, and Remortgage are significantly, positively 
associated with postsecondary enrollment in Table 48b. However, no individual savings 
decisions are significant in Models 8-9. 
 Restricting the population for the heterogeneous models creates sample size problems in 
the remaining tables for this combined strategy. Moving forward, I will only report results when 
the binary combined strategy model has at least 10 observations for the variable in the model. In 
Table 49a I find no evidence that parents’ college assets is associated with enrollment based on 
student’s gender, but I do find correlations based on race/ethnicity. White students with the 
combined Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation strategy are observed enrolling at a 
increased rate, 9.7 percentage points (p<0.05)(Models 5-6), relative to students from the Non-
Intent group. By comparison, Hispanic students are less likely to enroll when their parents use a 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation combined strategy. The enrollment prediction 
for the combined strategy is statistically significant and non-linear (Model 10). Model 9 
approximates a 24-percentage point (p<0.1) decreased likelihood of enrollment.23 I find a 
negative connection between using Insurance (0.293 OR)(p< 0.05) and Other Savings (0.331 
OR)(p< 0.05) for Male student enrollment. Using Remortgage to develop parents’ college assets 
for Female students is linked to a 13.3 (p<0.001) percentage point increase in enrollment. I find a 
6.5 percentage points (3.0 OR)(p<0.05) increase in enrollment among White students (Table 49b, 
Model 5-6) when parents include U.S. Bonds. African-American students are statistically, 
positively more likely to enroll when parents use Savings and college 529 plans in their savings 
                                                        
23 Model 5 is only significant at the 90% confidence interval. It is reported here only to provide magnitude to the 
non-linear influence found in Model 6. 
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portfolio (Models 7-8). Hispanic students are less likely to enroll by 58 percentage points 
(p<0.05)(Model 9) when parents alter their work schedule, Add Job, to develop postsecondary 
savings. This correlation is offset when parents open a college 529 plan (73 percentage 
points)(p<0.05).  
When I restrict the models based on household income, Table 50a shows that students 
from households earning between $75,000 and $100,000 are 12.5 percentage points (p<0.05) 
more likely to enroll when using the Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation combined 
strategy. Table 50b shows that students from the lowest income quartile, Income Q1, have a 
negative, non-linear response to enrollment when parents Reduce Expense (Model 2) to incur 
savings. Students who reside in households earning between $25,001 and $50,000 (Models 3-4) 
have multiple significant predictors. U.S. Bonds (17.4 percentage points)(p<0.05) and 
Remortgage (24.7 percentage points)(p<0.05) have positive magnitudes for enrollment, but 
Other Savings presents a negative 18.9 percentage points (p<0.1) likelihood for students. 
Students from Income Q4 (Models 7-8) households are more likely to enroll when parents Add 
Job (12 percentage points)(p<0.05) and Reduce Expense (10.5 percentage points)(p<0.05), but 
the likelihood is offset when parents use Stock/Real Estate, 19 percentage points (p<0.05), to 
build savings. 
Tables 51a-b have significant findings based on student’s postsecondary expectations. 
Table 51a shows that the combined Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation strategy 
increases the likelihood of enrollment for students who expect to enroll in college (8.6 
percentage points)(p<0.05) and students who intend to earn beyond a four-year degree (8.3 
percentage points)(p<0.05). In Table 51b I find that Add Job (36.7 percentage points)(p<0.05) 
increases the likelihood of enrollment for students who were unsure of their postsecondary 
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expectations. Models 5-6 show that opening a college 529 plan increases enrollment 5.1 
percentage points (p<0.05) for students who expect to earn beyond a four-year degree. 
Table 52a shows that the combined strategy does not promote enrollment at any specific 
postsecondary institution type. The insignificant results in Table 52a are the result of conflicting 
significant predictors from the individual savings decisions, illustrated in Table 52b. Households 
that include Other Savings in their portfolio improve the chance of enrollment to two-year 
institutions by 10.6 percentage points (p<0.05)(Models 1-2), however Remortgage decreases the 
likelihood by 12.6 percentage points (p<0.05). The opposite of these findings are true for 
observed enrollment at four-year institutions. Other Savings decrease the chance of enrollment at 
four-year institutions by 12.1 percentage points (p<0.001)(Models 3-4) while Remortgage 
increases the probability of enrollment by 12.7 percentage points (p<0.05). College 529 plans 
decrease the likelihood of enrollment by 8.4 percentage points (p<0.05) at Private, four-year 
institutions (Models 7-8). For the same institution type, Reduce Expenses increases the chance of 
enrollment by 10.0 percentage points (p<0.05)(Models 7-8). 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention. The combined 
strategy Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention identifies 
households who have established savings vehicles to hold savings, redirected household assets to 
build savings, and state the intent to add to redirect future household assets to build savings 
beyond 10th grade. Table 53a illustrates that the naïve models (Models 1-2) for the combined 
strategy are significantly associated with an 18.8 percentage point (p<0.001) increase in 
enrollment (Models 1-2). For the matched results (Model 3) I find a 4.9 percentage point 
(p<0.001) estimate from this combined strategy. The significance and magnitude for the match 
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result carry through the post-match Models 4-7. The models lose statistical significance when 
adding post-treatment variables in Models 8-9.  
 I find that U.S. Bonds, Stock/Real Estate, college 529 plans, and Plan to Reduce 
Expenses are all significant and positively associated with enrollment in the naïve models 
(Models 1-2) in Table 53b. A savings portfolio that includes Other Savings carries a positive 
coefficient in Models 8-9 and increases the chances of enrollment by 4.2 percentage points 
(p<0.001).  
 In Table 54a, I find that no significant results for the combined strategy when restricting 
the models on student’s gender or race and ethnicity. There are a number of individual savings 
options that align with improved enrollment for Female students. Most notably, U.S. Bonds (p< 
0.05) and Planned Remortgage (p< 0.05) increase the percentage by approximately 5 percentage 
points, each. Add Job (p< 0.05) decreases the observed enrollment by 4.1 percentage points. 
College 529 plans provide a positive 3.6 percentage point (p<0.05) prediction of enrollment 
among White students (Model 3), as shown in Table 54b.  
Table 55a demonstrates that households in Income Q2 (Models 3-4) increase the chance 
of their student enrolling by 9.4 percentage points (p<0.05) when using Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention. Households falling within Income Q4 (Models 7-8) 
increase the probability of enrollment by 5.1 percentage points (p<0.001) with the combined 
strategy. In Table 55a using U.S. Bonds increases enrollment by 5.2 percentage points (p<0.05) 
for households reporting income between $50,001 and $75,000 (Models 5-6). Stock/Real Estate 
decreases the likelihood of a student enrolling from the highest income quartile (Models 7-8).  
In Table 56a, Models 3-6 show that the combined Past Account Creation + Past Asset 
Reallocation + Future Intention strategy has a positive correlation for enrollment by students 
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who expect to enroll in college (5.1 percentage points)(p<0.05) and students who expect to earn 
beyond a four-year degree (4.8 percentage points)(p<0.05). Among students who expect to 
enroll, Other Savings produces a positive 3.7 percentage point (p<0.05) increase in enrollment 
(Table 49b, Models 3-4).  
Table 57a shows the combined strategy is not significant in increasing enrollment at any 
specific institution type. Table 57b illustrates conflicting predictors on postsecondary institution 
type based on the savings decisions. In Models 3-4, students with Savings are 5.3 percentage 
points (p<0.05) less likely to enroll at four-year institutions. However, students with college 529 
plans are 5.7 percentage points (p<0.001) more likely to enroll at the same institution type. 
Reduce Expenses is associated with students increasing enrollment at Public, four-year 
institutions by 6.9 percentage points (p<0.05)(Models 5-6), but using Remortgage to increase 
savings creates a contradictory relationship of 6.8 percentage points (p<0.05). Savings reduces 
the chances of enrollment at Private, four-year institutions by 5.6 percentage points (p<0.05) 
(Models 7-8). 
Discussion 
The stated intent of the research is to add further insight to the field of parents’ college 
assets and postsecondary enrollment. Previous research has either amassed all savings into a 
singular influence, or isolated individual methods (Elliott, 2011; Elliott & Beverly, 2010; Elliott, 
Song, & Nam, 2013; Hossler & Vesper, 1993). My contribution is an examination of how 
strategic grouping of individual savings methods are associated with unique, dissimilar outcomes 
on the likelihood of enrollment. This extends beyond treating all parents’ college assets equally 
and assumes that there is no single “silver bullet” for postsecondary savings.   
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The descriptive statistics illustrate that parents are not confident in the ability of any 
single savings device to create postsecondary affordability. Parents appear to use a strategy that 
diversifies their savings portfolio by including risk and risk-free methods. This is true even when 
using savings devices that are created specifically for postsecondary education. This finding 
coincides with previous literature and statistics on postsecondary savings habits (Ma, 2004; 
Manly & Wells, 2009; Sallie Mae, 2013). The returns from the six Past Account Creation 
options provide vastly different levels of return and have different incentives for use. Financially, 
spreading capital across multiple savings mechanisms may not be achieving the same financial 
gains and may not be increasing the chances of postsecondary access.  
The spread of parents’ asset accumulation strategies increases the risk of including 
strategies with contradictory associations with enrollment. The results of this study demonstrate 
that, on average, the cumulative decisions by parents to establish college assets are sensitive to 
environmental factors and the combination of other savings devices. After conditioning on 
factors such as expectations, income, academic aptitude, and amount saved, the process of 
developing savings does not provide a stimulant to postsecondary enrollment. This is 
contradictory to previous literature that describes the act of saving as producing mental 
accounting and financial management capabilities. Matched models with positive enrollment 
predictors from savings lose explanatory power when incorporating post-matching factors. This 
finding is important, but it does not fully address whether parents are “in the driver’s seat” with 
regard to creating postsecondary enrollment. When examining the association with individual 
savings methods, however, a different story emerges.  
The findings I present in this research support the hypothesis that parents’ savings 
decisions improve the likelihood of their child enrolling in a postsecondary institution. The 
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models that match on individual savings methods identify that parents may be inadvertently 
diminishing the anticipated outcomes of savings by being overly ambitious. The combination of 
strategies impacts the perceptions and environment the student resides in. Despite signaling 
affordability, students also receive the perception of a high level of household sacrifice. Perna 
(2006) described that the context of postsecondary information can overshadow the aspirations 
and resources available for enrollment. I believe that this research provides additional support for 
this idea, and adds the process of parent savings to applicability. This is most notable for 
households that use unconventional savings methods, identified as Other Savings in this 
research. The inclusion of Other Savings in a savings portfolio provides a statistically significant, 
negative likelihood of? enrollment overall (see Table 43b.) and for several student demographics. 
As I hypothesized, the impact from parents’ college assets is not uniform across student 
populations. When limiting the sample to underrepresented populations, very few savings 
methods are associated with bolstering enrollment. The models for savings strategies that include 
household sacrifices validate the significant, negative results I hypothesized. This is most 
noticeable when additional employment is used to accrue assets. We can interpret these findings 
in different ways. One, students may observe the additional work hours and opt to forego college 
so those assets can be redirected elsewhere. This assumes that students understand the additional 
work is for their enrollment funding, but this cannot be validated in this data though. A 
comparable interpretation is that the additional labor hours alter the student’s environment in 
ways that are not conducive to enrollment. 
One limitation of the research presented here is the inability to discern what information 
students have on postsecondary savings. Stated differently, how much do parents tell students? 
This should be a direction for future researchers; however, it does not undermine the 
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interpretation of my findings. First, the literature review identifies the multiple ways that parents 
are involved in the college going decision-making process. This makes it difficult to believe that 
a component of this involvement does not include some information on affordability and savings. 
Secondly, and most related to this study, the substantial findings of this research involve the 
characteristics that are visible to students. Reducing expenses and adopting a new work schedule 
each alter a student’s direct environment. Even when a student is not informed of the specific 
reason, incentives are still transformed in the same direction. Each of these trade-offs directly 
involves the household’s monetary resources. If a student believes the sacrifices are being made 
on their account, the explanations described above would apply. In an alternate circumstance, if a 
student is not aware of why the sacrifices are being made, they are still conscious of the 
household’s financial standing. When engaged in the college-going decision-making process, 
this is likely to be included in the assessment of affordability. As identified by Perna (2004), the 
weight applied to social and cultural context can supersede direct information. If a student is 
given positive feedback on affordability, the actions they observe in their environment offset the 
perception.  
Policy Implications 
As public policy continues to move away from socially financing higher education, the 
role of parents’ college assets will continue to grow, as will policy debate on the incentives used 
to promote savings. An assessment of the gains to student enrollment based on parents’ college 
assets holds great significance for this reason. Most external mechanisms awarding financial aid 
are unavailable until the final stages of the enrollment process, well after the decision to attend 
has been made. Savings represents one of the few available alternatives for families to minimize 
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the future out of pocket costs of attendance. As such, household savings represents a form of 
early information on postsecondary affordability.  
The descriptive statistics show that parents use a “mix and match” practice for 
establishing their savings portfolio. There is no prevailing rationale for the pairing of savings 
methods used by parents, with the potential exception of the level of risk that would be incurred. 
Families with limited financial awareness or access to financial institutions may be unaware of 
the nuances of tax policy and the full range of potential benefits (Olivas, 2003). This could 
unintentionally reduce their desire to invest or promote the idea of including a range of other 
savings methods. Policy expansion used to promote self-financing of higher education must 
consider the role of savings institutions to this extent. 
Olivas (2003) described that state subsidies may negatively impact the number of state 
and federal college investment funds. The author contends that subsidies can be reduced based 
on the availability of personal financing programs such as 529 college savings plans and 
Coverdell educational accounts. As a larger number of savings and finance options become 
available, so too does the capability of individual families to cover a greater fraction of the cost 
of education. My findings suggest that the assumptions regarding savings do not hold for all 
student populations, and can disproportionately hurt students on the margin of access.  
Policy that would incorporate pre-established savings plans for students (or children) 
have been debated numerous times over the last several years, as well as tax policy aligned with 
educational savings (Carrns, 2015; Elliott, 2009; Elliott & Beverly, 2011). My findings suggest 
that the creation of a savings plan may not be sufficient to induce a college-aspiring culture 
among underrepresented populations. Households need information on efficient ways to develop 
capital to save. This includes additional knowledge on the unintended consequences I have 
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identified in this research. A more in-depth understanding on student responsiveness is 
necessary.  
For all of the above reasons, further research is needed on the effects of parents’ college 
assets. The research findings here illuminate that parents’ savings can help promote 
postsecondary attendance for some students in some circumstances. A more complete 
understanding on the circumstances and strategies used by parents may help generate greater 
usage of savings, but this research does not currently exist. Additional research on the influence 
of parents’ college assets should not be relegated to enrollment outcomes, though. For instance, 
student loans may be viewed as a safety net for families who are not able to save, and may be the 
reason we witness a difference in savings and postsecondary expectations. This may alter their 
strategy and indirectly change how a student perceives the importance of higher education. 
Recent issues with student loan availability have illustrated that excessive debt, particularly 
when unemployment issues are present, may be hindering individual standards of living and 
potential economic growth (Burdman, 2005). A future direction for this research is to tackle the 
question of how parents’ college assets correlate with student debt.   
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Table 1. 
Sample Population Characteristics for Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs, separated by State and Cluster Analysis Results. 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed. Cluster Identity labels: 1=State-Based, 2=Institutional, and 3= Community-Sustained. 
* denotes programs that are not placed in consistent groups across clustering methods. 
Program Name State City? Early? Committed? Last Dollar? Percentage? Flat? GPA? ACT? Income? Select? 2-yr? 4-yr? Ward Avg. Wgt. Avg.
Alaska Performance Grant AK No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Alabama Student Assistance Program AL No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 1 1
Arkadelphia Promise AR Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 3 1 3
Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship AR No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
El Dorado Promise AR Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Great River Promise Scholarship AR Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Great River Promise - Phillips AR Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
School Counts!: Morrilton AR Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
ASU Barack Obama Scholarship AZ No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Promise of the Future AZ Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Blue and Gold Opportunity Plan CA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Cal Grant A / Cal Grant B CA No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Claremont McKenna College CA No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Connecticut College CA No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
The Cuesta Promise CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
The Fulfillment Fund CA Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Long Beach College Promise CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Oakland Promise CA Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 3 3
* PACE Promise CA Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 3 2 2
Pomona College CA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
San Francisco Promise CA Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 2 2 2
SBCC Promise CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Siskiyous Promise CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Stanford University CA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Ventura College Promise CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
West Hills President's Scholars CA No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No 1 1 1
West Valley College Community Grant CA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Youth 2 Leaders Education Foundation CA Yes No No Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Commitment to Colorado CO No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Denver Scholarship Foundation CO Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Bridgeport Tuition Plan CT Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
New Haven Promise CT Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Wesleyan University CT No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
DCTAG DC Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Delaware SEED Scholarship DE No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 1 1 1
* Inspire Scholarship DE No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 1 1 2
American Dream Scholarship FL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Bright Futures Scholarship Program FL No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Buffalo Scholarship Foundation FL Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Machen Florida Opportunity FL No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
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Table 1. cont. 
Sample Population Characteristics for Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs, separated by State and Cluster Analysis Results. 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed. The ISU4U program is omitted from discussion in the typology because it was isolated in all cluster results. Cluster 
Identity labels: 1=State-Based, 2=Institutional, and 3= Community-Sustained. 
* denotes programs that are not placed in consistent groups across clustering methods. 
 
 
Program Name State City? Early? Committed? Last Dollar? Percentage? Flat? GPA? ACT? Income? Select? 2-yr? 4-yr? Ward Avg. Wgt. Avg.
Pensacola Pledge Scholars FL Yes No No No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Rosen Foundation Scholarship FL Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Emory Advantage GA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Georgia Tech Promise GA No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
HOPE Scholarship / Zell Miller Grant GA No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Grinnell College IA No No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Chicago Star Scholarship IL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship IL Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Galesburg Promise IL Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Harper College Promise IL Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Huskie Advantage Program IL No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Illinois Promise IL No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Northwestern University IL No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Odyssey Scholarship IL No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Peoria Promise IL Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Rockford Promise IL Yes No No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
UChicago Promise IL Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
College Bound Scholarship IN Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Purdue Promise IN No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Twnety-First Century Scholars IN No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
* ISU 4U Promise IO Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 3 2 4
Cardinal Covenant KY No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Community Scholarship Program KY Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars KY Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
KEES KY No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Kentucky College Access Program Grant KY No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
School Counts!:Madisonville KY Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Louisiana GO Grant LA No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
TOPS LA No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Amherst College MA No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
B.U. Community Service Award MA Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
College of Holy Cross MA Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Harvard University MA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Massachusetts MASSGrant MA No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
MIT MA No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Tufts University MA No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Williams College MA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Garrett County Scholarship Program MD Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Maryland Pathways MD No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Bowdoin College ME No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
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Table 1. cont. 
Sample Population Characteristics for Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs, separated by State and Cluster Analysis Results. 
 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed. Cluster Identity labels: 1=State-Based, 2=Institutional, and 3= Community-Sustained. 
* denotes programs that are not placed in consistent groups across clustering methods. 
 
 
Program Name State City? Early? Committed? Last Dollar? Percentage? Flat? GPA? ACT? Income? Select? 2-yr? 4-yr? Ward Avg. Wgt. Avg.
Colby College ME No No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 2 2 2
State of Maine Grant ME No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Baldwin Promise MI Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Bay Commitment Scholarship MI Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Benton Harbor Promise MI Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes No 3 3 3
Campus and Community MI Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Detroit College Promise MI Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Detroit Scholarship Fund MI Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Hazel Park Promise MI Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Jackson Legacy MI Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Kalamazoo Promise MI Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Lansing Promise MI Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Legacy Scholars MI Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Michigan M-PACT MI No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Michigan Tuition Grant MI No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Michigan Tuition Incentive Program MI No Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Muskegon Promise MI Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Northport Promise MI Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Pontiac Promise MI Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Saginaw Promise MI Yes No Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Spartan Advantage MI No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Carleton College MN No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Minnesota State Grant MN No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Power of YOU MN Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Access Missouri Financial Assistance MO No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Missouri A+ Scholarship Program MO Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No 3 3 3
Washington University St. Louis MO No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Mississippi Tuition Assistance Grant MS No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Appalachian ACCESS NC No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Carolina Covenant NC No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Cleveland County Promise NC Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Davidson College NC No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Duke University NC No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Pack Promise NC No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
VanGuarantee NC Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes No 3 3 3
North Dakota Academic Scholarship ND No No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 1 1 2
North Dakota Student Incentive Grant ND No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Collegebound Nebraska NE No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Dartmouth College NH No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Cooperman College Scholarship NJ Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 3 3 3
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Table 1. cont. 
Sample Population Characteristics for Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs, separated by State and Cluster Analysis Results. 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed. Cluster Identity labels: 1=State-Based, 2=Institutional, and 3= Community-Sustained. 
* denotes programs that are not placed in consistent groups across clustering methods. 
 
 
 
Program Name State City? Early? Committed? Last Dollar? Percentage? Flat? GPA? ACT? Income? Select? 2-yr? 4-yr? Ward Avg. Wgt. Avg.
Newark College Promise NJ Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant NJ No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 1 1 1
School Counts!:Carney's NJ Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
School Counts!:Cumberland NJ Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Princeton Uniersity NJ No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Legislative Lottery Scholarship/ 3% Bridge NM No No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Govenrnor Quinn Millennium Scholarship NV No No No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Columbia University NY No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Cornell University NY No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
New York State TAP NY No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Rochester Promise NY Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Say Yes to Education: Buffalo NY Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Say Yes to Education: Syracuse NY Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Vassar College NY No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Blue and Gold Scholar Award OH No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Champion City Scholars Program OH Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Kenyon College OH No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Miami Access Initiative OH No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Montgomery Cty OH College Promise OH Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Oberlin College OH No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Ohio College Opportunity Grant OH No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Oklahoma Promise OK No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Oklahoma Tuitoin Aid Grant OK No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Tulsa Achieves OK Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Bernard Daly Educational Fund OR Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Future Connect OR Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Oregon Opportunity Grant OR No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Oregon Promise OR No No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No 1 1 1
Pathway Oregon OR No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
50th Anniversary Scholars PA Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
CORE Promise PA Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 3 3 3
Haverford College PA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Lafayette College PA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Lehigh University PA No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Philadelphia Education Fund PA Yes No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Pittsburgh Promise PA Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Swathmore College PA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
UPenn PA No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Brown University RI No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Crusade of Rhode Island RI No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
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Table 1. cont. 
Sample Population Characteristics for Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs, separated by State and Cluster Analysis Results. 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed. Cluster Identity labels: 1=State-Based, 2=Institutional, and 3= Community-Sustained. 
* denotes programs that are not placed in consistent groups across clustering methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
Program Name State City? Early? Committed? Last Dollar? Percentage? Flat? GPA? ACT? Income? Select? 2-yr? 4-yr? Ward Avg. Wgt. Avg.
South Dakota Jump Start Scholarship SD No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
South Dakota Opportunity Scholarship SD No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Ayers Foundation Scholars Program TN Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Dyer County Promise Scholarship TN Yes No Yes No No Yes No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Educate and Grow TN Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No ys Yes No 3 3 3
Opportunity Vanderbilt TN No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Tennessee Pledge TN No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
tnAchieves (Knox Achieves) TN Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
William Jennings Bryan Opportunity TN No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Aggie Assurance TX No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Bobcat Promise TX No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Lamar Promise TX No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Rice University TX No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Rusk TJC Citizens Promise TX Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Sacred Heart University TX Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes No Yes 2 2 2
* TEXAS Grant TX No No No No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 1 1 2
UTEP Promise TX No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
SLCC Promise UT Yes No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Regent Scholarship UT No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Beacon of Hope VA Yes No No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 3 3 3
Virginia Guaranteed Assistance VA No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
William and Mary Promise/Gateway VA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
13th Year Promise WA Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No 3 3 3
* College Success Foundation WA No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 1 1 2
Husky Promise WA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No Yes 2 2 2
Passport for Foster Youth Promise WA No No Yes No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
Seattle Promise WA No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No 1 1 1
Shoreline Scholars WA Yes No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Washington College Bound Scholarship WA No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
* WA State Need Grant WA No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 2
Nicolet Promise WI No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3 3 3
Wisconsin Tuition Assistance Grant WI No No No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1 1 1
WITC Promise WI No No Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 1 1 1
Hathaway Scholarship WY No No No No Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
West Virginia Promise Scholarship WV No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 1 1 1
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Table 2. 
Distribution Statistics of Sample Population of Residency-Based Financial Aid, separated by Ward Cluster Analysis Results 
 
Note. City signifies if the geographic region for eligibility is within a county or smaller. Early shows if students earn eligibility prior to entering high school. 
Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid distribution method. GPA, ACT, and 
Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describe 
the institution type aid can be redeemed.  
   
City Early Commit Percent Last Dollar Flat GPA Income Select 2-yr 4-yr
Characteristic Total n. 0 8 26 2 17 29 24 27 8 45 42
State-Based (Total) n. 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
Percentage % 0.0% 16.7% 54.2% 4.2% 35.4% 60.4% 50.0% 56.3% 16.7% 93.8% 87.5%
Characteristic Total n. 10 1 50 0 70 2 7 57 72 0 37
Institutional No Loan (Total) n. 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Percentage % 13.9% 1.4% 69.4% 0.0% 97.2% 2.8% 9.7% 79.2% 100.0% 0.0% 51.4%
Characteristic Total n. 79 41 61 13 46 20 32 18 56 75 37
Community-Sustained (Total) n. 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
Percentage % 100.0% 51.9% 77.2% 16.5% 58.2% 25.3% 40.5% 22.8% 70.9% 94.9% 46.8%
Characteristic Total n. 89 50 137 15 133 51 63 102 136 120 116
Sample Total n. 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199 199
Percentage % 44.7% 25.1% 68.8% 7.5% 66.8% 25.6% 31.7% 51.3% 68.3% 60.3% 58.3%
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Table 3. 
Dataset Characteristics for Sample Population of Community-Sustained Residency-Based Financial Aid Programs. 
 
Note. Community-sustained residency-Based aid programs are considered to be any program with Ward Cluster Analysis results= 3. Early shows if students earn 
eligibility prior to entering high school. Committed signals if aid award is distributed to all eligible students. Last Dollar, Percentage, and Flat identify the aid 
distribution method. None identifies that no sub-qualifications are used. GPA and Income identify if sub-qualifications are used for eligibility. Select determines 
if award is only redeemable at a select subset of institutions. 2-yr and 4-yr describes the institution type aid can be redeemed.
State
No. of 
Programs
Early Commit Percentage Unmet Need Flat None GPA Income
Select 
Institutions
2-year 
alternatives
4-yr 
alternatives
Arkansas 5 2 5 1 2 2 3 2 0 3 5 2
Arizona 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
California 11 9 9 0 8 3 8 2 2 8 9 5
Colorado 2 1 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 1 2 1
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Washington, DC 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
Florida 3 1 2 0 2 1 2 1 0 2 3 2
Illinois 6 4 5 2 3 1 4 2 0 5 6 1
Indiana 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
Kentucky 4 2 4 0 3 1 0 4 0 4 4 0
Maryland 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Michigan 14 8 12 6 6 2 12 2 0 6 14 10
Minnesota 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Missouri 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
North Carolina 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
New Jersey 4 1 2 0 4 0 0 4 2 4 3 2
New York 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Ohio 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 2 2 1
Oklahoma 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
Oregon 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 1
Pennsylvania 5 2 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4
Tennessee 4 3 4 0 2 2 4 0 0 3 4 1
Texas 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
Utah 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
Virginia 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
Washington 2 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 0
Wisconsin 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Total 79 42 61 13 46 20 38 32 18 56 75 37
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Table 4. 
Descriptive Statistics of Macon County, Illinois 
 
 
Source: RCC Yearbook (n.d.)  
Descriptive Category 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Population Statistics:
Population (16 yr.+) 88,816 88,847 87,453 87,737 86,939 85,920
Civilian Labor Force 53,170 53,982 56,707 55,553 54,684 51,329
Unemployed (%) 7.6% 10.1% 13.1% 11.2% 9.9% 6.5%
Income and Poverty Statistics:
Median Household Income $40,919 $44,415 $44,533 $45,957 $47,574 $48,040
Mean Household Income $53,597 $60,813 $58,049 $62,101 $63,140 $66,687
Per Capita Income $22,688 $25,244 $24,756 $26,148 $26,459 $28,185
Families below Poverty Level (%) 12.6% 9.5% 17.2% 15.3% 11.4% 13.8%
   w/ children 18yr or younger (%) 22.3% 16.8% 35.2% 24.8% 20.2% 25.6%
   w/ children 5 years or younger (%) 26.0% 17.7% 36.8% 41.3% 26.8% 30.3%
High School diploma 48.0% 47.4% 47.1% 46.8% 46.4% 45.9%
Associate’s degree 6.2% 7.1% 6.6% 6.6% 6.7% 8.0%
Bachelor’s degree 13.6% 14.2% 14.6% 14.7% 15.4% 15.2%
Highest Level of Education (25 yrs ≤):
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Table 5. 
Major Employers in Macon County in 2015, separated by Industry Type, Company Name, and 
Number of Employees  
 
 
          Source: RCC Yearbook (n.d.) 
 
Employees
Manufacturing
Archer Daniels Midland 4,040
Caterpillar 3,292
Tate & Lyle/A.E. Staley 634
Mueller 455
Akorn Incorporated 300
Macon Resources, Inc 285
Stratas Foods 200
PPG Industries, Inc. 175
Christy Foltz, Inc. 150
International Control Services 141
Service, Support & Transportation
Ameren Illinois 512
Norfolk Southern Corp. 500
Kelly Group 450
Bodine Electric Of 400
All Tri-R, Inc. 300
Centurion Industries, Inc. 300
Bodine Services Of Decatur, Inc. 200
McLeod Express 130
Myers Co., The L. E 110
McMillen Enterprises, Inc., R. D. 100
Office/Professional – Public
Decatur Public School District 1,500
Macon County 545
City of Decatur 506
Richland Community College 450
Mt Zion School District 240
IL Dept of Corrections 210
 Office/Professional – Private
Decatur Memorial Hospital 2,374
St. Mary’s Hospital 1,136
Millikin University 627
Addus Health Care 225
Decatur Conference Center & Hotel 165
Busey Bank 120
Business Center of Decatur 100
Soy Capital Bank & Trust Co 100
Industry Type and Company Name
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Table 6. 
Richland Community College In-District High Schools and Counties Represented, separated by 
Carroll Scholarship Eligibility and Public/Private affiliation 
 
 
Note. The 13 non-Carroll Scholarship high schools are given a unique random id number in the dataset used for this 
research. The random id numbers used for the dataset are, in numeric order: 440, 758, 1936, 5192, 5502, 5620, 
5623, 5625, 5627, 5628, 6629, 20145, and 121442. I am not able to align the specific high schools to random id 
numbers. 
 
   
 
 
 
  
Counties represented by High 
School District
Meridian High School Macon, Christian
Argenta-Oreana Macon, Dewitt
Central A& M Christian, Shelby
Cerro Gordo Macon, Piatt
Clinton Macon, DeWitt, Logan
Decatur Eisenhower Macon
Decatur MacArthur Macon
Maroa-Forsyth Macon, DeWitt
Mt. Zion Macon, Moultrie
Sangamon Valley Macon, Sangamon, Christian
Warrensburg-Latham Macon, Logan
Decatur Christian n.a.
Lutheran School Association n.a.
St. Teresa n.a.
Scholarship Eligibility for In-District 
High Schools and High School Type
Carroll Eligible High School:
Non-Eligible Public High Schools:
Non-Eligible Private High Schools:
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Table 7. 
Enrollment Size, Demographics, and Secondary School Characteristics of Richland Community 
College Enrolled Students, separated by Carroll Scholarship Eligible High Schools and Senior 
Class Year 
 
 
Note. In-District demographics represent the combined numbers for all 13 non-Meridian High Schools in the 
sample. Demographics for all other race and ethnicity categories are suppressed because of the small number of 
Meridian students in those categories. Average ACT score is calculated from the scores reported to RCC. Average 
Math courses taken is the number of mathematics courses taken beyond Illinois’ graduation requirement. 
+ signifies that the sample size is smaller than 10 students. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
n. 73 79 73 73 75 75
n. 23 37 15 26 37 40
% 31.5% 46.8% 20.5% 35.6% 49.3% 53.3%
n. 1,095 1,155 1,061 975 938 939
n. 307 303 274 250 277 238
% 28.0% 26.2% 25.8% 25.6% 29.5% 25.3%
n. + 19 + 12 16 27
% 39.1% 51.4% 26.7% 46.2% 43.2% 67.5%
n. 131 145 133 117 123 103
% 42.7% 47.9% 48.5% 46.8% 44.4% 41.5%
n. 14 18 11 14 21 13
% 60.9% 48.7% 73.3% 53.9% 56.8% 32.5%
n. 176 158 140 133 154 145
% 57.3% 52.2% 51.1% 53.2% 55.6% 58.5%
n. 22 35 12 24 36 37
% 96.0% 94.6% 80.0% 92.3% 97.3% 92.5%
n. 251 249 220 199 219 199
% 81.8% 82.2% 80.3% 79.3% 79.1% 80.2%
HS GPA 2.86 2.71 2.93 2.81 2.87 2.7
ACT 20.89 19.19 20.08 19.15 19.75 21.26
Math 1.39 1.41 1.4 1.62 1.62 1.83
HS GPA 3.13 3.11 3.2 3.16 3.26 3.24
ACT 20.32 19.82 19.85 20.09 20.08 19.23
Math 1.76 1.81 1.79 1.81 1.91 1.85
No. and Percent of 
RCC Enrolled:    
Male
Meridian
In-District
In-District
Avg.  HS GPA, ACT 
score, and No. of 
Math courses taken 
for RCC Enrolled 
Students
No. and Percent of 
RCC Enrolled: 
Female
Meridian
In-District
No. and Percent of 
RCC Enrolled: 
White
Meridian
In-District
Pre-Carroll Post-Carroll
Meridian
High School Senior 
Class Size, No. and 
Percent of Class 
Size Enrolled at 
RCC
Meridian
In-District
Characteristic School
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Table 8. 
Dataset Population, separated by Carroll Scholarship High School Eligibility and Number of Students Registered in time periods 
before and after the Carroll Scholarship announcement  
 
 
 
Note. The dataset constructed for this research includes students who transitioned to Richland immediately following high school 
completion. A fourth potential group exists of students who delayed enrollment. The fourth group of students is omitted from 
this research. 
 
Strictly took courses in the Pre-
Carroll Scholarship Semesters
Registered in both pre- and post-Carroll 
Scholarship semesters
Strictly took courses in the post-
Carroll Scholarship semesters
Students who would be eligible, but 
did not register for Richland courses 
in the semesters after the Carroll 
Scholarship creation.
Are initially ineligible for the Carroll 
scholarship because they began taking 
Richland courses in a time period prior to 
the scholarship creation, but became 
eligible and continued coursework in the 
post-Carroll Scholarship creation 
semesters.
Are eligible to receive the Carroll 
Scholarship in all semesters 
registered at Richland.
N= 39 N= 36 N= 103
Did not attend the eligible high 
school and did not register for 
Richland courses in the semesters 
after the Carroll scholarship 
creation.
Did not attend the eligible high school, but 
took Richland courses in the semesters 
before and after the Carroll Scholarship 
creation.
Did not attend the eligible high 
school, but took all Richland 
courses in the semesters after the 
Carroll Scholarship creation.
N= 489 N= 395 N= 775
Students who graduated 
from Meridian High School 
N=178
Students who graduated 
from the remaining 13 in-
district high schools     
N=1,659 
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Table 9. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Prior Year trends of High School Grade Point Average (HS 
GPA): MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Pre-Carroll Scholarship Senior Class Time 
Periods (2010-2012): Halved based on High School Grade Point Average 
  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The naïve regressions restrict the data to 
include only students that graduated in the pre-Carroll Scholarship time periods, 2010-
2012. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the 
omitted variable categories. 2010 is the omitted Senior Class Year Fixed Effect category. 
School ID Number 5625 is the omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
  
H.S. GPA H.S. GPA
Model (1.085-3.170) (3.171-5.000)
(Std. Error) OLS OLS
(1) (2)
MERIDIAN -0.0314 -0.0706
(0.0788) (0.0791)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.0331 0.0863**
(0.0433) (0.0412)
Male -0.0830** -0.104***
(0.0381) (0.0367)
White 0.300** -0.0511
(0.136) (0.150)
African-American -0.0389 -0.165
(0.146) (0.186)
Hispanic 0.0900 -0.0861
(0.177) (0.261)
Two or More Identified xx -0.116
xx (0.172)
Constant 2.192*** 3.545***
(0.152) (0.165)
Senior Class Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 48 23
N. Control (In-District) 387 401
Observations 435 424
R-squared 0.209 0.260
H.S. GPA
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Table 10. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Associates Degree Path and Transferable Degree Path: 
MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Pre-Carroll Scholarship Academic Semester Time 
Periods (Fall 2010-Summer 2013): Halved based on High School Grade Point Average 
 
H.S. GPA H.S. GPA H.S. GPA H.S. GPA
Models (1.085-3.170) (3.171-5.000) (1.085-3.170) (3.171-5.000)
(Std. Error) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN -0.0397 -0.0278 -0.0816 0.0208
(0.124) (0.117) (0.0822) (0.0138)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.0677 -0.0563 0.0334 0.0706**
(0.0724) (0.0605) (0.0374) (0.0319)
Male -0.0812 -0.0795 -0.0675** 0.0271
(0.0668) (0.0609) (0.0340) (0.0241)
White -0.390*** 0.775*** -0.0109 -0.0507
(0.0914) (0.0767) (0.0364) (0.0332)
African-American -0.223** 0.638** 0.0162 -0.0163
(0.105) (0.259) (0.0500) (0.0444)
Hispanic -0.0537 1.202*** 0.145 -0.111**
(0.168) (0.192) (0.0917) (0.0562)
Two or More Identified -0.286 0.625*** 0.0907 -0.00374
(0.186) (0.223) (0.0651) (0.0440)
Constant 0.968*** 0.173* 0.946*** 0.986***
(0.186) (0.103) (0.0907) (0.0310)
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 21 13 21 13
N. Control (In-District) 207 204 207 204
Observations 228 217 228 217
R-squared 0.070 0.155 0.066 0.064
Curricular Path
Associates Degree Path Transferable Degree Path
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The naïve regressions restrict the data to 
include only students that graduated in the pre-Carroll Scholarship time periods, 2010-
2012. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the 
omitted variable categories.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 11.  
OLS and Logistic Regression predictive Difference-in-Difference Models for Mean High School 
Grade Point Average: Carroll Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High 
School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
MERIDIAN x POST 0.0424 1.246 -0.0352 0.823 -0.0259 0.853 -0.0310 0.814
(0.0286) (0.252) (0.0370) (0.178) (0.0290) (0.143) (0.0195) (0.121)
MERIDIAN 0.261*** 4.340*** -0.0481* 0.804 -0.0380 0.809 -0.222*** 0.165***
(0.0279) (0.906) (0.0238) (0.125) (0.0247) (0.114) (0.0210) (0.0246)
POST -0.696*** 4.02e-07*** -0.219** 6.62e-06*** 0.00264 5.85e-05*** 0.375*** 0.00486***
(0.0339) (4.57e-07) (0.0768) (4.74e-06) (0.0683) (6.78e-05) (0.0594) (0.00546)
Dual Credit Enrollee -0.0263 0.822 -0.0140 0.912 0.0403 1.267 0.0762** 1.763***
(0.0280) (0.159) (0.0315) (0.178) (0.0303) (0.236) (0.0313) (0.304)
Male 0.0765*** 1.639*** 0.0468** 1.321*** -0.0259 0.863 -0.111*** 0.437***
(0.0125) (0.105) (0.0171) (0.137) (0.0215) (0.110) (0.0146) (0.0382)
White 0.0207 1.114 -0.0310 0.849 0.00446 1.005 0.0372 1.247
(0.0619) (0.557) (0.0976) (0.439) (0.0705) (0.415) (0.0555) (0.483)
African-American 0.224** 2.996** -0.0835 0.626 -0.0630 0.577 -0.0514 0.405
(0.0787) (1.609) (0.111) (0.375) (0.0635) (0.253) (0.0656) (0.225)
Hispanic 0.232 3.096 -0.145 0.390 -0.0441 0.742 0.0447 1.270
(0.222) (3.442) (0.131) (0.356) (0.144) (0.680) (0.0618) (0.596)
Two or More Identified 0.0749 1.574 -0.0509 0.742 -0.0344 0.766 0.0138 0.996
(0.112) (1.137) (0.144) (0.598) (0.0800) (0.426) (0.0686) (0.538)
Constant 0.815*** 345,611*** 0.529*** 65,525*** 0.237** 5,465*** -0.0768 91.96***
(0.0499) (392,519) (0.136) (50,631) (0.102) (7,173) (0.0823) (110.2)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior Class Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178
N. Control (In-District) 1,658 1,419 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658 1,658
Observations 1,836 1,597 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836 1,836
R-squared (Psuedo) 0.145 0.103 0.047 0.048 0.036 0.036 0.247 0.227
(3.710-5.000)
H.S. GPA
(1.085-2.720)
Q1 Q2
(2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701)
Q3 Q4
Note. Standard errors clustered by high school. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-White are the omitted 
variable categories. Logistic models report Odds Ratio coefficient results. Logistic models report Pseudo R-squared.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 12.  
OLS and Logistic Regression predictive Difference-in-Difference Models for Pell Grant Receipt: 
Carroll Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2)
OLS Logistic
MERIDIAN x POST 0.0223 1.121
(0.0160) (0.103)
MERIDIAN -0.0906*** 0.655***
(0.0220) (0.0650)
POST 0.0428** 1.261**
(0.0163) (0.118)
Dual Credit Enrollee -0.150*** 0.472***
(0.0348) (0.0684)
Male -0.0670*** 0.698***
(0.0161) (0.0652)
White 0.102* 1.692*
(0.0499) (0.514)
African-American 0.312*** 4.192***
(0.0619) (1.437)
Hispanic 0.312*** 4.582***
(0.0864) (1.812)
Two or More Identified 0.247** 3.204**
(0.107) (1.693)
Constant 0.386*** 0.604
(0.0567) (0.196)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
HS_GPA Quartile Dummy No Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 454 454
N. Control (In-District) 3,950 3,950
Observations 4,404 4,405
R-squared (Psuedo) 0.106 0.087
Pell Grant Recipient
 
Note. Standard errors clustered by high school. MERIDIAN is a 
dummy variable. School ID Number 5625 is the omitted Non-
Meridian High School dummy variable. Quartile 1 is the 
omitted HS_GPA Quartile dummy variable. Non-Dual Credit, 
Female, and Non-White are the omitted variable categories. 
Logistic models report Odds Ratio coefficient results. Logistic 
models report Pseudo R-squared.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 13. 
First-Year Student Financial Aid Information, separated by Carroll Scholarship High School 
Eligibility and Senior Class Year 
 
 
Note. In-District calculations represent the combined numbers for all 13 non-Meridian High Schools in the sample. 
RCC does not use a formal definition for categorizing financial aid programs and awards. All calculations are based 
on the category where RCC aligned the specific award. All financial aid calculations exclude the Carroll Scholarship 
award. Average award value is calculated using only students awarded that specific type of aid. Average EFC and 
Student Income is calculated using FAFSA application results and omits students who did not file FAFSA. Grant 
Aid Awards excludes Pell Grant calculations.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
n. 14 24 12 26 37 38
% 60.9% 64.9% 80.0% 100.0% 100.0% 95.0%
n. 219 230 213 201 235 218
% 71.3% 75.9% 77.7% 80.4% 84.8% 87.9%
$ 7,703 11,199 7,967 12,266 14,420 9,851
$ 8,014 6,062 8,987 8,990 9,331 8,413
$ 2,572 1,300 1,256 4,313 1,487 1,643
$ 2,866 2,144 1,933 2,590 2,471 2,877
% 26.1% 16.2% 40.0% 26.9% 16.2% 25.0%
$ 1,219 687 1,029 666 750 653
% 23.8% 28.1% 18.2% 26.0% 26.0% 27.4%
$ 1,098 808 755 813 822 816
% 39.1% 37.8% 53.3% 38.5% 40.5% 47.5%
$ 3,688 2,447 3,980 4,217 2,871 3,505
% 38.1% 46.5% 38.3% 39.6% 47.7% 49.2%
$ 3,688 2,447 3,980 4,217 2,871 3,505
% 17.4% 29.7% 33.3% 11.5% 16.2% 27.5%
$ 1,279 1,275 768 1,637 1,734 981
% 23.1% 23.8% 29.9% 34.4% 41.5% 39.1%
$ 1,484 1,344 1,366 1,312 1,387 1,496
% 17.4% 16.2% 40.0% 3.8% 5.4% 25.0%
$ 1,672 1,585 1,688 574 1,142 404
% 15.6% 16.2% 19.7% 22.8% 23.5% 39.5%
$ 1,671 1,730 1,755 2,105 2,269 1,623
Scholarship Aid 
Awards
Meridian
In-District
Tuition Waiver 
Awards
Meridian
In-District
Grant Aid 
Awards
Meridian
In-District
Pell Grant 
Awards
Meridian
In-District
Meridian
In-District
Pre-Carroll Post-Carroll
Filed FAFSA
Meridian
In-District
Avg. EFC 
Avg. Student 
Income
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Table 14. 
Average Carroll Scholarship Distribution Received; per Meridian student; separated by Senior 
Class and Academic Year Received 
 
Note. Average Carroll Scholarship Award by Senior Class, identifies the Senior Class year for the student receiving 
Carroll funding. This does not align with the postsecondary academic year the students received the award. 
+ signifies a sample size smaller than 10 students.  
  
  
Average Carroll Scholarship Award 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
n. + + + 15 28 24
$. 2,040 2,431 1,680 4,402 3,750 2,125
n. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27 49 95
$. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,825 1,854 1,246
Average Award, by Senior Class
Average Award, by Academic Year
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Table 15. 
First-Year Student Postsecondary Outcomes, separated by Carroll Scholarship High School 
Eligibility and Senior Class Year 
 
Note. In-District calculations represent the combined numbers for all 13 non-Meridian High Schools in the sample. 
Credit Hour Success Rate is the total credit hours attempted in a semester divided by the number of credit hours that 
did not result in a failing letter grade (F) or a course withdrawal (WD).  
+ signifies a sample size smaller than 10 students 
 
 
 
 
  
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
n. 23 37 15 26 37 40
n. 15 14 + 17 19 21
% 65.2% 37.8% 40.0% 65.4% 51.4% 52.5%
n. 307 303 274 250 277 248
n. 161 143 136 127 146 128
% 52.4% 47.2% 49.6% 50.8% 52.7% 51.6%
n. 23.5 22.7 21.5 25.3 22.9 23.8
n. 18 16.4 16.5 22.7 19.8 20.2
% 76.6% 72.2% 76.7% 89.7% 86.5% 84.9%
n. 23 21.8 22.7 23.1 23.4 23.7
n. 18.8 16.9 18.3 19.3 19.7 20.2
% 81.7% 77.5% 80.6% 83.5% 84.2% 85.2%
n. + 11 + + 16 10
% 30.4% 29.7% 20.0% 7.7% 43.2% 25.0%
n. 94 108 88 81 85 74
% 30.6% 35.6% 32.1% 32.4% 30.7% 29.8%
n. 13 28 + 11 21 24
% 56.5% 75.7% 40.0% 42.3% 56.8% 60.0%
n. 185 180 152 134 153 128
% 60.3% 59.4% 55.5% 53.6% 55.2% 51.6%
In-District
Students Enrolled, 
Students Enrolled Full-
Time (12+ cr. hr.), and 
percent Full-Time
Meridian
In-District
Failed a course
Meridian
In-District
Withdrew from a 
course
Meridian
In-District
Credit Hours 
Attempted, Credit 
Hours Earned, and 
Credit Hour Success 
Rate
Student Outcomes School
Pre-Carroll Post-Carroll
Meridian
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Table 16. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Mean High School Grade Point Average: Carroll 
Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point Average 
Quartiles 
 
Note. Standard errors clustered by high school. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Quartile 1 is the omitted HS_GPA Quartile dummy variable. 
Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the omitted variable categories. The models measure the Intention to 
Treat (ITT) because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, 
but is not necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
  
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Models (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST -0.0766* -0.00134 -0.0218 -0.0132 -0.0539*** 0.193***
(0.0409) (0.0107) (0.0206) (0.0149) (0.0178) (0.0232)
MERIDIAN -0.489*** -0.0500*** -0.0404 -0.0303 -0.0665*** -0.125***
(0.0404) (0.0132) (0.0485) (0.0206) (0.0189) (0.0242)
POST 0.0464 0.0427* 0.0784*** -0.0177 0.00135 0.112**
(0.0391) (0.0203) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0359) (0.0473)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.176*** 0.0513*** 0.111*** 0.00319 0.00713 0.0305
(0.0372) (0.0140) (0.0344) (0.0165) (0.0215) (0.0454)
Male -0.227*** -0.0293** -0.0376 0.00850 -0.0172 -0.0652**
(0.0159) (0.0128) (0.0257) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0264)
White 0.0330 -0.00853 0.134 -0.107*** 0.0949* -0.133**
(0.101) (0.0372) (0.125) (0.0185) (0.0484) (0.0578)
African-American -0.351** -0.105* 0.0287 -0.129*** 0.0241 -0.225***
(0.119) (0.0502) (0.113) (0.0226) (0.0920) (0.0710)
Hispanic -0.126 -0.0144 0.103 -0.195 0.00490 0.0363
(0.209) (0.0632) (0.161) (0.111) (0.0467) (0.155)
Two or More Identified -0.108 -0.0533** 0.0916 -0.175*** 0.200** -0.212**
(0.138) (0.0201) (0.0669) (0.0424) (0.0733) (0.0761)
Constant 3.264*** 2.276*** 2.094*** 3.047*** 3.334*** 4.007***
(0.0844) (0.0586) (0.112) (0.0147) (0.0593) (0.0371)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS_GPA Quartile Dummy No Yes No No No No
N. Treatment (Meridian) 168 168 74 42 40 12
N. Control (In-District) 1,517 1,517 351 380 378 408
Observations 1,685 1,685 425 422 418 420
R-squared 0.381 0.891 0.135 0.111 0.087 0.286
Student Secondary School Characteristics
H.S. GPA
Full Sample
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Table 17. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point Average 
Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Models (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 1.149** 0.550 0.331 2.472** 3.515***
(0.513) (0.756) (1.028) (1.051) (0.889)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.234*** 0.146*** 0.197*** 0.240*** 0.303***
(0.00998) (0.0188) (0.0216) (0.0210) (0.0169)
Pell Grant Recipient -0.526** -0.775* -0.838* -0.647 -0.00699
(0.239) (0.437) (0.484) (0.518) (0.469)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.199*** 0.243*** 0.229*** 0.207*** 0.115***
(0.0108) (0.0187) (0.0221) (0.0247) (0.0213)
Constant 5.018*** 4.987*** 5.976*** 5.039*** 4.082***
(0.391) (0.685) (0.908) (0.721) (0.833)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HS_GPA Quartile Dummy No No No No No
N. Treatment (Meridian) 774 320 191 178 58
N. Control (In-District) 7,095 1,574 1,679 1,676 1,812
Number of id 1,837 496 409 392 389
Observations 7,869 1,894 1,870 1,854 1,870
R-squared 0.551 0.510 0.497 0.563 0.671
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to 
signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Student and Semester fixed effects allow Meridian students to 
switch from the control group to the treatment group in the time period after the Carroll Scholarship introduction. 
This aspect of the DID model helps avoid contamination both groups. The models measure the Intention to Treat 
(ITT) because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, but is 
not necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 18. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point Average 
Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 1.870*** 0.816 2.000* 2.481** 3.913***
(0.492) (0.618) (1.088) (1.034) (0.984)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.223*** 0.107*** 0.180*** 0.222*** 0.307***
(0.0107) (0.0197) (0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0186)
Pell Grant Recipient -1.300*** -2.054*** -0.880* -1.892*** -0.185
(0.259) (0.471) (0.483) (0.609) (0.500)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.192*** 0.248*** 0.197*** 0.233*** 0.0911***
(0.0120) (0.0187) (0.0234) (0.0308) (0.0233)
Constant 5.215*** 4.833*** 6.268*** 5.166*** 4.594***
(0.399) (0.662) (0.907) (0.719) (0.905)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 774 320 191 178 58
N. Control (In-District) 7,095 1,574 1,679 1,676 1,812
Number of id 1,837 496 409 392 389
Observations 7,869 1,894 1,870 1,854 1,870
R-squared 0.426 0.324 0.367 0.471 0.588
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to 
signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Standard errors for Other Aid Award and Pell Grant Amount are not 
adjusted. Student and Semester fixed effects allow Meridian stuents to switch from the control group to the 
treatment group in the time period after the Carroll Scholarship introduction. This aspect of the DID model helps 
avoid contamination both groups. The models measure the Intention to Treat (ITT) because each member of the 
treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, but is not necessarily receiving Carroll 
Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 19. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Withdrawn at Richland: 
Carroll Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point 
Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST -0.690** -0.399 -1.501** -0.0705 -0.173
(0.316) (0.498) (0.711) (0.559) (0.227)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 8.57E-03 0.0352** 0.0173 0.0131 -3.59E-03
(6.04e-03) (0.0162) (0.0166) (0.0116) (9.63e-03)
Pell Grant Recipient 0.692*** 1.178*** 0.0447 0.957** 0.199
(0.202) (0.425) (0.413) (0.469) (0.243)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 7.45E-03 -4.69E-03 0.0287 -0.0169 0.0197
(0.0101) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0250) (0.0160)
Constant -0.149 0.0862 -0.273 0.0912 -0.518
(0.201) (0.437) (0.454) (0.318) (0.447)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 774 320 191 178 58
N. Control (In-District) 7,095 1,574 1,679 1,676 1,812
Number of id 1,837 496 409 392 389
Observations 7,869 1,894 1,870 1,854 1,870
R-squared 0.041 0.073 0.057 0.041 0.037
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Withdrawn
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to 
signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Student and Semester fixed effects allow Meridian students to 
switch from the control group to the treatment group in the time period after the Carroll Scholarship introduction. 
This aspect of the DID model helps avoid contamination both groups. The models measure the Intention to Treat 
(ITT) because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, but is 
not necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 20. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Failed at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point Average 
Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST -0.0872 -0.562 -0.261 0.650*** 0.106
(0.231) (0.511) (0.208) (0.241) (0.152)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 3.87E-03 5.12E-03 0.0114 2.45E-03 7.33E-03
(3.51e-03) (0.0132) (8.55e-03) (4.34e-03) (4.73e-03)
Pell Grant Recipient 0.120 0.0381 -0.109 0.0908 0.435**
(0.113) (0.300) (0.212) (0.133) (0.170)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.0272*** 0.0486*** 0.0267** 7.22E-03 8.69E-03
(6.28e-03) (0.0153) (0.0128) (7.96e-03) (9.10e-03)
Constant 0.0271 0.200 -0.0438 0.100 -0.122
(0.0987) (0.222) (0.218) (0.155) (0.185)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 774 320 191 178 58
N. Control (In-District) 7,095 1,574 1,679 1,676 1,812
Number of id 1,837 496 409 392 389
Observations 7,869 1,894 1,870 1,854 1,870
R-squared 0.027 0.052 0.023 0.032 0.042
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Failed
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to 
signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Student and Semester fixed effects allow Meridian students to 
switch from the control group to the treatment group in the time period after the Carroll Scholarship introduction. 
This aspect of the DID model helps avoid contamination both groups. The models measure the Intention to Treat 
(ITT) because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, but is 
not necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 21. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: 
Received Carroll Scholarship Funding Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade 
Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Carroll Scholarship Recipient 3.973*** 3.983*** 3.604*** 5.209*** 0.267
(0.367) (0.569) (0.709) (0.769) (1.097)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.181*** 0.152*** 0.109** 0.260*** 0.320***
(0.0253) (0.0502) (0.0448) (0.0408) (0.0680)
Pell Grant Recipient -0.823 0.915 -3.619*** -1.321 -3.341
(0.531) (0.735) (0.986) (1.292) (2.168)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.181*** 0.130*** 0.359*** 0.137** 0.117
(0.0250) (0.0359) (0.0389) (0.0688) (0.100)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.796** 1.408*** -2.251*** -2.506*** -1.454
(0.322) (0.469) (0.746) (0.901) (1.398)
H.S. GPA 0.628*** 1.368*** 3.291 -2.739 -4.855**
(0.222) (0.478) (2.049) (1.793) (1.801)
Male 0.826*** 0.758* 1.496*** 0.314 1.715
(0.267) (0.439) (0.517) (0.547) (1.221)
White 0.348 -0.562 -1.116 3.613*** -3.273
(0.509) (0.826) (1.266) (1.291) (2.254)
Constant 2.504** 0.854 -0.621 13.71** 31.65***
(1.111) (1.886) (5.774) (6.418) (9.825)
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Carroll) 227 107 56 50 14
N. Control (No Carroll) 520 213 135 128 44
Observations 747 320 191 178 58
R-squared 0.472 0.424 0.524 0.656 0.792
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-
White are the omitted variable categories. The treatment and control groups consist of Meridian students 
exclusively. Carroll Scholarship Recipient treatment is a binary measure identifying whether a student actually 
received Carroll Scholarship funds (Yes, Carroll Scholarship Recipient= 1, If a student does not receive a Carroll 
Scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Recipient= 0). Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell 
Grant awards. The models measure the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) because each member of the treatment 
group is receiving Carroll Scholarship funding, not just information on postsecondary affordability. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 22. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: 
Amount of Carroll Scholarship Received Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade 
Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Models (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Carroll Scholarship Amount ($100) 0.365*** 0.430*** 0.314*** 0.363*** 0.0916
(0.0209) (0.0339) (0.0455) (0.0386) (0.151)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.221*** 0.183*** 0.109*** 0.294*** 0.321***
(0.0266) (0.0482) (0.0390) (0.0388) (0.0627)
Pell Grant Recipient -0.169 1.549** -2.974*** -0.443 -3.268
(0.504) (0.670) (0.992) (1.048) (2.168)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.164*** 0.139*** 0.341*** 0.107* 0.112
(0.0235) (0.0329) (0.0366) (0.0610) (0.0930)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.587* 0.872** -2.305*** -2.339*** -1.397
(0.301) (0.404) (0.720) (0.852) (1.435)
H.S. GPA 0.525** 0.937** 3.235 -1.157 -5.159***
(0.206) (0.444) (1.987) (1.588) (1.767)
Male 0.983*** 1.005*** 1.519*** 0.720 1.674
(0.245) (0.386) (0.500) (0.515) (1.230)
White 0.901* -0.433 0.237 4.026*** -3.220
(0.546) (0.869) (0.964) (1.346) (2.267)
Constant 2.376** 2.029 -1.775 7.845 32.81***
(1.101) (1.853) (5.614) (5.729) (9.413)
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Carroll) 227 107 56 50 14
N. Control (No Carroll) 520 213 135 128 44
Observations 747 320 191 178 58
R-squared 0.537 0.534 0.545 0.705 0.793
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, 
Other Aid Amount, and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. 
Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-White are the omitted variable categories. The treatment and control groups 
consist of Meridian students exclusively. Carroll Scholarship Amount is a continuous treatment variable for the 
value of Carroll Scholarship funding that a student receives each semester (Carroll Scholarship Amount= “value”, If 
a student does not receive the Carroll Scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Amount= 0). Other Aid Amount excludes 
Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. The models measure the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
because each member of the treatment group is receiving Carroll Scholarship funding, not just information on 
postsecondary affordability. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 23. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Received 
Carroll Scholarship Funding Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point 
Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Models (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Carroll Scholarship Recipient 4.376*** 4.773*** 3.987*** 4.218*** 0.392
(0.397) (0.589) (0.808) (0.904) (1.543)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.197*** 0.0987 0.111** 0.246*** 0.285***
(0.0277) (0.0604) (0.0485) (0.0454) (0.0793)
Pell Grant Recipient -2.159*** -1.784** -3.479*** -0.345 -2.621
(0.614) (0.874) (1.104) (1.666) (2.313)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.232*** 0.2267*** 0.347*** 0.0645 0.0663
(0.0297) (0.0398) (0.0477) (0.101) (0.116)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.757** 1.286** -2.030** -3.012*** -0.901
(0.359) (0.499) (0.878) (0.928) (1.559)
H.S.GPA 1.428*** 1.977*** 2.725 -1.327 -8.818***
(0.237) (0.483) (2.080) (1.974) (2.049)
Male 0.283 0.140 1.002* -0.140 0.768
(0.287) (0.434) (0.588) (0.639) (1.295)
White 1.213** 1.022 -1.868 4.866** -2.626
(0.549) (0.768) (1.414) (1.903) (2.568)
Constant -0.938 -2.515 1.005 8.246 47.14***
(1.173) (1.548) (6.108) (7.020) (11.04)
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Carroll) 227 107 56 50 14
N. Control (No Carroll) 520 213 135 128 44
Observations 747 320 191 178 58
R-squared 0.435 0.414 0.447 0.519 0.758
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-
White are the omitted variable categories. The treatment and control groups consist of Meridian students 
exclusively. Carroll Scholarship Recipient treatment is a binary measure identifying whether a student actually 
received Carroll Scholarship funds (Yes, Carroll Scholarship Recipient= 1, If a student does not receive a Carroll 
Scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Recipient= 0). Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell 
Grant awards. The models measure the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) because each member of the treatment 
group is receiving Carroll Scholarship funding, not just information on postsecondary affordability. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 24. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Amount of 
Carroll Scholarship Received Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade Point 
Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Models (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Carroll Scholarship Amount ($100) 0.417*** 0.527*** 0.375*** 0.340*** 0.167
(0.0218) (0.0329) (0.0503) (0.0425) (0.219)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.241*** 0.137** 0.109** 0.279*** 0.285***
(0.0286) (0.0594) (0.0433) (0.0450) (0.0694)
Pell Grant Recipient -1.406** -1.006 -2.669** 0.427 -2.509
(0.590) (0.772) (1.141) (1.532) (2.304)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.215*** 0.280*** 0.330*** 0.0499 0.061
(0.0283) (0.0367) (0.0458) (0.0934) (0.103)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.520 0.628 -2.034** -2.911*** -0.807
(0.332) (0.399) (0.845) (0.886) (1.603)
H.S. GPA 1.316*** 1.456*** 2.720 0.147 -9.334***
(0.212) (0.361) (1.961) (1.837) (1.924)
Male 0.466* 0.445 1.027* 0.276 0.712
(0.256) (0.348) (0.568) (0.598) (1.316)
White 1.836*** 1.166 -0.212 5.264*** -2.522
(0.579) (0.820) (1.022) (1.931) (2.595)
Constant -1.096 -1.077 -0.648 2.823 49.05***
(1.144) (1.347) (5.755) (6.539) (10.28)
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Carroll) 227 107 56 50 14
N. Control (No Carroll) 520 213 135 128 44
Observations 747 320 191 178 58
R-squared 0.520 0.583 0.489 0.582 0.759
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, 
Other Aid Amount, and Pell Grant Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. 
Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-White are the omitted variable categories. The treatment and control groups 
consist of Meridian students exclusively. Carroll Scholarship Amount is a continuous treatment variable for the 
value of Carroll Scholarship funding that a student receives each semester (Carroll Scholarship Amount= “value”, If 
a student does not receive the Carroll Scholarship, Carroll Scholarship Amount= 0). Other Aid Amount excludes 
Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. The models measure the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) 
because each member of the treatment group is receiving Carroll Scholarship funding, not just information on 
postsecondary affordability. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 25. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Information Treatment Condition: restricted to students with no unmet need based 
on registered credit hours: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 1.384* 2.471 0.540 -0.990 3.028***
(0.807) (2.987) (0.977) (1.412) (0.940)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.188*** 0.165*** 0.132*** 0.232*** 0.224***
(0.0159) (0.0408) (0.0283) (0.0312) (0.028)
Pell Grant Recipient -2.822*** -1.753 -3.685*** -2.357*** -2.132***
(0.389) (1.126) (0.798) (0.702) (0.629)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.302*** 0.340*** 0.377*** 0.307*** 0.192***
(0.0129) (0.0187) (0.0225) (0.0367) (0.0288)
Constant 5.298*** 4.115*** 6.640*** 4.850*** 5.372***
(0.551) (1.075) (0.996) (1.285) (1.104)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 242 67 69 64 33
N. Control (In-District) 3,222 767 593 725 987
Number of id 1,225 319 234 270 325
Observations 3,464 834 662 789 1,020
R-squared 0.613 0.638 0.678 0.588 0.671
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester. Unmet need is calculated by multiplying the per 
credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and subtracting the value of non-Carroll 
Scholarship financial aid award. Carroll Scholarship Recipients are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount 
excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 26. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Information Treatment Condition: restricted to students with no unmet need based 
on registered credit hours: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 2.485*** 1.305 3.375*** 1.127 3.001***
(0.730) (1.184) (0.778) (2.728) (0.987)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.163*** 0.118*** 0.108*** 0.218*** 0.184***
(0.0160) (0.0384) (0.0390) (0.0328) (0.0301)
Pell Grant Recipient -2.410*** -2.586* -2.832*** -2.580*** -1.645**
(0.427) (1.350) (1.033) (0.787) (0.739)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.251*** 0.290*** 0.259*** 0.293*** 0.167***
(0.0150) (0.0224) (0.0290) (0.0385) (0.0340)
Constant 4.633*** 3.578** 3.275*** 3.881*** 6.261***
(0.640) (1.451) (0.996) (1.394) (1.301)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 242 67 69 64 33
N. Control (In-District) 3,222 767 593 725 987
Number of id 1,225 319 234 270 325
Observations 3,464 834 662 789 1,020
R-squared 0.390 0.355 0.386 0.427 0.520
Full Sample
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester. Unmet need is calculated by multiplying the per 
credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and subtracting the value of non-Carroll 
Scholarship financial aid award. Carroll Scholarship Recipients are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount 
excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
  206 
Table 27. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Funding Treatment Condition: restricted to students with no unmet need based on 
registered credit hours: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 1.119 0.0539 2.062 1.061 -0.416
(0.735) (0.662) (1.409) (0.770) (1.709)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.183*** 0.158*** 0.122*** 0.233*** 0.224***
(0.0154) (0.0393) (0.0258) (0.0307) (0.029)
Pell Grant Recipient -2.786*** -1.581 -3.529*** -2.417*** -1.949***
(0.368) (1.031) (0.830) (0.677) (0.578)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.300*** 0.339*** 0.374*** 0.308*** 0.177***
(0.0131) (0.0184) (0.0235) (0.0368) (0.0274)
Constant 5.327*** 4.316*** 6.669*** 2.051 5.323***
(0.558) (1.009) (1.023) (1.486) (1.102)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 302 116 69 78 31
N. Control (In-District) 3,222 767 593 725 987
Number of id 1,252 335 236 276 326
Observations 3,524 883 662 803 1,018
R-squared 0.596 0.612 0.645 0.589 0.670
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester. Unmet need is calculated by multiplying the per 
credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and subtracting the value of non-Carroll 
Scholarship financial aid award. Meridian student’s, who did not require the Carroll Scholarship to cover any unmet 
need, after the start of the scholarship program, are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll 
Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 28. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Funding Treatment Condition: restricted to students with no unmet need based on 
registered credit hours: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 2.663*** 2.302** 3.918** 1.156 -0.0200
(0.951) (1.075) (1.532) (1.027) (1.712)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.157*** 0.107*** 0.0946*** 0.228*** 0.185***
(0.0157) (0.0383) (0.0337) (0.0315) (0.0313)
Pell Grant Recipient -2.447*** -2.703** -2.294** -2.644*** -1.418**
(0.407) (1.226) (1.068) (0.762) (0.693)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.251*** 0.295*** 0.263*** 0.297*** 0.150***
(0.0153) (0.0224) (0.0306) (0.0388) (0.0330)
Constant 4.902*** 3.780*** 3.264*** 1.759 6.199***
(0.663) (1.235) (1.082) (1.605) (1.314)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 302 116 69 78 31
N. Control (In-District) 3,222 767 593 725 987
Number of id 1,252 335 236 276 326
Observations 3,524 883 662 803 1,018
R-squared 0.380 0.342 0.370 0.439 0.516
Full Sample
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester. Unmet need is calculated by multiplying the per 
credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and subtracting the value of non-Carroll 
Scholarship financial aid award. Meridian student’s, who did not require the Carroll Scholarship to cover any unmet 
need, after the start of the scholarship program, are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll 
Scholarship awards and Pell Grant awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 29. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Information Treatment Condition: restricted to students who are Pell Grant 
Recipients and have no unmet need: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 1.410* 9.648*** 0.428 0.187 0.834
(0.778) (0.622) (1.137) (1.095) (0.628)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.0883*** 0.0597* 0.0774** 0.120*** 0.123***
(0.0138) (0.0307) (0.0334) (0.0342) (0.0284)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.380*** 0.385*** 0.405*** 0.404*** 0.321***
(0.0125) (0.0172) (0.0215) (0.0388) (0.0321)
Constant 1.897*** 1.538*** 2.402*** 2.798*** 1.674*
(0.381) (0.551) (0.897) (0.329) (0.943)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 183 53 67 31 23
N. Control (In-District) 2,019 622 446 426 400
Number of id 781 251 171 161 138
Observations 2,202 675 513 457 423
R-squared 0.709 0.754 0.738 0.655 0.740
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Attempted
Full Sample
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester and are awarded a Pell Grant. Unmet need is 
calculated by multiplying the per credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and 
subtracting the value of non-Carroll Scholarship financial aid award. Meridian students who received the Carroll 
Scholarship are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 30. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at Richland: Carroll 
Scholarship Information Treatment Condition: restricted to students who are Pell Grant 
Recipients and have no unmet need: separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.648) (2.650-3.170) (3.172-3.700) (3.701-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x POST 2.737*** 4.794*** 3.341*** 3.788** 0.674
(0.515) (0.977) (1.011) (1.492) (0.780)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.0706*** 0.0386 0.0435 0.107*** 0.0897***
(0.0162) (0.0359) (0.0489) (0.0399) (0.0285)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.327*** 0.319*** 0.287*** 0.397*** 0.325***
(0.0149) (0.0223) (0.0299) (0.0406) (0.0350)
Constant 1.419** -0.0985 3.377*** 2.215** 0.620
(0.559) (1.102) (1.240) (1.035) (1.214)
Student Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Semester Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 183 53 67 31 23
N. Control (In-District) 2,019 622 446 426 400
Number of id 781 251 171 161 138
Observations 2,202 675 513 457 423
R-squared 0.419 0.396 0.435 0.423 0.569
Full Sample
Postsecondary Outcomes
Credit Hours: Earned
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients and Standard Errors for Other Aid Amount and Pell Grant 
Award are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. The treatment and control groups 
consist of students who had no unmet need during the semester and are awarded a Pell Grant. Unmet need is 
calculated by multiplying the per credit hour tuition rate at Richland by the number of registered credit hours, and 
subtracting the value of non-Carroll Scholarship financial aid award. Meridian students who received the Carroll 
Scholarship are omitted from this sample. Other Aid Amount excludes Carroll Scholarship awards and Pell Grant 
awards. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 31. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Students following a Postsecondary Associates Degree 
Path: Carroll Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School Grade 
Point Average Quartiles 
 
 
Note. Standard errors clustered by Academic Year. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. The Year Fixed Effect is associated with the last semester a 
student enrolled at Richland Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-White are the omitted variable categories. Logistic 
models report Odds Ratio coefficient results. Logistic models report Pseudo R-squared. Associates Degree Path is a 
binary dependent variable. Associates Degree Path= 1 if a student has identified following a curriculum associated 
with an Associate’s Degree; Associates Degree Path= 0 if a student has selected a non-Associates Degree 
curriculum. Students who have selected a transfer curriculum not associated with an Associate’s degree have been 
omitted from this sample. The curricular path identified during a student’s last semester is assumed to be the final 
decision at Richland. Models separated by HS GPA quartile 1 & 2 and HS GPA quartile 3 & 4 because Logistic 
regression is based off the dependent variables observations equal to one (Associates Degree Path= 1). Separating 
the sample by HS GPA quartiles creates small sample size problems for Meridian students with Associates Degree 
Path= 1. For this reason I combine the lower two and upper two HS GPA quartiles. The models measure the 
Intention to Treat (ITT) because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary 
affordability, but is not necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
MERIDIAN x POST 0.00118 0.751 0.0730 1.367 -0.0926** 2.25e-07***
(0.0533) (0.404) (0.0870) (1.072) (0.0236) (2.40e-07)
MERIDIAN -0.0426 0.558 -0.111 0.338 0.0445*** 1.288e+06***
(0.0520) (0.286) (0.0833) (0.242) (0.00818) (1.174e+06)
POST 0.167*** 6.610*** 0.120*** 4.420*** 0.0350*** 2.315***
(0.00144) (0.299) (0.00581) (0.549) (0.00173) (0.138)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.0328* 1.900*** 0.0384** 2.027*** 0.0135 1.636
(0.0149) (0.411) (0.0115) (0.514) (0.0252) (1.415)
Male -0.0250** 0.632*** -0.0568** 0.337*** 0.0131* 1.654***
(0.00743) (0.0699) (0.0176) (0.118) (0.00513) (0.302)
White 0.00417 1.072 -0.0223 0.622 0.0212 1.965
(0.0119) (0.243) (0.0201) (0.294) (0.0270) (1.067)
Constant 0.786*** 3.545*** 0.864*** 11.34*** 0.905*** 5.582***
(0.0101) (0.714) (0.0202) (6.057) (0.0175) (1.683)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 125 125 82 82 39 39
N. Control (In-District) 1,250 1,250 548 548 612 612
Observations 1,375 1,375 630 630 651 651
R-squared (Pseudo) 0.032 0.059 0.050 0.097 0.015 0.057
Postsecondary Student Decisions
Associates Degree Path
Full Sample
H.S. GPA: Q1 & Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 & Q4
(1.085-3.200) (3.204-5.000)
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Table 32. 
Difference-in-Difference Models for Students following a Postsecondary Transferable 
Curricular Path: Carroll Scholarship Eligibility Treatment Condition: separated by High School 
Grade Point Average Quartiles 
 
 
Note. Standard errors clustered by Academic Year. MERIDIAN is a dummy variable. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. The Year Fixed Effect is associated with the last semester a 
student enrolled at Richland. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and Non-White are the omitted variable categories. Logistic 
models report Odds Ratio coefficient results. Logistic models report Pseudo R-squared. Transferable Degree Path = 
1 if a student has identified following a curriculum associated with an Associate’s Degree or a transfer course 
outline; Transferable Degree Path = 0 if a student has selected a non-Associates Degree curriculum or a curriculum 
that does not transfer. Transferable Degree Path is an additive variable that contains Associates Degree Path and 
Richland’s transfer curriculum that contains transferable courses but is not aligned with an Associate’s Degree. The 
curricular path identified during a student’s last semester is assumed to be the final decision at Richland. Models 
separated by HS GPA quartile 1 & 2 and HS GPA quartile 3 & 4 because Logistic regression is based off the 
dependent variables observations equal to one (Transferable Degree Path= 1). Separating the sample by HS GPA 
quartiles creates small sample size problems for Meridian students with Transferable Degree Path= 1. For this 
reason I combine the lower two and upper two HS GPA quartiles. The models measure the Intention to Treat (ITT) 
because each member of the treatment group is receiving information on postsecondary affordability, but is not 
necessarily receiving Carroll Scholarship funding. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
MERIDIAN x POST -0.00671 0.733 0.0615 1.638 -0.0723** 2.26e-07***
(0.0152) (0.159) (0.0440) (0.985) (0.0202) (1.93e-07)
MERIDIAN -0.0209 0.642** -0.0831* 0.344** 0.0329*** 1.213e+06***
(0.0146) (0.133) (0.0407) (0.181) (0.00576) (850,312)
POST 0.0943*** 4.674*** 0.0665*** 3.106*** 0.0199*** 2.063***
(0.00118) (0.169) (0.00497) (0.416) (0.00205) (0.144)
Dual Credit Enrollee 0.0258* 1.910*** 0.0285*** 1.947*** 0.0127 1.781
(0.0111) (0.376) (0.00651) (0.433) (0.0213) (1.625)
Male -0.0152** 0.694*** -0.0426** 0.352*** 0.0119** 1.779***
(0.00459) (0.0688) (0.0127) (0.116) (0.00391) (0.304)
White 0.00619 1.152 -0.0141 0.690 0.0153 1.842
(0.00820) (0.243) (0.0162) (0.323) (0.0212) (1.068)
Constant 0.865*** 5.795*** 0.918*** 18.50*** 0.933*** 8.210***
(0.00709) (1.090) (0.0153) (9.627) (0.0133) (2.169)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 176 176 115 115 51 51
N. Control (In-District) 1,646 1,646 722 722 783 783
Observations 1,822 1,822 837 837 834 834
R-squared (Pseudo) 0.018 0.044 0.031 0.074 0.011 0.054
Postsecondary Student Decisions
Transferable Degree Path
Full Sample
H.S. GPA: Q1 & Q2
(1.085-3.200)
H.S. GPA: Q3 & Q4
(3.204-5.000)
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Table 33. 
Parents’ College Asset Methods, Definitions, Number of Observations, Combined Strategy Identification, and Average Number of 
Different Methods Used by Households that Save 
 
 
Note: * denotes that State program and College Fund are combined to represent college 529 savings.
Survey Question: 
Past Account Creation
Savings Started a savings account 4,201 X X X 4.58
Insurance Bought an insurance policy 1,981 X X X 5.23
U.S. bonds Bought U.S. savings bonds 2,061 X X X 5.06
Other Savings Established another form of savings 1,672 X X X 5.21
Stock/Real Estate Made investment in stocks/real estate 3,015 X X X 4.79
State program * Participated in state-sponsored college savings program 676 X X X 4.82
College fund * Set up a college investment fund 1,994 X X X 4.82
Remortgage Remortgaged property/took out home-equity loan 533 X X 6.17
Reduce Expense Reduced other expenses in some way 2,407 X X 5.29
Add Job Started working another job/more hours 1,265 X X 5.4
Plan to Reduce Expense Planned to reduce other expenses in some way 3,070 X 5.06
Plan to Remortgage Planned to remortgage property/take out home-equity 812 X 5.73
2.73 4.14 5.54 4.18
Variable N
Average No. of 
Individual Methods 
Used When the 
Portfolio Includes:
Avg. No. of Methods used within each Combined Strategy:
Have you or your spouse/partner done anything specific 
in order to have some money for your tenth grader's 
education after high school?
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
Previously Established Individual Holding Methods:
Previous Household Sacrifices and Decisions to Reallocate Assets:
Identified Future Intentions to Accrue Savings:
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Table 34. 
Population Means for the Pre- and Post-Match Sample, the Standardized Mean Difference, and 
the Test Results for the Null Hypothesis that the Standardized Mean Difference = 0: Past 
Account Creation 
 
 
Note. The p-value is reported for the null hypothesis that the post-matching mean standardized differences for each 
variable for the treatment population is equal to post-matching mean standardized differences for the control group.  
 
Mean Null Hypothesis 
Matching Estimators Treatment Control Treatment Control Std. Diff. p-value
catholic 0.1796 0.1170 0.1796 0.1705 0.0269 0.5561
father_college 0.7417 0.5327 0.7417 0.7144 0.0564 0.1314
female 0.5091 0.5315 0.5091 0.4834 0.0514 0.2073
freelunch 2.6076 3.3929 2.6076 2.6126 -0.0026 0.9445
guidance 3.6126 3.6362 3.6126 3.6987 -0.0342 0.3969
income_q1 0.0662 0.2588 0.0662 0.0687 -0.0062 0.8078
income_q2 0.2020 0.3598 0.2020 0.1978 0.0090 0.7993
income_q3 0.2334 0.2103 0.2334 0.2334 0.0000 1.0000
income_q4 0.2169 0.1076 0.2169 0.2136 0.0098 0.8431
income_q5 0.2815 0.0636 0.2815 0.2864 -0.0160 0.7867
male 0.4909 0.4685 0.4909 0.5166 -0.0514 0.2073
midwest 0.2724 0.2642 0.2724 0.2748 -0.0056 0.8912
mother_college 0.7632 0.5538 0.7632 0.7326 0.0638 0.0830
northeast 0.1614 0.1923 0.1614 0.1531 0.0214 0.5765
parent_expects 0.9975 0.9849 0.9975 0.9967 0.0076 0.7052
parentinfo 0.3675 0.1084 0.3675 0.3303 0.0197 0.5873
pretest 54.7624 50.8426 54.7624 54.9138 -0.0165 0.6758
private 0.1283 0.0733 0.1283 0.1275 0.0029 0.9515
public 0.6921 0.8097 0.6921 0.7020 -0.0241 0.5954
race_amind 0.0050 0.0077 0.0050 0.0116 -0.0794 0.0725
race_asian 0.0712 0.0745 0.0712 0.0911 -0.0761 0.0738
race_black 0.0728 0.1184 0.0728 0.0728 0.0000 1.0000
race_hispanic 0.0464 0.0904 0.0464 0.0447 0.0061 0.8453
race_hispanic_no 0.0306 0.0884 0.0306 0.0273 0.0127 0.6277
race_two 0.0406 0.0425 0.0406 0.0497 -0.0454 0.2811
race_white 0.7334 0.5780 0.7334 0.7028 0.0636 0.0944
rural 0.1796 0.2174 0.1796 0.1548 0.0613 0.1020
siblings_0 0.2177 0.1874 0.2177 0.2202 -0.0063 0.8827
siblings_1 0.4627 0.3646 0.4627 0.4545 0.0170 0.6832
siblings_2 0.2384 0.2682 0.2384 0.2376 0.0019 0.9619
siblings_3 0.0563 0.1096 0.0563 0.0671 -0.0367 0.2718
siblings_4 0.0166 0.0451 0.0166 0.0157 0.0044 0.8718
siblings_4plus 0.0083 0.0251 0.0083 0.0050 0.0232 0.3159
south 0.3733 0.3518 0.3733 0.3560 0.0363 0.3750
student_expects 0.9255 0.8559 0.9255 0.9371 -0.0350 0.2604
suburban 0.4975 0.4748 0.4975 0.5174 -0.0398 0.3289
urban 0.3228 0.3078 0.3228 0.3278 -0.0107 0.7945
west 0.1929 0.1917 0.1929 0.2161 -0.0588 0.1580
pscore 0.3909 0.2096 0.3909 0.3908 0.0007 0.9886
Pre-Matching Means Post-Matching Means
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Table 35. 
Population Means for the Pre- and Post-Match Sample, the Standardized Mean Difference, and 
the Test Results for the Null Hypothesis that the Standardized Mean Difference = 0: Past 
Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation 
 
 
Note. The p-value is reported for the null hypothesis that the post-matching mean standardized differences for each 
variable from the treatment population is equal to post-matching mean standardized differences for the control group.  
Mean Null Hypothesis 
Matching Estimators Treatment Control Treatment Control Std. Diff. p-value
catholic 0.2122 0.1138 0.2122 0.2280 -0.0480 0.5708
father_college 0.7449 0.5312 0.7449 0.7336 0.0229 0.7024
female 0.5666 0.5306 0.5666 0.5824 -0.0317 0.6348
freelunch 2.7223 3.4071 2.7223 2.7223 0.0000 1.0000
guidance 3.6591 3.6347 3.6591 3.5327 0.0500 0.4570
income_q1 0.0858 0.2592 0.0858 0.1016 -0.0373 0.4202
income_q2 0.2212 0.3589 0.2212 0.1986 0.0477 0.4100
income_q3 0.2506 0.2138 0.2506 0.2528 -0.0055 0.9384
income_q4 0.2077 0.1066 0.2077 0.2144 -0.0211 0.8052
income_q5 0.2348 0.0615 0.2348 0.2325 0.0085 0.9368
male 0.4334 0.4694 0.4334 0.4176 0.0317 0.6348
midwest 0.2980 0.2661 0.2980 0.3273 -0.0661 0.3467
mother_college 0.7630 0.5536 0.7630 0.7698 -0.0138 0.8120
northeast 0.1874 0.1927 0.1874 0.2032 -0.0401 0.5535
parent_expects 0.9977 0.9618 0.9977 0.9977 0.0000 1.0000
parentinfo 0.4424 0.0980 0.4424 0.3883 0.0284 0.5783
pretest 54.6324 50.6380 54.6324 54.1486 0.0519 0.4349
private 0.0993 0.0717 0.0993 0.1016 -0.0086 0.9111
public 0.6885 0.8145 0.6885 0.6704 0.0454 0.5652
race_amind 0.0045 0.0083 0.0045 0.0000 0.0510 0.1572
race_asian 0.0677 0.0734 0.0677 0.0587 0.0348 0.5813
race_black 0.1016 0.1177 0.1016 0.1242 -0.0705 0.2889
race_hispanic 0.0429 0.0906 0.0429 0.0497 -0.0243 0.6319
race_hispanic_no 0.0271 0.0897 0.0271 0.0316 -0.0164 0.6909
race_two 0.0451 0.0446 0.0451 0.0497 -0.0219 0.7522
race_white 0.7111 0.5757 0.7111 0.6862 0.0507 0.4212
rural 0.1941 0.2215 0.1941 0.1874 0.0164 0.7978
siblings_0 0.1964 0.1900 0.1964 0.1941 0.0057 0.9326
siblings_1 0.4041 0.3603 0.4041 0.3679 0.0750 0.2700
siblings_2 0.2393 0.2647 0.2393 0.2325 0.0154 0.8126
siblings_3 0.1084 0.1105 0.1084 0.1512 -0.1369 0.0576
siblings_4 0.0339 0.0465 0.0339 0.0406 -0.0326 0.5951
siblings_4plus 0.0181 0.0280 0.0181 0.0135 0.0279 0.5905
south 0.3205 0.3470 0.3205 0.2844 0.0760 0.2424
student_expects 0.9074 0.8416 0.9074 0.9120 -0.0126 0.8149
suburban 0.4831 0.4722 0.4831 0.4740 0.0181 0.7882
urban 0.3228 0.3063 0.3228 0.3386 -0.0342 0.6176
west 0.1941 0.1941 0.1941 0.1851 0.0228 0.7321
pscore 0.1878 0.0993 0.1878 0.1877 0.0013 0.9880
Pre-Matching Means Post-Matching Means
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Table 36. 
Population Means for the Pre- and Post-Match Sample, the Standardized Mean Difference, and 
the Test Results for the Null Hypothesis that the Standardized Mean Difference = 0: Past 
Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention 
 
 
Note. The p-value is reported for the null hypothesis that the post-matching mean standardized differences for each 
variable from the treatment population is equal to post-matching mean standardized differences for the control group.
Mean Null Hypothesis 
Matching Estimators Treatment Control Treatment Control Std. Diff. p-value
catholic 0.1907 0.1065 0.1907 0.2175 -0.0796 0.0543
father_college 0.7243 0.5073 0.7243 0.7320 -0.0159 0.6146
female 0.5033 0.5198 0.5033 0.4997 0.0071 0.8362
freelunch 2.8467 3.4572 2.8467 2.7837 0.0331 0.3223
guidance 3.8645 3.6311 3.8645 3.7195 0.0565 0.1054
income_q1 0.1123 0.2653 0.1123 0.1188 -0.0160 0.5533
income_q2 0.2668 0.3727 0.2668 0.2650 0.0038 0.9069
income_q3 0.2608 0.2060 0.2608 0.2377 0.0558 0.1203
income_q4 0.1884 0.0988 0.1884 0.1990 -0.0325 0.4326
income_q5 0.1717 0.0572 0.1717 0.1794 -0.0272 0.5560
male 0.4967 0.4802 0.4967 0.5003 -0.0071 0.8362
midwest 0.2721 0.2624 0.2721 0.2888 -0.0377 0.2828
mother_college 0.7398 0.5313 0.7398 0.7398 0.0000 1.0000
northeast 0.1836 0.1889 0.1836 0.1860 -0.0061 0.8591
parent_expects 0.9964 0.8872 0.9964 0.9970 -0.0022 0.7627
parentinfo 0.3856 0.0743 0.3856 0.3928 -0.0038 0.8910
pretest 53.8002 50.0308 53.8002 53.9194 -0.0127 0.7052
private 0.0927 0.0677 0.0927 0.0933 -0.0023 0.9527
public 0.7166 0.8259 0.7166 0.6892 0.0680 0.0828
race_amind 0.0083 0.0100 0.0083 0.0107 -0.0245 0.4775
race_asian 0.1028 0.0692 0.1028 0.0915 0.0418 0.2690
race_black 0.1313 0.1236 0.1313 0.1378 -0.0197 0.5786
race_hispanic 0.0523 0.0911 0.0523 0.0594 -0.0264 0.3679
race_hispanic_no 0.0511 0.0886 0.0511 0.0535 -0.0089 0.7569
race_two 0.0368 0.0439 0.0368 0.0434 -0.0327 0.3340
race_white 0.6174 0.5737 0.6174 0.6037 0.0278 0.4164
rural 0.1806 0.2236 0.1806 0.1848 -0.0102 0.7550
siblings_0 0.2109 0.1945 0.2109 0.1961 0.0372 0.2846
siblings_1 0.4070 0.3610 0.4070 0.4135 -0.0135 0.7000
siblings_2 0.2620 0.2645 0.2620 0.2585 0.0081 0.8137
siblings_3 0.0778 0.1072 0.0778 0.0802 -0.0080 0.7984
siblings_4 0.0255 0.0442 0.0255 0.0261 -0.0031 0.9135
siblings_4plus 0.0166 0.0286 0.0166 0.0255 -0.0571 0.0720
south 0.3714 0.3589 0.3714 0.3613 0.0210 0.5432
student_expects 0.9067 0.8162 0.9067 0.8978 0.0247 0.3841
suburban 0.4843 0.4733 0.4843 0.4813 0.0059 0.8631
urban 0.3351 0.3030 0.3351 0.3339 0.0026 0.9418
west 0.1729 0.1897 0.1729 0.1640 0.0230 0.4898
pscore 0.3985 0.2586 0.3985 0.3984 0.0005 0.9882
Pre-Matching Means Post-Matching Means
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Table 37. 
Statistics on Parents’ College Asset participation by Student’s Gender and Race and Ethnicity 
 
 
Sample Population:
n. 2,734 2,938 3,731 582 538
% 24.8% 26.6% 33.8% 5.3% 4.9%
n. 2,566 2,801 2,968 691 1,003
% 23.2% 25.4% 26.9% 6.3% 9.1%
n. 5,300 5,739 6,699 1,273 1,541
% 48.0% 52.0% 60.7% 11.5% 14.0%
Non-Response (omitted) n. 1,137 1,208 1,011 467 311
n. 859 883 1,283 120 140
% 31.4% 30.1% 34.4% 20.6% 26.0%
n. 266 334 423 58 44
% 9.7% 11.4% 11.3% 10.0% 8.2%
n. 1,120 1,167 1,352 303 240
% 41.0% 39.7% 36.2% 52.1% 44.6%
n. 2,036 2,165 2,735 471 386
% 74.5% 73.7% 73.3% 80.9% 71.7%
n. 943 1,038 1,226 278 177
% 34.5% 35.3% 32.9% 47.8% 32.9%
n. 1,027 1,034 1,507 185 118
% 37.6% 35.2% 40.4% 31.8% 21.9%
n. 826 846 1,043 180 192
% 30.2% 28.8% 28.0% 30.9% 35.7%
n. 1,474 1,541 2,178 228 228
% 53.9% 52.5% 58.4% 39.2% 42.4%
n. 1,151 1,186 1,624 215 164
% 42.1% 40.4% 43.5% 36.9% 30.5%
4.21 4.17 4.14 4.42 4.01
Hispanic
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Category Male Female
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Combined Treatment Strategy:
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Individual Saving Methods:
Stock/Real Estate
529 plans
Avg. No. of Savings Methods 
Used by Student Characteristic:
Student Characteristics
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation +   
Future Intention
Savings
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Other Savings
Parents’ College Assets
Non-Intent (No Savings)
Sample Total
Past Account Creation
White
African-
American
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Table 38.  
Statistics on Parents’ College Asset participation by Household Income 
 
 
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
Sample Population:
n. 563 1,320 1,289 1,056
% 5.1% 12.0% 11.7% 9.6%
n. 1,573 1,911 1,033 511
% 14.2% 17.3% 9.4% 4.6%
n. 2,136 3,231 2,322 1,567
% 19.3% 29.3% 21.0% 14.2%
Non-Response (omitted) n. 739 963 589 362
n. 117 331 347 318
% 20.8% 25.1% 26.9% 30.1%
n. 58 128 144 112
% 10.3% 9.7% 11.2% 10.6%
n. 256 615 553 422
% 45.5% 46.6% 42.9% 40.0%
n. 399 962 951 807
% 70.9% 72.9% 73.8% 76.4%
n. 179 493 429 405
% 31.8% 37.3% 33.3% 38.4%
n. 105 410 520 477
% 18.7% 31.1% 40.3% 45.2%
n. 169 385 381 292
% 30.0% 29.2% 29.6% 27.7%
n. 124 501 661 660
% 22.0% 38.0% 51.3% 62.5%
n. 137 404 488 474
% 24.3% 30.6% 37.9% 44.9%
3.66 4.03 4.25 4.44
Reported Household Income
Category
Parents’ College Assets
Non-Intent (No Savings)
Sample Total
Past Account Creation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Stock/Real Estate
529 plans
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Combined Treatment Strategy:
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Individual Saving Methods:
Avg. No. of Savings Methods 
Used by Household Income:
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation +   
Future Intention
Savings
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Other Savings
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Table 39. 
Statistics on Parents’ College Asset participation by Student’s Graduating High School GPA  
 
  
0.00 - 1.00 1.01 - 1.50 1.51 - 2.00 2.01 - 2.50 2.51 - 3.00 3.01 - 3.50 3.51 - 4.00
Sample Population:
n. 28 114 362 791 1,179 1,421 1,398
% 22.8% 33.2% 35.4% 42.9% 50.8% 58.7% 64.3%
n. 95 229 662 1,054 1,143 1,001 776
% 77.2% 66.8% 64.7% 57.1% 49.2% 41.3% 35.7%
n. 123 343 1,024 1,845 2,322 2,422 2,174
% 1.2% 3.4% 10.0% 18.0% 22.7% 23.6% 21.2%
Non-Response (omitted) n. 90 211 396 556 550 513 337
n. 6 21 100 221 374 460 442
% 4.9% 6.1% 9.7% 12.0% 16.1% 19.0% 20.3%
n. 2 8 32 90 97 153 166
% 1.6% 2.3% 3.1% 4.9% 4.2% 6.3% 7.6%
n. 14 66 172 341 489 547 528
% 11.4% 19.2% 16.8% 18.5% 21.1% 22.6% 24.3%
n. 20 91 264 575 867 1051 1042
% 16.3% 26.5% 25.8% 31.2% 37.3% 43.4% 47.9%
n. 14 45 141 282 430 469 461
% 11.4% 13.1% 13.8% 15.3% 18.5% 19.4% 21.2%
n. 7 34 105 290 428 530 541
% 5.7% 9.9% 10.3% 15.7% 18.4% 21.9% 24.9%
n. 11 46 110 223 351 432 385
% 8.9% 13.4% 10.7% 12.1% 15.1% 17.8% 17.7%
n. 13 42 159 364 611 808 830
% 10.6% 12.2% 15.5% 19.7% 26.3% 33.4% 38.2%
n. 12 46 120 279 453 631 639
% 9.8% 13.4% 11.7% 15.1% 19.5% 26.1% 29.4%
4.56 4.54 4.20 4.12 4.20 4.25 4.29
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Category
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Combined Treatment Strategy:
Statistics on Parents' College Asset by Individual Saving Methods:
High School Graduating GPA
Stock/Real Estate
529 plans
Avg. No. of Savings Methods Used 
by Student Characteristic:
Student Characteristic
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation +   
Future Intention
Savings
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Other Savings
Parents’ College Assets
Non-Intent (No Savings)
Sample Total
Past Account Creation
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Table 40. 
Statistics on Parents’ College Asset participation by Whether Parents and Students Discussed College, Parent’s Postsecondary 
Expectations for their Student, Student’s Own Postsecondary Expectations, Observed Student Enrolled, and Institution Type of 
Enrollment 
 
 
 
 
 
Enrolled 2-yr 4-yr Public, 4-yr Private, 4-yr
Did not 
Enroll
Yes No  ≤ 4-yr  > 4-yr Unsure  ≤ 4-yr   > 4-yr
Sample Population:
n. 4,939 1,386 3,447 2,175 1,205 729 3,507 1,970 3,339 2,275 496 2,364 2,738
% 44.7% 12.6% 31.2% 19.7% 10.9% 6.6% 31.8% 17.8% 30.2% 20.6% 4.5% 21.4% 24.8%
n. 3,608 1,501 1,954 1,283 611 1,763 2,450 2,607 3,199 1,363 1,022 2,503 1,754
% 32.7% 13.6% 17.7% 11.6% 5.5% 16.0% 22.2% 23.6% 29.0% 12.3% 9.3% 22.7% 15.9%
n. 8,547 2,887 5,404 3,458 1,816 2,492 5,957 4,577 6,538 3,638 1,518 4,867 4,537
% 77.4% 26.2% 49.0% 31.3% 16.5% 22.6% 54.0% 41.5% 59.2% 33.0% 13.8% 44.1% 41.1%
Non-Response (omitted) n. 1,987 804 1,085 720 319 1,013 1,039 1,028 66 45 449 1,086 736
n. 1,545 401 1,119 694 401 197 1,119 572 1,080 647 137 745 853
% 31.3% 28.7% 32.4% 31.9% 33.3% 26.9% 18.8% 12.5% 32.3% 28.4% 27.6% 31.5% 31.2%
n. 516 145 359 214 138 84 372 209 362 232 50 257 290
% 10.4% 10.4% 10.4% 9.8% 11.5% 11.5% 6.2% 4.6% 10.8% 10.2% 10.1% 10.9% 10.6%
n. 1,971 598 1,338 850 460 316 1,405 811 1,259 1,006 202 953 1,118
% 39.9% 42.8% 38.8% 39.0% 38.2% 43.1% 23.6% 17.7% 37.7% 44.2% 40.7% 40.3% 40.8%
n. 3,641 1,020 2,556 1,622 886 560 2,652 1,414 2,442 1,724 374 1,747 2,053
% 73.7% 73.1% 74.1% 74.5% 73.5% 76.4% 44.5% 30.9% 73.1% 75.8% 75.4% 73.9% 75.0%
n. 1,705 500 1,176 726 422 276 1,214 692 1,124 843 177 814 972
% 34.5% 35.8% 34.1% 33.3% 35.0% 37.7% 20.4% 15.1% 33.7% 37.1% 35.7% 34.4% 35.5%
n. 1,852 496 1,328 842 458 209 1,314 686 1,208 839 168 848 1,038
% 37.5% 35.5% 38.5% 38.7% 38.0% 28.5% 22.1% 15.0% 36.2% 36.9% 33.9% 35.9% 37.9%
n. 2,732 658 2,033 1,239 764 283 1,405 811 1,706 1,283 214 1,208 1,581
% 55.3% 47.1% 58.9% 56.9% 63.4% 38.6% 23.6% 17.7% 51.1% 56.4% 43.1% 51.1% 57.7%
n. 1,444 418 1,002 633 904 753 1,962 966 904 753 151 698 815
% 29.2% 29.9% 29.0% 29.1% 27.1% 33.1% 32.9% 21.1% 27.1% 33.1% 30.4% 29.5% 29.8%
n. 2,123 488 1,606 985 595 214 1,549 721 1,281 1,041 165 924 1,239
% 43.0% 35.0% 46.6% 45.2% 49.4% 29.2% 26.0% 15.8% 38.4% 45.8% 33.3% 39.1% 45.3%
4.22 4.13 4.27 4.23 4.34 3.96 4.14 4.30 4.01 4.45 4.09 4.11 4.27
Avg. No. of Savings Methods 
Used by Category:
Parent and Student 
Discussed college
Savings
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Other Savings
Stock/Real Estate
529 plans
Sample Total
Past Account Creation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation +     
Future Intention
Category
Statistics on Parents' College Assets by Combined Treatment Strategies:
Statistics on Parents' College Assets by Individual Saving Methods:
Parent Expectations Student ExpectationsEnrollment and Institution Type
Parents’ College Assets
Non-Intent (No Savings)
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Table 41.  
Statistics on the Amount of Savings Accumulated by 10th grade, by Parents’ College Asset Combined Strategies and Individual 
Holding Methods  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None < $2,000
$2,001 - 
$5,000
$5,001 - 
$10,000
$10,001 - 
$20,000
$20,001 - 
$30,000
$30,001 - 
$50,000
> $50,000
n. 233 124 186 233 273 192 194 264
% 3.9% 19.6% 21.7% 24.2% 31.3% 40.2% 47.2% 55.8%
n. 85 61 94 93 93 53 42 59
% 1.4% 9.6% 11.0% 9.6% 10.7% 11.1% 10.2% 12.5%
n. 293 317 417 448 350 167 115 108
% 4.9% 50.0% 48.7% 46.4% 40.2% 34.9% 28.0% 22.8%
n. 521 456 655 752 676 371 296 343
% 8.7% 71.9% 76.4% 77.9% 77.6% 77.6% 72.0% 72.5%
n. 244 201 301 335 334 178 151 175
% 4.1% 31.7% 35.1% 34.7% 38.4% 37.2% 36.7% 37.0%
n. 230 163 315 417 371 192 153 171
% 3.9% 25.7% 36.8% 43.2% 42.6% 40.2% 37.2% 36.2%
n. 360 168 310 509 539 347 310 394
% 6.0% 26.5% 36.2% 52.8% 61.9% 72.6% 75.4% 83.3%
n. 236 144 223 274 265 140 141 195
% 4.0% 22.7% 26.0% 28.4% 30.4% 29.3% 34.3% 41.2%
n. 253 126 264 391 431 254 250 311
% 4.2% 19.9% 30.8% 40.5% 49.5% 53.1% 60.8% 65.8%
3.91 3.89 4.13 4.41 4.51 4.43 4.28 4.35
Statistics on Amount Saved by Individual Saving Methods:
Amount Saved by Student's 10th grade year
Avg. No. of Savings Methods 
Used by Amount Saved:
Past Account Creation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation +   
Future Intention
Savings
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Other Savings
Stock/Real Estate
529 plans
Sataistics on Amount Saved by Combined Treatment Strategy:
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Table 42. 
Correlation between Households Using Individual Parents’ College Asset Options and Number of Families Using Each Combination 
 
 
Note. Calculations below the diagonal line signify the correlation coefficient for the households that use the two individual savings alternatives. The number 
above the diagonal line is the number of households in the data sample that include both individual savings decisions in their savings portfolio. 
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Table 43a.  
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation: Binary Treatment Variable: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Matched
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.202*** 3.448*** 0.0430*** 0.0430*** 1.501*** 0.0397*** 1.594*** 0.0275 1.379
(0.0107) (0.292) (0.0162) (0.0133) (0.188) (0.0127) (0.220) (0.0289) (0.440)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 1,485 1,485 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,208 1,125 1,125
N. Non-Intent (control) 5,107 5,107 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,250 3,250
Model Observations 6,592 6,592 4,713 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,250 2,250
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.035 0.034 n.a. 0.085 0.118 0.189 0.232 0.248 0.303
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
Models using Combined Strategy variable:
Past Account Creation
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Table 43b.  
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation: Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy, 
any Postsecondary Institution Type  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Models Matched
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0803*** 1.639*** n.a. 0.00888 1.120 0.0229 1.268 0.0122 1.149
(0.0171) (0.208) n.a. (0.0182) (0.180) (0.0172) (0.230) (0.0189) (0.276)
-0.0118 0.866 n.a. -0.00150 1.022 0.0139 1.219 0.0126 1.144
(0.0193) (0.147) n.a. (0.0194) (0.208) (0.0182) (0.266) (0.0189) (0.285)
0.0459*** 1.466** n.a. 0.0245 1.326 0.0157 1.264 0.0158 1.349
(0.0173) (0.247) n.a. (0.0180) (0.279) (0.0174) (0.290) (0.0178) (0.360)
0.0777*** 1.832*** n.a. 0.0187 1.225 -0.000489 1.054 -0.00999 0.893
(0.0173) (0.272) n.a. (0.0177) (0.230) (0.0168) (0.214) (0.0188) (0.226)
0.0235 1.128 n.a. -0.0339 0.714 -0.0345* 0.695 -0.0432** 0.531**
(0.0209) (0.205) n.a. (0.0219) (0.147) (0.0209) (0.161) (0.0211) (0.136)
0.120*** 2.640*** n.a. 0.0400** 1.609** 0.0298** 1.611** 0.0259 1.707**
(0.0151) (0.395) n.a. (0.0156) (0.308) (0.0150) (0.335) (0.0169) (0.432)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 1,045 1,045 853 853 853 853 853 789 789
N. Insurance 435 435 358 358 358 358 358 327 327
N. U.S. Bonds 531 531 421 421 421 421 421 392 392
N. Stock/Real Estate 798 798 661 661 661 661 661 612 612
N. Other Savings 325 325 263 263 263 263 263 250 250
N. 529 plan 723 723 596 596 596 596 596 556 556
Model Observations 6,592 6,592 4,713 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,416 2,250 2,250
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.034 0.037 n.a. 0.086 0.123 0.191 0.236 0.251 0.310
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
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Table 44a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Treatment Variable: by Gender and Race and Ethnicity: any Postsecondary Institution 
Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0361 1.495 0.0227 1.399 0.0248 1.569 0.155 3.003 -0.142 0.489
(0.0470) (0.544) (0.0367) (0.714) (0.0337) (0.613) (0.106) (2.381) (0.154) (0.449)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 555 555 570 510 824 824 81 75 87 56 
N. Non-Intent (control) 591 591 534 534 496 496 59 59 59 50 
Model Observations 1,146 1,146 1,104 1,044 1614 1614 162 156 173 133 
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.192 0.224 0.203 0.263 0.198 0.256 0.086 0.177 0.310 0.239 
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Past Account Creation
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Student's Race and EthnicityStudent's Gender
Models using Combined Strategy variable:
HispanicAfrican-AmericanWhiteMale Female
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 44b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Gender and Race and 
Ethnicity: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.00321 1.150 0.0158 1.431 -0.000262 1.048 -0.0305 0.941 -0.0172 0.882
(0.0320) (0.345) (0.0229) (0.481) (0.0219) (0.301) (0.109) (0.683) (0.0871) (0.744)
0.0214 1.246 -0.0129 0.720 0.00379 1.112 0.00268 0.944 0.0214 0.656
(0.0310) (0.430) (0.0248) (0.252) (0.0221) (0.356) (0.0959) (0.662) (0.0654) (0.555)
0.0229 1.283 0.0227 1.481 0.0329* 1.600 0.0454 1.009 -0.00373 1.443
(0.0281) (0.410) (0.0225) (0.606) (0.0197) (0.491) (0.0915) (0.718) (0.105) (1.913)
0.0293 1.215 -0.0293 0.767 -0.0120 0.856 0.0765 1.510 0.0314 1.514
(0.0284) (0.378) (0.0257) (0.268) (0.0208) (0.235) (0.108) (1.281) (0.0939) (1.922)
-0.0381 0.677 -0.0529* 0.480** -0.0367* 0.598* -0.0141 0.610 -0.0377 0.586
(0.0334) (0.234) (0.0287) (0.174) (0.0221) (0.170) (0.136) (0.532) (0.0954) (0.673)
0.0248 1.405 0.0257 1.780 0.0527*** 2.362*** 0.0815 2.539 -0.0477 0.677
(0.0271) (0.422) (0.0207) (0.684) (0.0184) (0.724) (0.0885) (1.966) (0.0749) (0.482)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 390 390 399 359 568 568 62 56 59 38
N. Insurance 145 145 182 163 226 226 36 33 24 11
N. U.S. Bonds 190 190 202 176 312 312 25 23 18 13
N. Stock/Real Estate 295 295 317 268 481 481 30 26 39 19
N. Other Savings 112 112 138 121 201 201 11 10 18 10
N. 529 plan 286 286 270 230 427 427 33 30 40 24
Model Observations 1,146 1,146 1,104 1,044 1,614 1,614 162 156 173 133
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.195 0.229 0.208 0.276 0.194 0.268 0.048 0.045 0.307 0.239
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Student's Gender
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Student's Race and Ethnicity
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
White African-American HispanicMale Female
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 45a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Treatment Variable: by Household Income: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.191* 3.190* -0.0476 0.759 0.158*** 11.84** 0.0471 2.117
(0.107) (1.957) (0.0655) (0.298) (0.0479) (13.55) (0.0636) (2.233)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 72 59 227 227 266 247 239 238
N. Non-Intent (control) 72 60 187 187 192 192 133 133
Model Observations 152 127 453 453 536 517 468 467
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.302 0.180 0.163 0.163 0.178 0.224 0.201 0.248
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Models using Combined Strategy variable:
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
Past Account Creation
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
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Table 45b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Household Income: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.124 2.419 -0.00919 1.089 0.0654* 2.206** 0.0118 0.817
(0.0976) (1.393) (0.0478) (0.401) (0.0382) (0.856) (0.0439) (0.585)
0.0170 1.030 -0.0728 0.509 0.0644 2.163 0.00723 1.437
(0.123) (0.639) (0.0560) (0.220) (0.0431) (1.309) (0.0391) (0.857)
0.136 3.047 0.0591 1.785 0.00787 1.149 0.0279 1.557
(0.101) (2.675) (0.0549) (0.893) (0.0411) (0.495) (0.0348) (1.073)
-0.0286 0.655 0.0259 1.296 -0.00381 1.084 -0.00356 0.960
(0.169) (0.889) (0.0498) (0.538) (0.0368) (0.454) (0.0366) (0.583)
0.0436 1.012 -0.159** 0.275*** -0.113** 0.411* 0.0165 1.236
(0.152) (0.779) (0.0620) (0.117) (0.0513) (0.187) (0.0386) (0.945)
0.00609 1.125 -5.70e-05 1.147 0.0696* 2.844** 0.0806** 4.459**
(0.132) (0.989) (0.0526) (0.480) (0.0362) (1.298) (0.0335) (2.658)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 51 43 160 160 193 185 166 166
N. Insurance 20 18 71 71 73 67 71 71
N. U.S. Bonds 18 14 65 65 93 87 99 99
N. Stock/Real Estate 14 11 87 87 137 122 153 152
N. Other Savings 11 10 51 51 56 55 52 52
N. 529 plan 16 11 81 81 125 112 131 130
Model Observations 152 127 453 453 536 517 468 467
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.304 0.185 0.179 0.185 0.187 0.236 0.213 0.275
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
($75,001-100,000)
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Other Savings
529 plan
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000)
Saving
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Table 46a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Treatment Variable: by Student’s Postsecondary Enrollment Expectations: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type  
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0167 1.357 0.0298 1.496 0.0264 1.486
(0.132) (0.980) (0.0298) (0.513) (0.0292) (0.521)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 84 79 1,041 1,041 991 991
N. Non-Intent (control) 53 53 659 659 626 626
Model Observations 157 152 2,093 2,093 2,001 2,001
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.316 0.263 0.181 0.230 0.164 0.219
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unsure Enroll in College
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
≥ 4-yr degree
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Table 46b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Student’s 
Postsecondary Enrollment Expectations: any Postsecondary Institution Type  
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.108 0.514 0.0158 1.340 0.0175 1.395
(0.110) (0.370) (0.0189) (0.332) (0.0186) (0.364)
0.0815 1.969 0.00882 1.111 0.00476 1.044
(0.100) (1.326) (0.0191) (0.318) (0.0191) (0.315)
0.0895 2.217 0.0257 1.624 0.0212 1.591
(0.110) (1.649) (0.0171) (0.484) (0.0170) (0.514)
0.125 2.070 -0.00890 0.879 -0.00946 0.851
(0.104) (1.286) (0.0183) (0.230) (0.0182) (0.236)
-0.242* 0.192* -0.0299 0.609* -0.0315 0.586*
(0.123) (0.186) (0.0206) (0.168) (0.0210) (0.173)
0.136 2.716* 0.0215 1.470 0.0307** 1.858**
(0.101) (1.546) (0.0160) (0.393) (0.0153) (0.546)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 59 56 730 730 696 696
N. Insurance 29 29 298 298 284 284
N. U.S. Bonds 29 27 363 363 342 342
N. Stock/Real Estate 37 34 575 575 557 557
N. Other Savings 18 18 232 232 221 221
N. 529 plan 43 39 513 513 487 487
Model Observations 157 152 2,093 2,093 2,001 2,001
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.358 0.312 0.183 0.236 0.168 0.228
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
Unsure Enroll in College ≥ 4-yr degree
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Saving
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
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Table 47a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Treatment Variable: by Postsecondary Institution Type  
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0142 1.075 0.0321 1.230 -0.00716 0.954 0.0421 1.286
(0.0371) (0.219) (0.0373) (0.268) (0.0386) (0.191) (0.0364) (0.279)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,125 1,122 1,107 1,122 1,118
N. Non-Intent (control) 712 712 712 712 710 697 710 705
Model Observations 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,245 2,214 2,245 2,234
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.076 0.071 0.274 0.227 0.105 0.080 0.069 0.070
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution
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Table 47b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation: 
Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Postsecondary 
Institution Type  
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.00560 0.952 0.0212 1.150 0.0232 1.107 0.00729 1.025
(0.0258) (0.142) (0.0254) (0.173) (0.0280) (0.149) (0.0240) (0.162)
0.0230 1.145 -0.0121 0.955 -0.0515* 0.793 0.0329 1.221
(0.0273) (0.181) (0.0269) (0.154) (0.0312) (0.119) (0.0266) (0.201)
0.0133 1.075 0.0176 1.138 0.00708 1.031 0.00389 1.026
(0.0259) (0.164) (0.0256) (0.177) (0.0297) (0.144) (0.0252) (0.164)
-0.0109 0.929 0.00669 1.057 0.0189 1.087 -0.00504 0.978
(0.0258) (0.140) (0.0262) (0.163) (0.0294) (0.149) (0.0249) (0.157)
0.00259 1.023 -0.0422 0.762 -0.0452 0.814 -0.00550 0.976
(0.0292) (0.181) (0.0295) (0.132) (0.0335) (0.129) (0.0291) (0.179)
-0.0174 0.894 0.0501** 1.386** 0.00941 1.045 0.0472* 1.362**
(0.0247) (0.132) (0.0248) (0.205) (0.0286) (0.139) (0.0243) (0.207)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 789 789 789 789 787 773 787 785
N. Insurance 327 327 327 327 325 320 325 324
N. U.S. Bonds 392 392 392 392 392 387 392 391
N. Stock/Real Estate 612 612 612 612 610 606 610 608
N. Other Savings 250 250 250 250 250 247 250 249
N. 529 plan 556 556 556 556 554 547 554 551
Model Observations 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,245 2,214 2,245 2,234
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.077 0.071 0.277 0.230 0.108 0.082 0.072 0.072
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution 4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
529 plan
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
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Table 48a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Treatment Variable: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Matched
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.181*** 2.859*** 0.0339 0.0338 1.331 0.0349 1.510* 0.0955** 4.471**
(0.0164) (0.358) (0.0244) (0.0233) (0.258) (0.0221) (0.343) (0.0421) (2.672)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 548 548 443 443 443 443 443 405 375
N. Non-Intent (control) 5,107 5,107 3,611 372 372 372 372 352 352
Model Observations 5,655 5,655 4,054 886 886 886 886 821 791
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.013 0.012 n.a. 0.089 0.126 0.217 0.289 0.348 0.403
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
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Table 48b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Individual Savings Components 
Nested in Treatment Strategy: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Matched
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0140 0.805 n.a. -0.0596* 0.585* -0.0456 0.607 -0.0425 0.496
(0.0310) (0.211) n.a. (0.0321) (0.186) (0.0302) (0.220) (0.0311) (0.233)
-0.0374 0.722 n.a. -0.0521 0.633 -0.0338 0.689 -0.0196 0.783
(0.0326) (0.185) n.a. (0.0344) (0.192) (0.0315) (0.245) (0.0307) (0.354)
0.0793*** 1.864** n.a. 0.0684** 1.787* 0.0452 1.542 0.0495* 1.872
(0.0295) (0.501) n.a. (0.0307) (0.572) (0.0293) (0.559) (0.0274) (0.827)
0.0859*** 1.868*** n.a. 0.0399 1.375 0.0159 1.260 -0.00596 0.986
(0.0285) (0.436) n.a. (0.0304) (0.392) (0.0278) (0.410) (0.0291) (0.405)
-0.0403 0.725 n.a. -0.0845** 0.508** -0.0643* 0.394*** -0.0167 0.642
(0.0338) (0.181) n.a. (0.0360) (0.151) (0.0344) (0.131) (0.0304) (0.245)
0.0637** 1.642* n.a. 0.0169 1.183 0.0163 1.178 0.0200 1.114
(0.0291) (0.430) n.a. (0.0298) (0.353) (0.0282) (0.399) (0.0294) (0.518)
0.0909*** 1.908** n.a. 0.0335 1.527 0.0370 1.793* 0.0289 1.962
(0.0284) (0.487) n.a. (0.0304) (0.457) (0.0283) (0.625) (0.0306) (1.024)
0.0713** 1.610* n.a. 0.0523* 1.723* 0.0482* 2.120** 0.0387 2.293*
(0.0278) (0.401) n.a. (0.0301) (0.508) (0.0285) (0.737) (0.0281) (1.146)
0.0884** 2.033 n.a. 0.0571 1.794 0.0381 1.639 0.0374 2.547
(0.0386) (0.901) n.a. (0.0430) (0.930) (0.0414) (0.883) (0.0393) (1.741)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 426 426 346 346 346 346 346 315 296
N. Insurance 204 204 167 167 167 167 167 153 140
N. U.S. Bonds 228 228 185 185 185 185 185 171 159
N. Stock/Real Estate 302 302 242 242 242 242 242 227 200
N. Other Savings 169 169 137 137 137 137 137 120 112
N. 529 plan 212 212 179 179 179 179 179 166 148
N. Add Job 273 273 226 226 226 226 226 207 191
N. Reduce Expenses 339 339 269 269 269 269 269 246 231
N. Remortgage 73 73 59 59 59 59 59 53 48
Model Observations 5,655 5,655 4,054 886 886 886 886 821 791
(Pseudo) R-Squared 0.015 0.015 n.a. 0.107 0.146 0.251 0.303 0.349 0.406
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
529 plan
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
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Table 49a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Treatment Variable: by Gender and Race and Ethnicity: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0734 2.326 0.0975* 3.327 0.0974** 3.355* 0.0652 1.808 -0.240* 1.17e-08***
(0.0640) (1.621) (0.0578) (2.601) (0.0432) (2.088) (0.162) (2.344) (0.138) (1.66e-08)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 175 168 230 207 292 268 39 28 29 17 
N. Non-Intent (control) 178 178 238 238 244 244 37 32 33 29 
Model Observations 353 346 468 445 578 554 93 76 64 48 
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.332 0.337 0.205 0.269 0.219 0.268 0.519 0.487 0.382 0.245 
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Male Female White African-American Hispanic
Student's Gender Student's Race and Ethnicity
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 49b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: 
by Gender and Race and Ethnicity: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.00799 0.885 -0.0722* 0.298 -0.0401 0.515 0.201 6.41e+30*** 0.0746 0
(0.0530) (0.608) (0.0397) (0.224) (0.0322) (0.224) (0.148) (1.185e+31) (0.220) (0)
-0.0923* 0.293** -0.00835 0.805 -0.0253 0.653 -0.160 3.74e-07 -0.212* 0
(0.0515) (0.170) (0.0405) (0.473) (0.0339) (0.330) (0.111) (0) (0.125) (0)
0.0915* 3.229* 0.0222 1.247 0.0648** 3.003** -0.172 0 0 0
(0.0468) (2.051) (0.0346) (0.800) (0.0306) (1.470) (0.122) (0) (0) (0)
0.0127 1.002 0.000442 1.012 -0.000904 1.046 0.268 1.065e+50 0.277 0
(0.0458) (0.557) (0.0344) (0.568) (0.0311) (0.437) (0.188) (0) (0.204) (0)
-0.103* 0.331** 0.0284 2.055 -0.0415 0.656 0.0959 3.14e-09*** -0.302 0
(0.0540) (0.171) (0.0368) (1.291) (0.0378) (0.307) (0.122) (6.61e-09) (0.295) (0)
-0.00729 0.997 0.0447 1.802 0.0342 2.288 0.0344 3.29e+18*** 0.733** 0
(0.0480) (0.605) (0.0357) (1.175) (0.0287) (1.430) (0.111) (1.058e+19) (0.276) (0)
0.0215 1.735 0.0398 2.330 0.0269 1.334 -0.296* 0 -0.582** 0
(0.0439) (0.912) (0.0450) (2.264) (0.0316) (0.633) (0.169) (0) (0.240) (0)
0.0538 2.345 0.0402 2.587 0.0363 1.685 -0.173 0 -0.450 0
(0.0424) (1.315) (0.0408) (2.436) (0.0296) (0.767) (0.162) (0) (0.268) (0)
-0.0186 0.854 0.133*** 0 0.00942 1.281 0 0 0 0
(0.0702) (0.547) (0.0400) (0) (0.0478) (0.706) (0) (0) (0) (0)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 144 139 171 142 228 212 31 20 24 12
N. Insurance 63 61 90 71 103 92 21 16 12 6
N. U.S. Bonds 75 72 96 80 138 127 13 9 5 3
N. Stock/Real Estate 104 97 123 89 178 155 12 6 15 5
N. Other Savings 52 51 68 57 76 71 13 6 11 5
N. 529 plan 72 67 94 72 114 98 19 11 10 5
N. Add Job 97 93 110 89 149 137 16 12 19 8
N. Reduce Expenses 96 93 150 128 182 170 26 15 12 7
N. Remortgage 27 26 26 0 40 36 3 0 3 0
Model Observations 353 346 468 423 578 554 93 73 64 45
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.347 0.362 0.217 0.289 0.224 0.285 0.616 0.789 491 0.474
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Hispanic
Saving
Male Female White African-American
Student's Gender
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
Add Job
Student's Race and Ethnicity
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Models with zero standard 
error values have insufficient observations to repost coefficient estimates. The models (numerically identified) 
include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a household has 
included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are dropped from 
Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 50a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Treatment Variable: by Household Income: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.144 3.059 0.0911 2.444 0.0323 0.930 0.125** 3.708e+06***
(0.125) (2.538) (0.0988) (2.213) (0.0675) (1.026) (0.0553) (3.520e+06)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 35 28 92 90 99 48 83 43 
N. Non-Intent (control) 42 33 80 80 90 70 71 71 
Model Observations 79 62 177 175 205 129 170 130 
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.423 0.212 0.270 0.242 0.250 0.204 0.222 0.253 
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
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Table 50b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: 
by Household Income: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Models with zero standard 
error values have insufficient observations to repost coefficient estimates. The models (numerically identified) 
include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a household has 
included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are dropped from 
Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0625 0.732 -0.0586 0.721 0.0101 0.849 0.0387 0
(0.150) (1.372) (0.101) (0.460) (0.0438) (0.689) (0.0510) (0)
0.0377 0 -0.105 0.427 -0.00548 0.931 -0.0934 0.478
(0.203) (0) (0.0978) (0.322) (0.0474) (0.749) (0.0680) (1.832)
0.475*** 0 0.174** 3.237* -0.0139 0.673 0.0853 5.433e+24***
(0.145) (0) (0.0719) (1.960) (0.0517) (0.562) (0.0538) (1.387e+25)
0.588** 0 -0.00136 1.034 -0.0269 0.419 -0.190** 0
(0.221) (0) (0.0718) (0.549) (0.0489) (0.333) (0.0735) (0)
0.0804 0 -0.189* 0.242** 0.0334 1.226 0.0552 0
(0.184) (0) (0.0971) (0.155) (0.0465) (0.967) (0.0601) (0)
-0.00246 0 -0.120 0.361 0.0470 4.253* 0.0473 3.434e+13***
(0.183) (0) (0.0961) (0.268) (0.0426) (3.742) (0.0526) (1.733e+14)
-0.000940 0.167 -0.0353 0.779 0.0101 1.224 0.120** 7.811e+96***
(0.184) (0.298) (0.0870) (0.596) (0.0322) (0.846) (0.0491) (1.601e+97)
-0.195 0.00665** 0.0672 2.122 0.00919 1.431 0.105** 1.128e+83***
(0.141) (0.0133) (0.0831) (1.593) (0.0495) (1.272) (0.0496) (3.244e+83)
-0.617* 0 0.247*** 7.711** -0.0535 0 0.165* 0
(0.322) (0) (0.0883) (6.261) (0.0922) (0) (0.0835) (0)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 21 13 75 74 75 38 71 38
N. Insurance 12 8 42 40 33 16 31 16
N. U.S. Bonds 7 0 38 37 41 21 39 20
N. Stock/Real Estate 7 0 46 44 56 25 51 23
N. Other Savings 17 9 20 20 28 13 21 13
N. 529 plan 12 7 23 22 42 22 39 19
N. Add Job 20 12 46 45 52 20 37 19
N. Reduce Expenses 21 13 59 58 65 36 52 26
N. Remortgage 2 0 11 11 12 7 13 5
Model Observations 79 54 177 175 205 129 170 130
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.516 0.350 0.320 0.300 0.255 0.232 0.275 0.502
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
Saving
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Table 51a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Treatment Variable: by Student’s Postsecondary Enrollment 
Expectations: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0370 0.720 0.0864** 3.159* 0.0829** 3.208*
(0.149) (0.626) (0.0419) (1.868) (0.0406) (2.224)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 37 35 368 338 354 324
N. Non-Intent (control) 34 34 318 318 297 297
Model Observations 74 72 747 717 711 681
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.374 0.287 0.232 0.284 0.206 0.276
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
Unsure Enroll in College ≥ 4-yr degree
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Table 51b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: 
by Student’s Postsecondary Enrollment Expectations: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Models with zero standard 
error values have insufficient observations to repost coefficient estimates. The models (numerically identified) 
include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a household has 
included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are dropped from 
Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0608 0 -0.0447 0.537 -0.0425 0.569
(0.173) (0) (0.0274) (0.244) (0.0261) (0.300)
-0.240 0 -0.0181 0.717 -0.0157 0.680
(0.170) (0) (0.0307) (0.323) (0.0297) (0.338)
0.327* 0 0.0305 1.541 0.0225 1.373
(0.191) (0) (0.0266) (0.692) (0.0259) (0.710)
-0.178 0 0.0198 1.610 0.0143 1.636
(0.147) (0) (0.0289) (0.713) (0.0286) (0.814)
-0.250 0 -0.0249 0.787 -0.0377 0.583
(0.156) (0) (0.0301) (0.337) (0.0299) (0.283)
0.0540 3.336 0.0294 1.723 0.0509** 2.797**
(0.137) (49.03) (0.0274) (0.761) (0.0250) (1.456)
0.367** 9.262e+168*** 0.0234 1.518 0.0238 1.796
(0.182) (1.649e+170) (0.0286) (0.704) (0.0283) (0.930)
-0.0213 1.302e+54*** 0.0408 1.727 0.0309 1.549
(0.133) (1.163e+55) (0.0278) (0.810) (0.0270) (0.865)
0 0 0.00957 1.245 0.0375 2.570
(0) (0) (0.0362) (0.697) (0.0325) (1.982)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 29 29 286 267 277 258
N. Insurance 18 18 135 122 130 117
N. U.S. Bonds 14 14 157 145 153 141
N. Stock/Real Estate 17 17 210 183 203 176
N. Other Savings 11 9 109 101 103 95
N. 529 plan 11 10 155 137 151 133
N. Add Job 22 21 185 169 180 164
N. Reduce Expenses 21 20 225 210 215 200
N. Remortgage 5 5 48 43 46 41
Model Observations 74 72 747 717 711 681
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.448 0.601 0.235 0.291 0.211 0.291
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Saving
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
Unsure Enroll in College ≥ 4-yr degree
Post-Match, Weighted Regressions
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
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Table 52a. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Treatment Variable: by Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.00726 1.036 0.0894 1.628 0.0118 1.046 0.0641 1.511
(0.0607) (0.367) (0.0585) (0.583) (0.0674) (0.351) (0.0624) (0.566)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 405 405 405 405 404 397 404 397
N. Non-Intent (control) 352 352 352 352 351 342 351 342
Model Observations 821 821 821 821 819 800 819 800
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.072 0.068 0.280 0.230 0.102 0.080 0.118 0.115
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution 4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
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Table 52b. 
Propensity Score Matching Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: Past Account Creation 
+ Past Asset Reallocation: Binary Individual Savings Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: 
by Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0490 0.752 -0.00626 0.938 0.0207 1.087 -0.0452 0.765
(0.0486) (0.209) (0.0493) (0.271) (0.0536) (0.290) (0.0499) (0.243)
4.08e-05 1.015 -0.0538 0.699 -0.0781 0.680 0.0232 1.168
(0.0431) (0.264) (0.0438) (0.186) (0.0477) (0.162) (0.0410) (0.324)
0.00529 1.027 0.0478 1.372 0.0340 1.210 -0.000767 0.953
(0.0418) (0.259) (0.0412) (0.340) (0.0475) (0.275) (0.0408) (0.255)
0.0144 1.134 -0.0140 0.860 -0.0110 0.938 0.0157 1.144
(0.0443) (0.307) (0.0428) (0.219) (0.0481) (0.219) (0.0419) (0.332)
0.106** 1.921** -0.121*** 0.485*** -0.0444 0.803 -0.0624 0.632
(0.0474) (0.515) (0.0462) (0.135) (0.0503) (0.201) (0.0415) (0.187)
0.0882* 1.658* -0.0391 0.776 0.0441 1.243 -0.0840** 0.537**
(0.0459) (0.445) (0.0456) (0.210) (0.0482) (0.288) (0.0417) (0.161)
-0.0397 0.696 0.0814* 1.745* 0.0108 1.036 0.0792* 1.636*
(0.0460) (0.207) (0.0460) (0.499) (0.0520) (0.260) (0.0440) (0.439)
0.00503 0.940 0.0494 1.419 -0.0457 0.792 0.100** 1.934**
(0.0444) (0.272) (0.0428) (0.385) (0.0498) (0.193) (0.0437) (0.532)
-0.126** 0.429** 0.127** 2.459** 0.0623 1.348 0.00760 0.990
(0.0563) (0.179) (0.0611) (0.955) (0.0676) (0.430) (0.0592) (0.393)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 315 315 315 315 314 308 314 308
N. Insurance 153 153 153 153 152 147 152 147
N. U.S. Bonds 171 171 171 171 171 167 171 167
N. Stock/Real Estate 227 227 227 227 226 223 226 223
N. Other Savings 120 120 120 120 120 118 120 118
N. 529 plan 166 166 166 166 166 162 166 162
N. Add Job 207 207 207 207 206 203 206 203
N. Reduce Expenses 246 246 246 246 246 242 246 242
N. Remortgage 53 53 53 53 53 52 53 52
Model Observations 821 821 821 821 819 800 819 800
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.088 0.084 0.290 0.242 0.109 0.086 0.132 0.131
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
529 plan
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution 4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
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Table 53a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Treatment 
Variable: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Matched
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.188*** 3.032*** 0.0487*** 0.0487*** 1.492*** 0.0499*** 1.613*** 0.0302 1.322
(0.00991) (0.211) (0.0146) (0.0121) (0.147) (0.0116) (0.173) (0.0223) (0.326)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 2,138 2,138 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,683 1,589 1,589
N. Non-Intent (control) 5,107 5,107 3,917 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,081 1,003 1,003
Model Observations 7,245 7,245 5,600 3,366 3,366 3,366 3,366 3,150 3,150
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.037 0.350 n.a. 0.101 0.120 0.020 0.221 0.272 0.324
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
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Table 53b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Individual Savings 
Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
  
Matched
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
(Std. Error) OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.00985 1.039 n.a. -0.0120 0.905 -0.00710 0.952 -0.0182 0.810
(0.0176) (0.150) n.a. (0.0185) (0.150) (0.0177) (0.172) (0.0174) (0.169)
-0.0256* 0.803* n.a. -0.0165 0.848 -0.00499 0.910 -0.00506 0.901
(0.0155) (0.102) n.a. (0.0165) (0.124) (0.0159) (0.143) (0.0157) (0.162)
0.0493*** 1.538*** n.a. 0.0447*** 1.516** 0.0394** 1.537** 0.0293* 1.445*
(0.0148) (0.214) n.a. (0.0157) (0.247) (0.0155) (0.272) (0.0150) (0.283)
0.0579*** 1.602*** n.a. -0.00836 0.964 -0.0203 0.919 -0.0244 0.811
(0.0148) (0.204) n.a. (0.0160) (0.141) (0.0153) (0.147) (0.0154) (0.154)
0.00562 1.045 n.a. 0.0262 1.270 0.0415*** 1.356* 0.0421*** 1.450**
(0.0154) (0.137) n.a. (0.0164) (0.192) (0.0156) (0.219) (0.0154) (0.268)
0.0414*** 1.418** n.a. 0.00644 1.148 0.000396 1.106 0.0121 1.230
(0.0148) (0.193) n.a. (0.0158) (0.180) (0.0149) (0.184) (0.0149) (0.248)
0.00205 0.995 n.a. -0.00429 0.932 -0.0166 0.809 -0.0191 0.742*
(0.0155) (0.131) n.a. (0.0167) (0.139) (0.0160) (0.131) (0.0157) (0.134)
0.0294 1.202 n.a. 0.0147 1.133 0.00694 1.107 -0.0100 0.961
(0.0207) (0.199) n.a. (0.0220) (0.222) (0.0216) (0.233) (0.0211) (0.239)
0.0261 1.251 n.a. -3.20e-05 1.055 0.0111 1.103 -0.00147 0.920
(0.0183) (0.220) n.a. (0.0196) (0.213) (0.0192) (0.250) (0.0191) (0.239)
0.0882*** 1.578** n.a. 0.0240 1.188 0.0345 1.331 0.0322 1.418
(0.0251) (0.311) n.a. (0.0273) (0.286) (0.0263) (0.342) (0.0268) (0.464)
0.0197 1.118 n.a. 0.0107 1.121 -0.000973 0.995 -0.00247 0.989
(0.0171) (0.167) n.a. (0.0182) (0.197) (0.0174) (0.189) (0.0173) (0.216)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 1,709 1,709 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,335 1,251 1,251
N. Insurance 879 879 689 689 689 689 689 645 645
N. U.S. Bonds 777 777 626 626 626 626 626 588 588
N. Stock/Real Estate 1,084 1,084 875 875 875 875 875 827 827
N. Other Savings 783 783 619 619 619 619 619 578 578
N. 529 plan 780 780 623 623 623 623 623 588 588
N. Add Job 851 851 669 669 669 669 669 634 634
N. Reduce Expenses 1,815 1,815 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,355 1,355
N. Remortgage 400 400 309 309 309 309 309 292 292
N. Plan to Reduce Exp. 2,040 2,040 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 1,605 406 406
N. Plan to Remortgage 541 541 427 427 427 427 427 1,003 1,003
Model Observations 7,245 7,245 5,600 3,366 3,366 3,366 3,366 3,150 3,150
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.038 0.038 n.a. 0.103 0.123 0.201 0.224 0.275 0.328
Models conditioned on:
pscores No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Plan to Remortgage
529 plan
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Plan to Reduce Expenses
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
Naïve, Unweighted Post- Match, Weighted Regressions
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Table 54a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Treatment 
Variable: by Gender and Race and Ethnicity: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0122 0.913 0.0348 1.486 0.0546* 1.993* 0.00321 0.983 0.0249 1.169
(0.0355) (0.349) (0.0312) (0.476) (0.0292) (0.835) (0.0600) (0.515) (0.0712) (0.559)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 789 789 800 800 987 982 201 187 162 153
N. Non-Intent (control) 787 787 774 774 614 613 119 111 134 133
Model Observations 1,576 1,576 1,574 1,574 1,942 1,936 403 379 339 329
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.267 0.308 0.180 0.235 0.246 0.298 0.211 0.176 0.19 0.166
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Hispanic
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
Student's Gender Student's Race and Ethnicity
Male Female White African-American
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 54b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Individual Savings 
Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Gender and Race and Ethnicity: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0194 0.874 -0.0338 0.670 -0.0170 0.896 0.00981 1.024 0.00524 1.106
(0.0252) (0.233) (0.0250) (0.203) (0.0210) (0.239) (0.0717) (0.571) (0.0669) (0.596)
-0.0131 0.856 -0.0152 0.845 0.00470 1.030 -0.0285 0.736 -0.0163 0.916
(0.0228) (0.214) (0.0223) (0.199) (0.0193) (0.232) (0.0524) (0.315) (0.0728) (0.479)
0.0496** 1.777** 0.0222 1.332 0.0275 1.391 0.0926* 2.590* 0.0515 1.981
(0.0216) (0.477) (0.0211) (0.367) (0.0185) (0.334) (0.0519) (1.446) (0.0640) (1.336)
-0.0101 0.900 -0.0280 0.752 0.00711 1.158 -0.0938 0.420 -0.00949 0.864
(0.0222) (0.235) (0.0221) (0.194) (0.0188) (0.282) (0.0598) (0.231) (0.0567) (0.397)
0.0447** 1.590* 0.0264 1.276 0.0334* 1.442 0.00526 1.047 0.0128 1.089
(0.0226) (0.385) (0.0220) (0.334) (0.0192) (0.372) (0.0550) (0.454) (0.0572) (0.512)
0.00572 1.166 0.0301 1.707* 0.0355** 1.763** 0.0131 1.051 -0.0606 0.690
(0.0212) (0.295) (0.0227) (0.543) (0.0175) (0.452) (0.0527) (0.468) (0.0622) (0.350)
-0.0410* 0.590** 0.00720 1.016 -0.0166 0.740 -0.0179 0.985 0.0139 1.088
(0.0228) (0.145) (0.0226) (0.250) (0.0191) (0.167) (0.0658) (0.499) (0.0567) (0.525)
-0.00145 1.115 -0.00714 0.936 -0.0229 0.765 0.115 2.275 0.0195 1.064
(0.0303) (0.380) (0.0294) (0.323) (0.0236) (0.228) (0.0974) (1.597) (0.114) (0.950)
0.0160 1.213 -0.0323 0.769 -0.0365 0.676 0.0287 1.225 0.00682 1.291
(0.0265) (0.435) (0.0274) (0.247) (0.0233) (0.206) (0.0932) (0.999) (0.0706) (0.839)
-0.0123 0.553 0.0632 1.998* 0.0440 1.641 -0.108 0.446 0.0290 1.303
(0.0375) (0.271) (0.0391) (0.810) (0.0291) (0.640) (0.118) (0.456) (0.143) (1.203)
0.0527** 1.998** -0.0246 0.790 0.0278 1.329 0.0272 1.259 -0.0219 0.728
(0.0260) (0.668) (0.0237) (0.206) (0.0219) (0.375) (0.0685) (0.713) (0.0586) (0.384)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 615 615 636 636 768 765 169 156 115 107
N. Insurance 322 322 323 323 392 391 94 85 48 44
N. U.S. Bonds 307 307 281 281 411 410 66 64 35 30
N. Stock/Real Estate 418 418 409 409 544 540 88 79 69 62
N. Other Savings 301 301 277 277 317 316 83 79 83 77
N. 529 plan 305 305 283 283 376 374 70 64 43 39
N. Add Job 312 312 322 322 392 390 73 68 67 65
N. Reduce Expenses 671 671 684 684 823 818 177 165 142 134
N. Remortgage 140 140 152 152 188 188 21 19 33 32
N. Plan to Reduce Exp. 753 753 761 761 930 925 196 183 156 147
N. Plan to Remortgage 188 188 218 218 246 246 46 43 51 50
Model Observations 1,576 1,576 1,574 1,574 1,942 1,936 403 379 339 329
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.273 0.321 0.187 0.246 0.249 0.304 0.228 0.201 0.13 0.172
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
Student's Gender
Male Female
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Student's Race and Ethnicity
White African-American Hispanic
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Plan to Reduce Expenses
Plan to Remortgage
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 55a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Treatment 
Variable: by Household Income: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
0.0160 1.106 0.0939** 2.603* -0.0381 0.687 0.0513*** 884,398***
(0.0856) (0.502) (0.0444) (1.366) (0.0526) (0.279) (0.0163) (370,645)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 171 169 426 426 418 292 301 207
N. Non-Intent (control) 153 148 316 316 253 188 150 126
Model Observations 358 350 844 844 800 580 586 437
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.238 0.19 0.193 0.198 0.216 0.165 0.147 0.198
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
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Table 55b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Individual Savings 
Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Household Income: any Postsecondary Institution 
Type 
 
 
 Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0129 0.941 0.000502 1.042 -0.0366 0.699 -0.0296 0.576
(0.0846) (0.450) (0.0430) (0.329) (0.0329) (0.346) (0.0276) (0.371)
-0.0365 0.771 -0.0232 0.844 -0.00969 0.895 0.00313 0.873
(0.0717) (0.308) (0.0381) (0.224) (0.0260) (0.355) (0.0270) (0.549)
0.0332 1.142 0.0131 1.117 0.0515** 2.306** 0.0278 1.677
(0.0908) (0.592) (0.0379) (0.332) (0.0255) (0.939) (0.0229) (1.010)
0.0158 1.169 -0.0366 0.774 -0.0146 0.750 -0.0561** 0.184*
(0.0705) (0.509) (0.0375) (0.215) (0.0262) (0.311) (0.0256) (0.164)
0.101 1.676 0.0424 1.367 0.0105 0.921 0.0119 0.994
(0.0688) (0.671) (0.0375) (0.388) (0.0270) (0.387) (0.0253) (0.734)
0.0610 1.488 0.0192 1.284 0.0263 1.722 0.0153 2.422
(0.0822) (0.700) (0.0376) (0.384) (0.0245) (0.814) (0.0241) (1.610)
-0.0631 0.687 -0.0416 0.655 0.0175 1.219 -0.00714 0.824
(0.0684) (0.279) (0.0388) (0.188) (0.0262) (0.516) (0.0263) (0.549)
-0.0261 0.894 0.0173 1.147 -0.0258 0.778 0.00505 0.979
(0.106) (0.545) (0.0563) (0.453) (0.0331) (0.495) (0.0297) (0.633)
-0.221 0.310 0.00690 1.275 0.0397 2.906 -0.0214 0.593
(0.153) (0.248) (0.0561) (0.546) (0.0301) (2.016) (0.0352) (0.405)
0.0269 1.176 0.0548 1.654 -0.00114 0.878 0.0706 5.605
(0.134) (0.936) (0.0662) (0.804) (0.0531) (0.782) (0.0457) (5.888)
0.0735 1.425 0.0300 1.227 -0.0414 0.564 -0.000163 1.768
(0.0941) (0.763) (0.0431) (0.385) (0.0342) (0.299) (0.0273) (1.457)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 137 136 338 338 324 232 239 164
N. Insurance 63 62 177 177 176 128 138 94
N. U.S. Bonds 32 31 132 132 178 122 138 99
N. Stock/Real Estate 48 47 164 164 227 160 194 130
N. Other Savings 80 79 159 159 142 106 102 68
N. 529 plan 48 46 123 123 145 97 128 89
N. Add Job 77 75 187 187 156 103 118 74
N. Reduce Expenses 152 150 365 365 359 254 253 176
N. Remortgage 13 12 64 64 89 52 56 42
N. Plan to Reduce Exp. 167 165 412 412 396 280 284 194
N. Plan to Remortgage 31 30 91 91 116 71 90 64
Model Observations 358 350 844 844 800 580 586 437
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.251 0.204 0.195 0.202 0.223 0.185 0.159 0.231
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Plan to Remortgage
529 plan
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Plan to Reduce Expenses
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
($0-25,000) ($25,001-50,000) ($50,001-75,000) ($75,001-100,000)
Reported Household Income
Income Q1 Income Q2 Income Q3 Income Q4
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Table 56a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Treatment 
Variable: by Student’s Postsecondary Expectations: any Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
 Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.108 0.467 0.0510** 1.800** 0.0476** 1.767*
(0.101) (0.302) (0.0225) (0.535) (0.0225) (0.551)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 147 123 1,442 1,442 1,383 1,383
N. Non-Intent (control) 111 106 892 892 844 844
Model Observations 309 276 2,841 2,841 2,714 2,714
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.323 0.233 0.184 0.239 0.176 0.239
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
Unsure Enroll in College ≥ 4-yr degree
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
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Table 56b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Individual Savings 
Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Student’s Postsecondary Expectations: any 
Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models 
(numerically identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary 
coded Yes= 1 if a household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not 
included it. Observations are dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for 
sample size differences between OLS and Logistic models. 
         *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Logistic OLS Logistic OLS Logistic
-0.0412 0.809 -0.0129 0.885 -0.00522 0.979
(0.0800) (0.406) (0.0177) (0.194) (0.0174) (0.228)
-0.0789 0.413* -0.00900 0.908 -0.0127 0.857
(0.0693) (0.210) (0.0160) (0.174) (0.0158) (0.174)
0.0328 1.550 0.0235 1.314 0.0215 1.304
(0.0757) (0.870) (0.0149) (0.276) (0.0147) (0.298)
-0.0526 0.708 -0.0246 0.745 -0.0207 0.759
(0.0740) (0.367) (0.0157) (0.150) (0.0152) (0.164)
0.00705 0.998 0.0365** 1.491** 0.0246 1.300
(0.0788) (0.502) (0.0155) (0.299) (0.0154) (0.274)
0.0724 2.412 0.00677 1.201 0.00804 1.245
(0.0816) (1.400) (0.0153) (0.255) (0.0151) (0.278)
0.0809 1.676 -0.0219 0.714* -0.0179 0.725
(0.0696) (0.767) (0.0161) (0.140) (0.0158) (0.151)
-0.0216 1.079 -0.00141 1.003 -0.00643 0.928
(0.0783) (0.759) (0.0219) (0.264) (0.0211) (0.259)
0.0471 1.843 -0.0130 0.953 -0.0210 0.823
(0.0837) (1.444) (0.0194) (0.257) (0.0194) (0.238)
-0.0433 0.567 0.0489* 1.672 0.0446* 1.705
(0.121) (0.596) (0.0272) (0.546) (0.0262) (0.607)
-0.00868 0.924 0.00911 1.091 0.0108 1.111
(0.0876) (0.672) (0.0175) (0.246) (0.0172) (0.270)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 119 100 1,132 1,132 1,087 1,087
N. Insurance 59 49 586 586 562 562
N. U.S. Bonds 49 41 539 539 518 518
N. Stock/Real Estate 60 43 767 767 739 739
N. Other Savings 64 52 514 514 493 493
N. 529 plan 35 29 553 553 542 542
N. Add Job 62 52 572 572 550 550
N. Reduce Expenses 117 102 1,238 1,238 1,189 1,189
N. Remortgage 33 26 259 259 249 249
N. Plan to Reduce Exp. 143 122 1,371 1,371 1,317 1,317
N. Plan to Remortgage 35 26 371 371 360 360
Model Observations 309 276 2,841 2,841 2,714 2,714
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.333 0.252 0.187 0.243 0.177 0.242
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Plan to Reduce Expenses
Plan to Remortgage
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
529 plan
Saving
Student's Postsecondary Expectations
Unsure Enroll in College ≥ 4-yr degree
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
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Table 57a. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Treatment 
Variable: by Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. Observations are dropped 
from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between OLS and 
Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
0.0203 1.120 0.00886 1.020 -0.00357 0.973 0.0249 1.186
(0.0316) (0.191) (0.0307) (0.183) (0.0334) (0.163) (0.0281) (0.224)
Sample Size:
N. Treatment 1,589 1,589 1,589 1,578 1,583 1,572 1,583 1,572
N. Non-Intent (control) 1,003 1,003 1,003 996 1,002 995 1,002 995
Model Observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,130 3,139 3,119 3,139 3,119
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.058 0.053 0.307 0.250 0.135 0.113 0.082 0.084
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Past Account Creation + 
Past Asset Reallocation + 
Future Intention
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution 4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
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Table 57b. 
Propensity Score Matching Naïve, Matched, and Post-Match Models for Student Enrollment: 
Past Account Creation + Past Asset Reallocation + Future Intention: Binary Individual Savings 
Components Nested in Treatment Strategy: by Postsecondary Institution Type 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Logistic models report pseudo R-Squared. The models (numerically 
identified) include all of the individual savings variables. The individual variables are binary coded Yes= 1 if a 
household has included that option in its savings portfolio and No=0 if they have not included it. Observations are 
dropped from Logistic models when they predict failure perfectly, accounting for sample size differences between 
OLS and Logistic models. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Models
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit
0.0249 1.143 -0.0528** 0.733** 0.00196 1.004 -0.0560** 0.679**
(0.0248) (0.161) (0.0239) (0.108) (0.0268) (0.136) (0.0237) (0.103)
0.00990 1.062 -0.0166 0.913 -0.0116 0.942 -0.00141 1.008
(0.0223) (0.129) (0.0213) (0.118) (0.0232) (0.110) (0.0192) (0.137)
0.00996 1.082 0.0149 1.043 0.0261 1.152 -0.0144 0.925
(0.0222) (0.134) (0.0215) (0.136) (0.0243) (0.135) (0.0202) (0.128)
-0.0212 0.890 -0.00418 0.978 -0.0351 0.847 0.0316 1.247
(0.0226) (0.112) (0.0219) (0.129) (0.0245) (0.102) (0.0207) (0.178)
0.0435* 1.283** -0.00588 0.945 -0.0151 0.938 0.00773 1.072
(0.0229) (0.158) (0.0219) (0.124) (0.0238) (0.113) (0.0203) (0.151)
-0.0415* 0.780* 0.0572*** 1.417*** 0.0323 1.140 0.0266 1.188
(0.0222) (0.100) (0.0213) (0.188) (0.0246) (0.138) (0.0208) (0.163)
-0.00367 0.984 -0.00929 0.946 -0.0219 0.909 0.0137 1.105
(0.0232) (0.126) (0.0221) (0.127) (0.0244) (0.111) (0.0209) (0.159)
-0.0421 0.785 0.0245 1.162 0.0686** 1.392** -0.0409 0.749
(0.0314) (0.132) (0.0305) (0.205) (0.0327) (0.235) (0.0298) (0.139)
0.0275 1.157 -0.0375 0.786 -0.0684** 0.701** 0.0301 1.195
(0.0285) (0.183) (0.0275) (0.133) (0.0307) (0.108) (0.0279) (0.204)
0.0323 1.194 0.0155 1.086 -0.0404 0.817 0.0583 1.464
(0.0401) (0.273) (0.0394) (0.255) (0.0440) (0.178) (0.0389) (0.377)
-0.00458 0.977 0.0251 1.133 0.00307 1.007 0.0222 1.159
(0.0261) (0.142) (0.0255) (0.176) (0.0280) (0.140) (0.0241) (0.182)
Sample Size:
N. Savings 1,251 1,251 1,251 1,243 1,247 1,239 1,247 1,239
N. Insurance 645 645 645 640 642 637 642 637
N. U.S. Bonds 588 588 588 586 586 584 586 584
N. Stock/Real Estate 827 827 827 820 824 817 824 817
N. Other Savings 578 578 578 573 575 570 575 570
N. 529 plan 588 588 588 581 586 579 586 579
N. Add Job 634 634 634 629 630 625 630 625
N. Reduce Expenses 1,355 1,355 1,355 1,346 1,351 1,342 1,351 1,342
N. Remortgage 292 292 292 289 291 288 291 288
N. Plan to Reduce Exp. 1,514 1,514 1,514 1,503 1,509 1,498 1,509 1,498
N. Plan to Remortgage 406 406 406 404 404 402 404 402
Model Observations 3,150 3,150 3,150 3,130 3,139 3,119 3,139 3,119
R-Squared (Pseudo) 0.062 0.057 0.310 0.254 0.140 0.117 0.088 0.090
Models conditioned on:
pscores Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Amount Saved & GPA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enrolled Institution Type (Observed)
2-yr Institution 4-yr Institution Public, 4-yr Institution Private, 4-yr Institution
Post-Match, Weighted Regression
Plan to Remortgage
529 plan
Add Job
Reduce Expenses
Remortgage
Plan to Reduce Expenses
Saving
Insurance
U.S. Bonds
Stock/Real Estate
Other Savings
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Appendix B – Figures 
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Figure 1. Cluster Analysis Dendrogram Tree for Average linkage with matching coefficients Method: Sample Population of 
Residency-Based Aid Programs. G1-G15 represents the numbering for the order groups were created. The number of programs within 
each group is listed below the group number. Dendrogram trees illustrate the net difference in similarity calculations at the point when 
groups are merged. The Dendrogram trees can be used to discern when groups of non-similar programs were combined to achieve the 
single cluster. Vertical “branches” represent the net difference in the similarity calculations. 
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Figure 2. Cluster Analysis Dendrogram Tree for Weighted Average linkage Method: Sample Population of Residency-Based Aid 
Programs. G1-G15 represents the numbering for the order groups were created. The number of programs within each group is listed 
below the group number. Dendrogram trees illustrate the net difference in similarity calculations at the point when groups are merged. 
The Dendrogram trees can be used to discern when groups of non-similar programs were combined to achieve the single cluster. 
Vertical “branches” represent the net difference in the similarity calculations. 
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Figure 3. Cluster Analysis Dendrogram Tree for Ward linkage Method: Sample Population of Residency-Based Aid Program. G1-
G15 represents the numbering for the order groups were created. The number of programs within each group is listed below the group 
number. Dendrogram trees illustrate the net difference in similarity calculations at the point when groups are merged. The 
Dendrogram trees can be used to discern when groups of non-similar programs were combined to achieve the single cluster. Vertical 
“branches” represent the net difference in the similarity calculations. 
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Figure 4. Timeframe: Identifying the earliest point in time students begin to satisfy the residency 
longevity requirement to earn the financial aid commitment. Programs that do not have a 
longevity requirement are categorized as Kindergarten through Junior High. Categories are 
mutually exclusive.   
Nicolet Promise
13th Year Promise
SLCC Promise
tnAchieves (Knox Achieves)
Educate and Grow
Ayers Foundation Scholars Program
Morgan Success 
CORE Promise
50th Anniversary Scholars
VanGuarantee
Pontiac Promise
Northport Promise
Muskegon Promise
Legacy Scholars
Kalamazoo Promise
Hazel Park Promise
Detroit Scholarship Fund
Benton Harbor Promise
Garrett County Scholarship Program
Louisville Rotary Dyer County Promise Scholarship
Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars Pittsburgh Promise
College Bound Scholarship Tulsa Achieves
Peoria Promise Say Yes to Education: Syracuse Shoreline Scholars
Galesburg Promise Say Yes to Education: Buffalo Beacon of Hope
Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship School Counts!:Cumberland Rusk TJC Citizens Promise
Chicago Star Scholarship School Counts!:Carney's Philadelphia Education Fund
American Dream Scholarship Missouri A+ Scholarship Future Connect
New Haven Promise Saginaw Promise Bernard Daly Educational Fund
Aims Comm. Coll. Promise Lansing Promise Montgomery Cnty Ohio
West Valley College Community Grant Detroit College Promise Champion City Scholars Program
Ventura College Promise Baldwin Promise Newark College Promise
Valley-Bound Commitment School Counts!:Madisonville Cooperman College Scholarship
Siskiyous Promise Community Scholarship Program Power of YOU
SBCC Promise Harper College Promise Jackson Legacy
Long Beach College Promise Rosen Foundation Scholarship Bay Commitment Scholarship
The Cuesta Promise Denver Scholarship Foundation Rockford Promise
Adelante Promise Oakland Promise Buffalo Scholarship Foundation
Promise of the Future School Counts!: Morrilton DCTAG
El Dorado Promise Great River Promise - Phillips Youth 2 Leaders Education Foundation
Arkadelphia Promise Great River Promise Scholarship The Fulfillment Fund
Kindergarten through Junior High High School No Commitment
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Figure 5. Value: Identifies the measurement and maximum value the aid may represent. Single, 
Flat aid values are separated by value above and below $3,000. Percent references programs that 
use a longevity equation to determine aid award. Unmet Need is Last-Dollar funding applied to 
cover remaining expenses after all other non-repayable aid awards are applied. Categories are 
mutually exclusive.    
Nicolet Promise
Shoreline Scholars
13th Year Promise
SLCC Promise
tnAchieves (Knox Achieves)
Educate and Grow
Pittsburgh Promise
Morgan Success 
50th Anniversary Scholars
Bernard Daly Educational Fund
Tulsa Achieves
Montgomery Cnty Ohio
Champion City Scholars Program
Say Yes to Education: Syracuse
Say Yes to Education: Buffalo
School Counts!:Cumberland
School Counts!:Carney's
Cooperman College Scholarship
VanGuarantee
Missouri A+ Scholarship 
Power of YOU
Muskegon Promise
Detroit Scholarship Fund
Garrett County Scholarship 
Louisville Rotary 
Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars
Community Scholarship Program
Harper College Promise
Carroll Scholarship
Chicago Star Scholarship
Rosen Foundation 
Dyer County Promise American Dream 
CORE Promise Aims Comm. Coll. Promise
Future Connect Beacon of Hope Youth 2 Leaders
Saginaw Promise Rusk TJC Citizens Promise West Valley Community 
Northport Promise Ayers Foundation Scholars Ventura College Promise
Lansing Promise Philadelphia Education Fund Valley-Bound Commitment
Jackson Legacy Newark College Promise Legacy Scholars Siskiyous Promise
Hazel Park Promise Pontiac Promise Kalamazoo Promise SBCC Promise
Detroit College Promise Baldwin Promise Benton Harbor Promise Long Beach College Promise
Bay Commitment Scholarship Buffalo Scholarship College Bound Scholarship The Cuesta Promise
School Counts!:Madisonville DCTAG Peoria Promise Adelante Promise
Rockford Promise Denver Scholarship Galesburg Promise Promise of the Future
New Haven Promise Oakland Promise El Dorado Promise Great River Promise - Phillips
School Counts!: Morrilton The Fulfillment Fund Arkadelphia Promise Great River Promise
Flat or Capped, < $3,000 Flat or Capped, ≥ $3,000 Percent (%) Unmet Need (Last-Dollar)
 
  258 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Sub-Qualifications: Identifying additional stipulations that students must meet for 
eligibility. A program is classified as No Sub-Qualifications if students are not required to meet 
any benchmarks not related to residency. GPA Requirements refer to secondary school grades or 
test scores. Need Requirement references whether students must qualify for federal need-based 
financial aid programs through the FAFSA application process. Merit and Need Requirements 
identify programs that require both academic and financial stipulations. Categories are mutually 
exclusive. 
 
13th Year Promise
tnAchieves (Knox Achieves)
Educate and Grow
Dyer County Promise
Ayers Foundation Scholars
Morgan Success 
CORE Promise
Future Connect
Bernard Daly Educational Fund
Saginaw Promise
Pontiac Promise
Northport Promise
Legacy Scholars
Lansing Promise
Kalamazoo Promise
Hazel Park Promise
Detroit Scholarship Fund
Detroit College Promise Beacon of Hope
Benton Harbor Promise Rusk TJC Citizens Promise
Bay Commitment Scholarship Pittsburgh Promise
Baldwin Promise Tulsa Achieves
Garrett County Scholarship School Counts!:Cumberland
Rockford Promise School Counts!:Carney's
Peoria Promise Cooperman College Scholarship
Galesburg Promise Missouri A+ Scholarship
Carroll Scholarship Muskegon Promise
Rosen Foundation Jackson Legacy
Buffalo Scholarship School Counts!:Madisonville
DCTAG Louisville Rotary 
Youth 2 Leaders Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars
West Valley College Community Scholarship Program
Ventura College Promise College Bound Scholarship Nicolet Promise
Siskiyous Promise Harper College Promise Shoreline Scholars
SBCC Promise Chicago Star Scholarship SLCC Promise 50th Anniversary Scholars
Long Beach College Promise American Dream Philadelphia Education Fund Champion City Scholars
The Cuesta Promise New Haven Promise Montgomery Cnty Ohio Newark College Promise
Adelante Promise Aims Comm. Coll. Promise Say Yes to Education: Syracuse VanGuarantee
Great River Promise - Phillips The Fulfillment Fund Say Yes to Education: Buffalo Denver Scholarship
Great River Promise Promise of the Future Power of YOU Oakland Promise
El Dorado Promise School Counts!: Morrilton Valley-Bound Commitment Arkadelphia Promise
No Sub-Qualifications GPA Requirement Need Requirement Merit and Need Requirement
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Figure 7. Grade Point Average Sub-Qualifications: Identifies the minimum secondary school 
Grade Point Average required for eligibility. Programs that have multiple GPA benchmarks to 
determine different award values are listed in multiple categories. Grade Point Average Sub-
Qualification spectrum only includes programs with minimum GPA requirement. 
Beacon of Hope
Rusk TJC Citizens Promise
Pittsburgh Promise
Cooperman College Scholarship
Nicolet Promise VanGuarantee
Tulsa Achieves Missouri A+ Scholarship
Champion City Scholars Jackson Legacy Shoreline Scholars
School Counts!:Cumberland School Counts!:Madisonville 50th Anniversary Scholars
School Counts!:Carney's Louisville Rotary Muskegon Promise
Newark College Promise Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars College Bound Scholarship
Harper College Promise Community Scholarship Program Chicago Star Scholarship
Denver Scholarship Denver Scholarship American Dream
Aims Comm. Coll. Promise The Fulfillment Fund New Haven Promise
Oakland Promise Promise of the Future Oakland Promise
School Counts!: Morrilton Arkadelphia Promise Arkadelphia Promise
< 2.5 GPA 2.5 ≤ GPA < 3.0 ≥ 3.0 GPA
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Figure 8. Institutional Type: Identifies what type of institution or set of institutions that aid may 
be redeemed. Categories are mutually exclusive. Programs aligned with a specific institution are 
classified as Single, Specific. Programs that can be redeemed at a list of select institutions are 
classified as Select 2- or 4-year. Programs that can be redeemed at all two-year institutions 
within the state are categorized as In-State 2-year. Programs that all aid to be redeemed at all in-
state institutions are classified as In-State 2- & 4-year. Programs that allow aid to be used outside 
of the state are classified as Any 2-& 4-year. 
Nicolet Promise
Shoreline Scholars
13th Year Promise
SLCC Promise
Rusk TJC Citizens Promise
Educate and Grow
Morgan Success 
50th Anniversary Scholars
Future Connect
Tulsa Achieves
Montgomery Cnty Ohio
Champion City Scholars
School Counts!:Cumberland
School Counts!:Carney's
VanGuarantee
Legacy Scholars
Garrett County Scholarship
School Counts!:Madisonville
Louisville Rotary 
Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars tnAchieves (Knox Achieves)
Community Scholarship Program Dyer County Promise
Peoria Promise CORE Promise
Harper College Promise Bernard Daly Educational Fund
Galesburg Promise Say Yes to Education: Syracuse
Carroll Scholarship Say Yes to Education: Buffalo
American Dream Newark College Promise Beacon of Hope
Aims Comm. Coll. Promise Cooperman College Scholarship Pittsburgh Promise
West Valley College Power of YOU Saginaw Promise Ayers Foundation Scholars
Ventura College Promise Muskegon Promise Pontiac Promise Philadelphia Education Fund
Valley-Bound Commitment Lansing Promise Northport Promise College Bound Scholarship
Siskiyous Promise Jackson Legacy Kalamazoo Promise Rockford Promise
SBCC Promise Detroit Scholarship Fund Hazel Park Promise DCTAG
Long Beach College Promise Bay Commitment Scholarship Detroit College Promise Youth 2 Leaders
The Cuesta Promise Chicago Star Scholarship Baldwin Promise Oakland Promise
Adelante Promise Buffalo Scholarship Rosen Foundation The Fulfillment Fund
School Counts!: Morrilton Promise of the Future Missouri A+ Scholarship New Haven Promise El Dorado Promise
Great River Promise Great River Promise - Phillips Benton Harbor Promise Denver Scholarship Arkadelphia Promise
Single, Specific Instituion Select 2- or 4-year In-State 2-year In-State 2- & 4-year Any 2- & 4-year
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Figure 9. Supporting Programs: Identifies if a program includes access to mentoring, college 
readiness programs, or a network of advisors to guide students through the process of 
transitioning into higher education. Programs that do include a non-monetary support program 
are categorized based on when students may begin to access the network: prior to secondary 
school (pre- 9th grade) or during secondary school years (9th-12th grade). Categories are 
mutually exclusive. 
Detroit College Promise
Bay Commitment Scholarship Nicolet Promise
Garrett County Scholarship Shoreline Scholars
School Counts!:Madisonville 13th Year Promise
Louisville Rotary Beacon of Hope
Community Scholarship Program SLCC Promise
College Bound Scholarship Rusk TJC Citizens Promise
Rockford Promise tnAchieves (Knox Achieves)
Peoria Promise Educate and Grow
Harper College Promise Dyer County Promise
Galesburg Promise Ayers Foundation Scholars
Carroll Scholarship Pittsburgh Promise
Chicago Star Scholarship Philadelphia Education Fund
Rosen Foundation Morgan Success 
Buffalo Scholarship CORE Promise
American Dream 50th Anniversary Scholars
DCTAG Future Connect
New Haven Promise Bernard Daly Educational Fund
Aims Comm. Coll. Promise Tulsa Achieves
Ventura College Promise Montgomery Cnty Ohio
Siskiyous Promise Missouri A+ Scholarship
Say Yes to Education: Syracuse SBCC Promise Power of YOU
Say Yes to Education: Buffalo The Fulfillment Fund Saginaw Promise
Detroit Scholarship Fund The Cuesta Promise Pontiac Promise
Champion City Scholars Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars Promise of the Future Northport Promise
Legacy Scholars Denver Scholarship School Counts!: Morrilton Muskegon Promise
Benton Harbor Promise West Valley College Great River Promise - Phillips Lansing Promise
Baldwin Promise Valley-Bound Commitment Great River Promise Kalamazoo Promise
Youth 2 Leaders Oakland Promise El Dorado Promise Jackson Legacy
Long Beach College Promise Adelante Promise Arkadelphia Promise Hazel Park Promise
Yes, pre- High School Yes, High School No Program 
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Figure 10. Two-Dimension Spectrum overlay for Timeframe and Value. Community-Sustained program names are abbreviated to 
conserve space. Program alignment is based on categorization in each of the two spectrums. Categories are mutually exclusive. 
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Figure 11. Three-Dimensional Cube of Timeframe, Value, and Sub-Qualifications spectrum. Community- Sustained program names 
are abbreviated to conserve space.
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Figure 12. Yearly Richland enrollment trends, by high school graduating Senior Class, by In-
District and Carroll Scholarship eligible Meridian High School. Percentages are based on the 
number of students with postsecondary academic records at Richland and the high schools 
reported number of graduates for each senior class. In-District averages are the combination of 
the 13 Non-Meridian In-District high schools. 
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Figure 13. Adaption of Perna’s Conceptual Framework and DID Model Covariates Identified by 
Research Question Number 
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Figure 14. Quantile distribution of High School Grade Point Averages for Students that Enrolled 
at Richland; the full sample and separated by Meridian and In-District high schools. The vertical 
axis measures the range of HS GPA and the horizontal axis measures the percentage of the 
population. The area under the curve signifies the percentage of the population with the specific 
HS GPA value or below. 
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Figure 15. Graph of prior year trends for Credit Hours: Attempted in an academic year, 
separated by HS GPA quartile. The horizontal line represents a zero coefficient value. For years 
when the 95% confidence interval bars overlap the zero coefficient value, I reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a difference in mean values for treatment school and the control schools. 
The Carroll Scholarship began in academic year 2013. All years 2013 and after represent when 
students had information on the award. 
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Figure 16. Graph of prior year trends for Credit Hours: Earned in an academic year, separated 
by HS GPA quartile. The horizontal line represents a zero coefficient value. For years when the 
95% confidence interval bars overlap the zero coefficient value, I reject the null hypothesis that 
there is a difference in mean values for treatment school and the control schools. The Carroll 
Scholarship began in academic year 2013. All years 2013 and after represent when students had 
information on the award. 
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Figure 17. Graph of prior year trends for Credit Hours: Withdrawn in an academic year, 
separated by HS GPA quartile. The horizontal line represents a zero coefficient value. For years 
when the 95% confidence interval bars overlap the zero coefficient value, I reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a difference in mean values for treatment school and the control schools. 
The Carroll Scholarship began in academic year 2013. All years 2013 and after represent when 
students had information on the award. 
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Figure 18. Graph of prior year trends for Credit Hours: Failed in an academic year, separated by 
HS GPA quartile. The horizontal line represents a zero coefficient value. For years when the 95% 
confidence interval bars overlap the zero coefficient value, I reject the null hypothesis that there 
is a difference in mean values for treatment school and the control schools. The Carroll 
Scholarship began in academic year 2013. All years 2013 and after represent when students had 
information on the award. 
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Figure 19. Quantile Regression Coefficient graphs for HS GPA, Credit Hours: Attempted, and 
Credit Hours: Earned. The horizontal line represents the OLS coefficient value over the full 
sample. The line of interest represents the coefficient estimate at the corresponding quantile. 
Quantiles are measured along the bottom axis. For years when the 95% confidence interval 
(indicated by the grey area in the Figures) overlaps the OLS coefficient value, I reject the null 
hypothesis that there is a difference in coefficient values between OLS and quantitle regression.  
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Figure 20. Adaptation of Perna’s Conceptual Framework and PSM Estimator covariates 
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Figure 21. Pre- and Post-Match Kernel Density plots for Past Account Creation. The distance 
under each curve represents the full portion of the group with a particular pscore, and extends 
horizontally across the full range of pscores. The vertical distance between curves, the kernel 
density, measures the sample’s proportional difference between the two groups. After applying 
the matched weighting there should be no discernable difference in curves horizontally or 
vertically, as is the case for this data. 
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Figure 22. Pre- and Post-Match Kernel Density plot for Past Account Creation + Past Asset 
Reallocation. The distance under each curve represents the full portion of the group with a 
particular pscore, and extends horizontally across the full range of pscores. The vertical distance 
between curves, the kernel density, measures the sample’s proportional difference between the 
two groups. After applying the matched weighting there should be no discernable difference in 
curves horizontally or vertically, as is the case for this data. 
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Figure 23. Pre- and Post-Match Kernel Density plot for Past Account Creation + Past Asset 
Reallocation + Future Intention. The distance under each curve represents the full portion of the 
group with a particular pscore, and extends horizontally across the full range of pscores. The 
vertical distance between curves, the kernel density, measures the sample’s proportional 
difference between the two groups. After applying the matched weighting there should be no 
discernable difference in curves horizontally or vertically, as is the case for this data. 
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Appendix C. 
List of Program Websites Used to Identify Operational Procedures 
 
 
Program Name Website Reference for Program Characteristics and Operational Procedures
Alaska Performance Grant https://acpe.alaska.gov/FINANCIAL_AID/Grants_Scholarships/Alaska_Performance_Scholarship
Alabama Student Assistance Program http://www.ache.state.al.us/Content/Departments/StudentAsst/StudentAsst.aspx
Arkadelphia Promise http://arkadelphiapromise.com
Arkansas Academic Challenge Scholarship http://scholarships.adhe.edu/scholarships/detail/academic-challenge-scholarships
El Dorado Promise http://www.eldoradopromise.com
Great River Promise Scholarship http://www.anc.edu/promise/
Great River Promise - Phillips http://www.pccua.edu/admissions-financial-aid/scholarships/the-great-river-promise
School Counts!: Morrilton http://ccschoolcounts.org
ASU Barack Obama Scholarship https://students.asu.edu/obama
Promise of the Future https://centralaz.edu/community/foundation/promise-for-the-future/
Adelante Promise https://www.sac.edu/StudentServices/SantaAnaAdelante/Pages/default.aspx
Blue and Gold Opportunity Plan http://admission.universityofcalifornia.edu/paying-for-uc/glossary/blue-and-gold/
Cal Grant A / Cal Grant B http://www.csac.ca.gov/doc.asp?id=905
Claremont McKenna College https://www.cmc.edu/news/claremont-mckenna-college-introduces-no-loan-policy
Connecticut College http://aspen.conncoll.edu/news/3835.cfm
The Cuesta Promise http://www.cuesta.edu/admissionsaid/cuestapromise/
The Fulfillment Fund http://fulfillment.org/programs
Long Beach College Promise http://www.longbeachcollegepromise.org
Oakland Promise https://www.eastbaycollegefund.org/oakland-promise/
PACE Promise http://thesanmarcospromise.org/programs/pace-promise/
Pomona College https://www.pomona.edu/events/news/NewsItems/121207finaid.asp
San Francisco Promise https://sfpromise.sfsu.edu
SBCC Promise http://www.sbccpromise.org
Siskiyous Promise http://www.siskiyous.edu/promise/
Stanford University https://news.stanford.edu/news/2008/february20/finaid-022008.html
Valley-Bound Commitment https://www.valleycollege.edu/student-services/specialized-counseling-services/valley-bound-commitment/
Ventura College Promise http://www.venturacollege.edu/departments/administrative/foundation/programs/vc-promise
West Hills President's Scholars http://www.westhillscollege.com/district/foundation/scholarships/presidents-scholars.asp
West Valley College Community Grant http://westvalley.edu/community-grant/
Youth 2 Leaders Education Foundation http://www.y2lef.org
Aims Community College Promise https://www.aims.edu/foundation/scholarships/high-school/aims-promise-scholarship.php
Commitment to Colorado http://www.csusystem.edu/commitment-to-colorado
Denver Scholarship Foundation https://denverscholarship.org
Bridgeport Tuition Plan https://www.fairfield.edu/undergraduate/financial-aid-and-tuition/scholarships-and-grants/
New Haven Promise http://newhavenpromise.org
Wesleyan University http://www.wesleyan.edu/admission/affording/how.html
DCTAG https://osse.dc.gov/dctag
Delaware SEED Scholarship https://www.dtcc.edu/admissions-financial-aid/financial-aid-scholarships/types-aid/seed
Inspire Scholarship https://www.desu.edu/admissions/tuition-financial-aid/scholarships/inspire-scholarship
American Dream Scholarship http://www.mdc.edu/financialaid/scholarships/american-dream.aspx
Bright Futures Scholarship Program http://www.floridastudentfinancialaid.org/ssfad/bf/
Buffalo Scholarship Foundation https://www.buffaloscholarshipfoundation.org
Machen Florida Opportunity http://fos.ufsa.ufl.edu
Pensacola Pledge Scholars http://uwf.edu/admissions/undergraduate/cost-and-financial-aid/awards-and-scholarships/pensacola-pledge/
Rosen Foundation Scholarship https://www.tangeloparkprogram.com/programs/scholarship/
Emory Advantage http://studentaid.emory.edu/types/grant-schol/emory-advantage.html
Georgia Tech Promise https://www.finaid.gatech.edu/tech-promise
HOPE Scholarship / Zell Miller Grant https://gsfc.georgia.gov/hope
Grinnell College http://wm.grinnell.edu/cgi-bin/relish.dll/showrel?id=22&rDate=02/11/2008&dDate=2/11/2008
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Program Name Website Reference for Program Characteristics and Operational Procedures
Chicago Star Scholarship http://www.ccc.edu/departments/Pages/chicago-star-scholarship.aspx
Dell and Evelyn Carroll Scholarship http://herald-review.com/news/local/macon-couple-s-endowment-to-fund-full-richland-scholarships-for/article_3b27091c-6b6a-11e2-a29c-001a4bcf887a.html
Galesburg Promise http://www.sandburg.edu/Services/Financial-Aid/Foundation-Scholarships/Galesburg-Promise.html
Harper College Promise http://goforward.harpercollege.edu/about/promise/index.php
Huskie Advantage Program http://northernstar.info/campus/huskie-advantage-may-help-make-ends-meet-for-incoming-freshmen/article_77c37298-dca1-50fc-8ec2-dbf8e5171da3.html
Illinois Promise http://osfa.illinois.edu/types-of-aid/illinois-promise
Northwestern University http://www.northwestern.edu/newscenter/stories/2008/01/noloanpolicy.html
Odyssey Scholarship https://odyssey.uchicago.edu
Peoria Promise http://www.peoriapromise.org
Rockford Promise http://www.rockfordpromise.org
UChicago Promise https://promise.uchicago.edu
College Bound Scholarship http://www.readysetgrad.org/college/college-bound-scholarship-program
Purdue Promise https://www.purdue.edu/studentsuccess/specialized/purduepromise/index.html
Twnety-First Century Scholars http://scholars.in.gov
** ISU 4U Promise http://www.newswise.com/articles/more-than-a-promise-isu-4u-aims-to-offer-more-than-financial-assistance?channel=
Cardinal Covenant http://www.wlky.com/article/uofl-celebrates-largest-gift-to-cardinal-covenant-program/3755663
Community Scholarship Program https://westkentucky.kctcs.edu/academics/k12/csp.aspx
Hopkinsville Rotary Scholars http://www.hopkinsvillerotary.com/scholars/
KEES https://www.kheaa.com/website/kheaa/kees?main=1
Kentucky College Access Program Grant https://www.kheaa.com/website/kheaa/cap?main=1
Louisville Rotary Club Scholarship https://jefferson.kctcs.edu/news/rotary-club-of-louisville-to-promise-scholarships.aspx
School Counts!:Madisonville https://madisonville.kctcs.edu/costs_and_financial_aid/scholarship_opportunities/school_counts/
Louisiana GO Grant https://www.osfa.la.gov/go_grant.html
TOPS https://www.osfa.la.gov/TOPS.htm
Amherst College https://www.amherst.edu/admission/afford_amherst/index.html
B.U. Community Service Award https://www.bu.edu/finaid/types-of-aid/scholarships-grants/need-based/bu-community-service-award/
College of Holy Cross https://www.holycross.edu/sites/default/files/campaign-landing/resources/holy_cross_financial_aid_final.pdf
Harvard University https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2013/11/08/harvard-initiative-to-attract-low-income-students-includes-free-tuition/
Massachusetts MASSGrant http://www.mass.edu/osfa/programs/massgrant.asp
MIT https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/08/20/mit-moves-away-aid-policy-which-low-income-students-dont-need-borrow
Tufts University http://enews.tufts.edu/stories/116/2007/12/19/TuftsUniversityEliminatesLoansforLowerIncomeStudents
Williams College https://communications.williams.edu/news-releases/williams-replaces-all-financial-aid-loans-with-grants/
Garrett County Scholarship Program https://www.garrettcounty.org/commissioners/scholarship-program---garrett-college
Maryland Pathways http://terp.umd.edu/2.2/interpretations/
Bowdoin College http://www.bowdoin.edu/news/archives/1bowdoincampus/004745.shtml
Colby College https://www.colby.edu/news/2011/10/27/amidst-student-debt-crisis-colby-reaffirms-no-loans/
State of Maine Grant https://www.scholarships.com/financial-aid/college-scholarships/scholarships-by-state/maine-scholarships/state-of-maine-grant-program/
Baldwin Promise http://www.baldwinpromise.org/content/baldwin-promise
Bay Commitment Scholarship http://bayfoundation.org/scholarships/bay-commitment-scholarship/
Benton Harbor Promise http://bentonharborpromise.com/about/about-eligibility/
Campus and Community http://www.finlandia.edu/about/campus-community-together-good/
Detroit College Promise http://www.detroitcollegepromise.com
Detroit Scholarship Fund http://www.detroitchamber.com/econdev/education-and-talent/detroit-promise/
Hazel Park Promise http://www.hazelpark.org/residents/promise_zone.php
Jackson Legacy http://www.jacksoncf.org/page-1431733
Kalamazoo Promise https://www.kalamazoopromise.com
Lansing Promise http://lansingpromise.org
Legacy Scholars http://www.kellogg.edu/admissions/legacyscholars/
Michigan M-PACT http://www.ur.umich.edu/0405/Mar07_05/00.shtml
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Program Name Website Reference for Program Characteristics and Operational Procedures
Michigan Tuition Grant https://www.michigan.gov/documents/FactSheetMTG_153010_7.pdf
Michigan Tuition Incentive Program http://www.michigan.gov/mistudentaid/0,4636,7-128-60969_61016-274565--,00.ht ml
Muskegon Promise http://www.muskegonisd.org/career-college/promise/
Northport Promise https://www.northportpromise.com
Pontiac Promise http://www.pontiacpromisezone.org
Saginaw Promise http://www.saginawpromise.org
Spartan Advantage https://finaid.msu.edu/spad.asp
Carleton College https://apps.carleton.edu/media_relations/press_releases/?story_id=391275
Minnesota State Grant https://www.ohe.state.mn.us/mPg.cfm?pageID=138
Power of YOU https://www.minneapolis.edu/Admissions/Power-of-YOU
Access Missouri Financial Assistance https://dhe.mo.gov/ppc/grants/accessmo.php
Missouri A+ Scholarship Program https://dhe.mo.gov/ppc/grants/aplusscholarship.php
Washington University St. Louis https://source.wustl.edu/2008/02/wustl-to-expand-financial-aid-for-lowincome-families/
Mississippi Tuition Assistance Grant http://riseupms.com/state-aid/mtag/
Appalachian ACCESS https://studentlearningcenter.appstate.edu/access
Carolina Covenant http://carolinacovenant.unc.edu
Davidson College https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/19/davidson
Duke University https://financialaid.duke.edu/newsupport
Pack Promise https://financialaid.ncsu.edu/pack-promise/
VanGuarantee https://www.vgcc.edu/fao/vanguarantee
North Dakota Academic Scholarship https://www.ndus.edu/students/paying-for-college/grants-scholarships/
North Dakota Student Incentive Grant https://www.ndus.edu/students/paying-for-college/grants-scholarships/
Collegebound Nebraska http://collegeboundnebraska.com
Dartmouth College http://www.dartmouth.edu/~news/releases/2010/02/08a.html
Cooperman College Scholarship http://coopermanscholars.org
Newark College Promise https://nhapromise.wordpress.com
New Jersey Tuition Aid Grant http://www.hesaa.org/Pages/NJGrantsHome.aspx
School Counts!:Carney's http://www.salemnj.org/schools/salem_high_school/guidance___counseling/s_c_h_o_o_l_c_o_u_n_t_s_
School Counts!:Cumberland http://www.cccnj.edu/paying-college/school-counts
Princeton University https://paw.princeton.edu/article/no-loan-pledge-decade-later
Legislative Lottery Scholarship/ 3% Bridge http://www.hed.state.nm.us/students/lotteryscholarship.aspx
Govenrnor Quinn Millennium Scholarship http://www.nevadatreasurer.gov/GGMS/GGMS_Home/
Columbia University http://cc-seas.financialaid.columbia.edu/how/aid/works
Cornell University http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2012/07/cornell-affirms-need-blind-admissions-aid-policies#boxes
New York State TAP https://www.hesc.ny.gov/pay-for-college/apply-for-financial-aid/nys-tap.html
Rochester Promise http://www.rochester.edu/news/show.php?id=7022
Say Yes to Education: Buffalo http://sayyesbuffalo.org
Say Yes to Education: Syracuse http://sayyessyracuse.org
Vassar College https://alumsdigest.vassar.edu/issues/2008/04/affordability.html
Blue and Gold Scholar Award https://www.utoledo.edu/financialaid/scholarships/pdfs/scholar_2017_2018/Blue%20and%20Gold%20T%20and%20C.pdf
Champion City Scholars Program https://www.clarkstate.edu/about-clark-state/youth-outreach-programs/champion-city-scholars/
Kenyon College http://www.kenyon.edu/x39073.xml
Miami Access Initiative http://www2.northwest.k12.oh.us/docs2/ScholarshipInfo/MiamiAccessInitiative.htm
Montgomery Cty OH College Promise http://www.mcocp.org
Oberlin College https://www.oberlin.edu/newserv/08apr/access.html#gsc.tab=0&gsc.q=newserv%2008apr%20access&gsc.sort=
Ohio College Opportunity Grant https://www.ohiohighered.org/ocog
Oklahoma Promise http://www.okhighered.org/okpromise/
Oklahoma Tuition Aid Grant https://www.okcollegestart.org/Financial_Aid_Planning/Oklahoma_Grants/Oklahoma_Tuition_Aid_Grant.aspx
Tulsa Achieves http://www.tulsacc.edu/admissions-aid/admissions/tulsa-achieves
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Bernard Daly Educational Fund http://extension.oregonstate.edu/lake/sites/default/files/jamie_m._davis_rules_and_reg_bernard_daly_fund.pdf
Future Connect https://www.pcc.edu/future-connect/
Oregon Opportunity Grant https://oregonstudentaid.gov/oregon-opportunity-grant.aspx
Oregon Promise https://oregonstudentaid.gov/oregon-promise.aspx
Pathway Oregon https://pathwayoregon.uoregon.edu
50th Anniversary Scholars https://www.ccp.edu/paying-college/tuition-assistance-programs/50th-anniversary-scholars-program
CORE Promise https://corescholars.org/promise/
Haverford College https://www.haverford.edu/college-communications/news/haverford-college-replace-loans-grants-incoming-first-year-students
Lafayette College https://www.lafayette.edu/news.php/view/11885/
Lehigh University https://www1.lehigh.edu/news?iNewsID=2654&strBack=/default.asp
Morgan Success Scholarship https://www.lccc.edu/tuition-financial-aid/scholarships/morgan-success-scholarship
Philadelphia Education Fund http://www.philaedfund.org
Pittsburgh Promise https://www.pittsburghpromise.org
Swathmore College http://www.swarthmore.edu/news-archive-2007-2008/swarthmore-eliminates-loans-financial-aid-awards
UPenn https://news.upenn.edu/article.php?id=1287
Brown University http://www.brown.edu/Administration/News_Bureau/2007-08/07-105.html
Crusade of Rhode Island http://thecollegecrusade.org/tccri/
South Dakota Jump Start Scholarship https://www.sdbor.edu/student-information/Pages/Jump-Start-Scholarship.aspx
South Dakota Opportunity Scholarship https://sdos.sdbor.edu
Ayers Foundation Scholars Program http://www.ayersscholars.org
Dyer County Promise Scholarship http://www.dscc.edu/node/7061
Educate and Grow http://www.northeaststate.edu/Financial-Aid/Internal-Scholarships/Educate-and-Grow-Scholarship/
Opportunity Vanderbilt https://giving.vanderbilt.edu/oppvu/
Tennessee Pledge http://tntoday.utk.edu/2005/11/10/tennessee-pledge-scholarships-help-students-attend-ut/
Tennessee Promise http://tnpromise.gov
tnAchieves (Knox Achieves) https://tnachieves.org
William Jennings Bryan Opportunity https://www.facebook.com/BryanCollege/videos/511669513931/
Aggie Assurance http://financialaid.tamu.edu/Aggie-Assurance
Bobcat Promise http://www.finaid.txstate.edu/bobcatpromise
Lamar Promise https://www.lamar.edu/financial-aid/types-of-aid/grants/lamar-promise.html
Rice University http://news.rice.edu/2008/12/18/rice-increases-no-loan-threshold-to-80000-2/
Rusk TJC Citizens Promise https://www.tjc.edu/ruskpromise
Sacred Heart University http://www.sacredheart.edu/404/?referrer=www.sacredheart.edu/pages/23744_sacred_heart_university_to_offer_tuition_free_education_to_low_income_fairfield_county_students.cfm
TEXAS Grant https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=TEXAS+Grant&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8
UTEP Promise https://academics.utep.edu/Default.aspx?tabid=44628
Regent Scholarship https://scholarships.tamu.edu/Scholarship-Programs/Regents-Scholars
SLCC Promise https://www.slcc.edu/promise/
Beacon of Hope http://beaconofhopelynchburg.org/scholarships/
Virginia Guaranteed Assistance http://www.schev.edu/docs/default-source/tuition-aid-section/financial-aid/vgap-fact-sheet.pdf
William and Mary Promise/Gateway http://www.wm.edu/sites/wmpromise/
13th Year Promise http://www.southseattle.edu/13th-year/
College Success Foundation https://www.collegesuccessfoundation.org
Husky Promise https://www.washington.edu/huskypromise/
Passport for Foster Youth Promise http://www.wsac.wa.gov/passport-foster-youth
Seattle Promise http://foundation.seattlecentral.edu/impact/scholarships
Shoreline Scholars https://www.shoreline.edu/shoreline-scholars/
Washington College Bound Scholarship http://www.wsac.wa.gov/college-bound
WA State Need Grant http://www.wsac.wa.gov/state-need-grant
Nicolet Promise http://www.nicoletcollege.edu/about/features/nicolet-promise.html
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Wisconsin Tuition Assistance Grant http://www.heab.state.wi.us/programs.html
WITC Promise http://www.witc.edu/foundationcontent/pdfs/WITCPromiseApplicationForm2017.pdf
Hathaway Scholarship https://edu.wyoming.gov/beyond-the-classroom/college-career/scholarships/hathaway/
West Virginia Promise Scholarship https://www.cfwv.com/Financial_Aid_Planning/Scholarships/Scholarships_and_Grants/West_Virginia_PROMISE.aspx
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Table 58. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Prior Year trends of Postsecondary Credit Hours Attempted at 
Richland: MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Interaction with Academic Year: separated 
by High School Grade Point Average Quartile 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. MERIDIAN x Academic Year is a dummy variable. For instance, 
Meridian x 2010 = 1 if Meridian= 1 and if the dependent variable occurs in academic year 2010 (2010= 1). If either 
equation is untrue, the interaction term Meridian x 2010= 0. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the omitted 
variable categories. 2015 is the omitted Academic Year Fixed Effect category. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Coefficients for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid 
Amount, and Pell Grant Amount are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Standard 
errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid Award, and Pell Grant Amount are not adjusted. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x 2010 -1.647 -0.960 -3.789 -3.215
(3.237) (2.665) (2.746) (1.972)
MERIDIAN x 2011 2.793 0.191 0.825 -5.755
(1.841) (2.797) (2.514) (5.252)
MERIDIAN x 2012 -0.415 -3.179 -3.173 -5.271
(2.161) (2.333) (2.280) (3.663)
MERIDIAN x 2013 0.819 -0.864 3.305 -3.742**
(2.280) (2.367) (2.844) (1.746)
MERIDIAN x 2014 4.289** 2.550 3.509 -1.213
(1.942) (1.989) (2.269) (2.069)
MERIDIAN x 2015 5.120*** 0.368 7.615*** -1.366
(1.829) (1.795) (2.616) (1.673)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.00270*** 0.00291*** 0.00359*** 0.00442***
(0.000247) (0.000210) (0.000231) (0.000149)
Pell Grant Recipient -4.289*** -4.971*** -3.677*** -3.824***
(0.792) (0.982) (1.124) (1.037)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.00311*** 0.00278*** 0.00223*** 0.00170***
(0.000166) (0.000212) (0.000244) (0.000248)
Dual Credit Enrollee -2.080*** -2.984*** -2.602*** -1.905***
(0.549) (0.699) (0.645) (0.533)
Male 0.606 0.922 2.099*** 0.431
(0.499) (0.575) (0.582) (0.528)
White -1.605 1.120 -4.032* 0.380
(1.418) (1.197) (2.068) (1.687)
African-American -2.843* -0.604 -7.125*** -4.945**
(1.486) (1.401) (2.297) (2.238)
Hispanic -3.890 3.562 -10.98*** -0.820
(2.401) (5.542) (2.880) (2.812)
Two or More Identified -4.007** 2.421 -7.115*** -1.365
(1.618) (1.994) (2.538) (2.057)
Constant 15.23*** 15.24*** 19.11*** 13.08***
(1.990) (1.794) (2.429) (2.036)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 175 110 103 36
N. Control (In-District) 836 889 895 952
Observations 1,011 999 998 988
R-squared 0.381 0.307 0.384 0.548
Credit Hours: Attempted
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Table 59. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Prior Year trends of Postsecondary Credit Hours Earned at 
Richland: MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Interaction with Academic Year: separated 
by High School Grade Point Average Quartile 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. MERIDIAN x Academic Year is a dummy variable. For instance, 
Meridian x 2010 = 1 if Meridian= 1 and if the dependent variable occurs in academic year 2010 (2010= 1). If either 
equation is untrue, the interaction term Meridian x 2010= 0. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the omitted 
variable categories. 2015 is the omitted Academic Year Fixed Effect category. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Coefficients for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid 
Amount, and Pell Grant Amount are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Standard 
errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid Award, and Pell Grant Amount are not adjusted. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x 2010 -2.023 -1.651 -3.169 -2.028
(2.224) (2.481) (2.691) (2.049)
MERIDIAN x 2011 0.543 -2.830 0.229 -4.911
(1.702) (2.411) (2.894) (5.088)
MERIDIAN x 2012 0.317 -3.552 -2.679 -5.022
(1.922) (2.381) (2.179) (4.044)
MERIDIAN x 2013 3.238 -0.178 2.314 -3.164*
(2.171) (2.208) (2.809) (1.692)
MERIDIAN x 2014 5.592*** 1.943 2.837 -3.162
(1.882) (1.986) (2.171) (2.911)
MERIDIAN x 2015 5.989*** 0.686 6.394*** -0.585
(1.746) (1.847) (2.460) (2.200)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.205*** 0.265*** 0.366*** 0.452***
(0.000266) (0.000205) (0.000221) (0.000159)
Pell Grant Recipient -6.057*** -5.278*** -5.512*** -3.644***
(0.815) (1.046) (1.019) (1.014)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 0.314*** 0.271*** 0.245*** 0.152***
(0.000185) (0.000235) (0.000246) (0.000246)
Dual Credit Enrollee -1.350** -2.209*** -1.459** -1.525***
(0.539) (0.704) (0.664) (0.554)
Male 0.216 0.733 2.340*** 0.368
(0.484) (0.574) (0.582) (0.532)
White -1.085 0.486 -3.658** -0.584
(2.290) (1.237) (1.802) (1.614)
African-American -2.592 -2.062 -6.762*** -6.010***
(2.311) (1.450) (2.145) (2.255)
Hispanic -3.063 4.773 -10.83*** -1.681
(3.230) (5.480) (2.446) (2.115)
Two or More Identified -3.625 1.198 -7.077*** -2.666
(2.378) (1.878) (2.351) (2.000)
Constant 11.28*** 12.99*** 16.84*** 12.44***
(2.654) (1.787) (2.216) (2.038)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 175 110 103 36
N. Control (In-District) 836 889 895 952
Observations 1,011 999 998 988
R-squared 0.331 0.293 0.393 0.553
Credit Hours: Earned
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Table 60. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Prior Year trends of Postsecondary Credit Hours Withdrawn 
at Richland: MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Interaction with Academic Year: 
separated by High School Grade Point Average Quartile 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. MERIDIAN x Academic Year is a dummy variable. For instance, 
Meridian x 2010 = 1 if Meridian= 1 and if the dependent variable occurs in academic year 2010 (2010= 1). If either 
equation is untrue, the interaction term Meridian x 2010= 0. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the omitted 
variable categories. 2015 is the omitted Academic Year Fixed Effect category. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Coefficients for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid 
Amount, and Pell Grant Amount are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Standard 
errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid Award, and Pell Grant Amount are not adjusted. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x 2010 0.145 0.653 -0.879 -1.253**
(2.047) (1.129) (0.986) (0.558)
MERIDIAN x 2011 2.352* 2.843* 0.823 -0.780
(1.356) (1.502) (1.105) (0.506)
MERIDIAN x 2012 -1.112 0.332 -0.413 -0.674*
(1.273) (1.739) (0.754) (0.387)
MERIDIAN x 2013 -2.429** -0.827 0.786 -0.611
(1.041) (0.825) (1.094) (0.418)
MERIDIAN x 2014 -1.487 0.562 0.346 1.868
(1.144) (0.740) (0.591) (1.383)
MERIDIAN x 2015 -1.068 -0.355 0.948 -0.851
(1.013) (0.876) (0.914) (0.774)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.000582*** 0.000267** -0.000117 -9.42e-05
(0.000142) (0.000134) (7.38e-05) (6.58e-05)
Pell Grant Recipient 1.778*** 0.420 1.055* -0.180
(0.607) (0.660) (0.555) (0.658)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) -7.74e-05 2.81e-05 -8.61e-05 0.000165
(0.000154) (0.000160) (0.000146) (0.000167)
Dual Credit Enrollee -0.725** -0.742** -1.154*** -0.396
(0.346) (0.363) (0.340) (0.272)
Male 0.451 0.281 -0.00616 0.0720
(0.306) (0.280) (0.275) (0.249)
White -0.592 0.498 0.0993 0.924*
(1.319) (0.776) (0.754) (0.485)
African-American -0.459 1.303 0.342 1.132
(1.357) (0.871) (0.954) (0.770)
Hispanic -0.885 -1.356 -0.424 0.859
(1.609) (0.919) (1.203) (1.315)
Two or More Identified -0.435 0.960 0.421 1.356
(1.500) (1.104) (1.150) (0.850)
Constant 4.248*** 2.391** 2.068** 0.777
(1.607) (0.990) (0.874) (0.665)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 175 110 103 36
N. Control (In-District) 836 889 895 952
Observations 1,011 999 998 988
R-squared 0.083 0.070 0.077 0.068
Credit Hours: Withdrawn
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Table 61. 
OLS Regression naïve Models for Prior Year trends of Postsecondary Credit Hours Failed at 
Richland: MERIDIAN student treatment condition: Interaction with Academic Year: separated 
by High School Grade Point Average Quartile 
 
 
Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. MERIDIAN x Academic Year is a dummy variable. For instance, 
Meridian x 2010 = 1 if Meridian= 1 and if the dependent variable occurs in academic year 2010 (2010= 1). If either 
equation is untrue, the interaction term Meridian x 2010= 0. Non-Dual Credit, Female, and All Other are the omitted 
variable categories. 2015 is the omitted Academic Year Fixed Effect category. School ID Number 5625 is the 
omitted Non-Meridian High School dummy variable. Coefficients for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid 
Amount, and Pell Grant Amount are multiplied by 100 to signify the impact of $100 dollars in aid award. Standard 
errors for Carroll Scholarship Amount, Other Aid Award, and Pell Grant Amount are not adjusted. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
H.S. GPA: Q1 H.S. GPA: Q2 H.S. GPA: Q3 H.S. GPA: Q4 
Model (1.085-2.720) (2.722-3.200) (3.204-3.701) (3.710-5.000)
(Std. Error) (1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS OLS OLS
MERIDIAN x 2010 1.802 -0.631 -0.650** -0.351
(1.304) (0.510) (0.285) (0.275)
MERIDIAN x 2011 1.305 -0.454 -0.545 -0.227
(0.817) (0.668) (0.368) (0.208)
MERIDIAN x 2012 0.483 -0.629 -0.743*** -0.309*
(0.550) (0.400) (0.287) (0.173)
MERIDIAN x 2013 -0.716 -0.408 0.0290 -0.0721
(0.515) (0.370) (0.356) (0.180)
MERIDIAN x 2014 1.219 -0.108 0.835 1.209
(0.754) (0.565) (0.781) (0.858)
MERIDIAN x 2015 0.854 -0.608 -0.362 0.0972
(0.641) (0.490) (0.250) (0.539)
Other Aid Amount ($100) 0.000208** 6.89e-05 1.74e-06 -2.16e-05
(0.000100) (7.12e-05) (4.09e-05) (3.04e-05)
Pell Grant Recipient 0.646* -0.550* -0.0826 0.182
(0.388) (0.318) (0.227) (0.279)
Pell Grant Amount ($100) 6.80e-05 0.000281*** 3.46e-05 9.51e-05
(0.000104) (9.25e-05) (5.22e-05) (8.25e-05)
Dual Credit Enrollee -0.551** -0.341 -0.440** -0.160
(0.242) (0.227) (0.172) (0.136)
Male 0.0877 -0.193 0.105 0.242**
(0.205) (0.169) (0.150) (0.120)
White 0.486 0.0239 -0.717 0.112
(0.908) (0.393) (0.675) (0.241)
African-American 0.327 0.0244 -0.581 -0.208
(0.939) (0.506) (0.725) (0.507)
Hispanic -0.293 -0.295 -1.359** 0.407
(1.138) (0.465) (0.680) (0.372)
Two or More Identified 1.357 0.167 -0.768 0.211
(1.118) (0.577) (0.818) (0.345)
Constant 0.491 0.937* 1.434** 0.152
(1.013) (0.565) (0.714) (0.294)
Non-Meridian High School Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Academic Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. Treatment (Meridian) 175 110 103 36
N. Control (In-District) 836 889 895 952
Observations 1,011 999 998 988
R-squared 0.068 0.061 0.086 0.069
Credit Hours: Failed
